The musicians and Petrillo

ILLINOIS HISTORICAL SURVEY

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JAMES C. PETRIUjO
MUSIOCNT

CARL A. BAUMANN

JOE COIKUIX

LOCAL NO. lO, A. F. OF M.

Chicago Federation

CHICAGO 2, ILL.

To all members of the Chicago Federation of
Musicians :

This book THE MUSICIANS and PETRILLO is sent to
you with the compliments of the Chicago Federation
of Musicians by order of the Board of Directors
of Local No. 10.

Fraternally yours,

^u^^i a,^^6e^>

Recording Secretary

JAMES CAESAR PETRILLO

The Musicians and Petrillo

By
ROBERT D. LEITER

BOOKMAN ASSOCIATES, INC.

New York

Copyright 1953 by
Bookman Associates, Inc.

All rights reserved

No part of this book may be reproduced

without permission from the publisher.

Reviewers may quote brief passages.

First edition

First Printing, June 1953
Second Printing, September 1953

145

Manufactured in the United States of America

To the memories of

my mother, gussie

and

my father, j. heschel

CONTENTS

Preface 7

Chapter 1 The Musicians Form a Union 9

Chapter 2 The Union Gains Prestige and Status 26

Chapter 3 Enter James Caesar Petrillo 42

Chapter 4 The Musicians Encounter Technology 54

Chapter 5 The Supremacy of the National Union 75

Chapter 6 The Jurisdiction and Operation of a Local 94

Chapter 7 Petrillo Removes Two Thorns 112

Chapter 8 The Record Ban in 1942 or Roosevelt

Couldn't End That One 132

Chapter 9 How the Interlochen Dispute Led

to the Lea Act 149

Chapter 10 Petrillo Stabilizes Labor Relations 164

Chapter 11 Petrillo Marches On— Technological Prob-
lems Remain 181

Notes 188

Bibliography 196

Index 198

PREFACE

The story of the musicians union is a study in personalities,
power, and technological change. For more than half a century
the union of musicians— the American Federation of Musicians-
has been dominated by forceful leaders who, when they desired,
have imposed their wishes upon the organization. These men
generally have adhered scrupulously to the laws and rules of the
union; but at the same time the laws have been so formulated
that the international president has been able, if he deemed it
necessary, to balk the desires of the majority of the members.

The power of the union is evident not only in the internal
affairs of the organization, but in the union's relations with
employers. The American Federation of Musicians exercises
complete control over professional musicians in the United
States. A musician who is not in the union normally cannot
earn a livelihood by playing an instrument. The union fre-
quently has been able to impose the terms of employment upon
employers without negotiation. Some employers and some agents
have been required to secure licenses from the union before
being able to hire or deal with musicians.

The judicial functions performed by the AFM have made it
unnecessary and unusual for members or employers to appeal to
the courts. Claims are collected for members or employers, fines
are imposed, and regulations are enforced. The ability of the
union to expel a member or to put an employer on the unfair
list and thereby make it impossible for him to obtain the
services of musicians has proved sufficiently effective in enforc-
ing its decisions.

Inventions have changed the forms and types of music which
the public hears. These technological advances have impinged
on the employment opportunities of musicians and have raised
problems and issues which have been the concern of the public
for many years. The activities of musicians are closely connected
with the entertainment industry and have therefore aroused
more popular interest than the work of most other laborers. Only

during the last few years, however, has some progress been made
in solving a few of these problems.

This book traces the development and growth of the union
as an economic force. It begins with the earliest attempts to
unionize musicians in the United States and carries the narra-
tive to the present time. It considers the various problems which
arose, the impact of the actions of musicians on other sectors of
the economy, and the personalities of the men who shaped the
destiny of the union. Throughout its existence, the American
Federation of Musicians has been involved in a competitive
struggle. At first organized musicians were faced with the com-
petition of the nonunionized instrumentalists. When this prob-
lem was essentially solved, it was replaced by the more serious
and complicated one involving the competitive force of tech-
nology.

This study was made over a period of several years. It involved
a careful examination of every issue of the monthly newspapers
of the international union and of the New York local, of the
periodicals of several other locals, and of official documents
released by the union. Clipping files and newspaper indexes
were consulted. Numerous magazine articles dealing with the
musicians and with James Caesar Petrillo were studied. All the
Congressional hearings and reports connected with this union
were analyzed. Relevant publications issued by trade associa-
tions and by interested employers were read. Many books were
checked for pertinent information.

Scores of conferences and interviews were held with represen-
tatives of management, with elected and appointed officials of
the international union and of several locals, and with persons
interested in music. Many working musicians, some of whom
were my students at the time of the discussions, supplied various
types of information. To all of these persons, a great number
of whom have asked to remain anonymous, I express my
gratitude.

R.D.L.
City College of New York
June 1, 1953

THE MUSICIANS FORM A UNION

1

". . . by far the most marked progress our organization
has made was made by reason of its readiness to confer
with the employer and settle controversies over the con-
ference table."

JOSEPH NICHOLAS WEBER

• The Place of the Musician in the Nineteenth Century

Musicians represent a respected group in the labor force today,
but they did not always enjoy such status. For centuries musi-
cians, along with actors, magicians, acrobats, hypnotists, and
other performers, in general, were regarded as peculiar persons.
The ability to play an instrument was considered by many people
to be strange. The public was especially suspicious of those men
who supplemented their musical performance with other feats
in order to earn a livelihood. Such cases were not unusual. An
application letter from a musician written during the Middle
Ages and preserved at Oxford University says: "I can play the
lute and the pipe, the harp, the organistrum, the bagpipe and
the tabor. I can throw knives and catch them without cutting
myself. I can tell a tale against any man and make love verses for
the ladies. I can move tables and juggle the chairs. I can turn
somersaults and stand on my head."1

Musicians were looked upon askance in the United States
throughout the nineteenth century. Since then, however, their
prestige has risen. A number of factors have been responsible for
the change.

A competent musician had to have both talent and skill. Yet
before the twentieth century, only in rare cases was he able to
make a living by working solely as a musician. Employment op-
portunities were not good. Permanent symphony orchestras
were found only in a few of the largest cities. There were not
many big bands, and several of those in existence were found in
state penitentiaries. Musicians were limited essentially to playing
at dances, picnics, serenades, and funerals.

10

The struggle by musicians to improve their economic status
was similar in many ways to those engaged in by other workers;
but in various respects it had its own characteristics. Music at
first was not classified either as a trade or as a profession. But
musicians formed labor associations by the second half of the
nineteenth century and in this regard they acted like other
skilled workers.

Unskilled workers usually lacked the education, intelligence,
experience, and energy, to set up permanent organizations for
their own advantage. Workers with skills had higher standards of
living and more opportunity to examine their status and plan
for the advancement of their interests. The craftsmen in the
larger cities were the first to form labor unions.

These unions, however, did not have the same purposes as
those in existence today. Twentieth-century trade unions are con-
cerned mainly with the improvement of wages, hours, and con-
ditions of work. During the first part of the nineteenth century
the right of workers to engage in such activities was not estab-
lished legally. Concerted demands upon employers often were
considered conspiracies in restraint of trade. The first labor
unions therefore were social organizations. Frequently, they
functioned as mutual insurance organizations and members
would be entitled to sick benefits, death benefits, and unemploy-
ment benefits. By the middle of the century rulings of the judi-
ciary established the right of workers to organize and exert eco-
nomic strength in order to improve their economic position.

Shoemakers, carpenters, printers, and tailors established labor
organizations. Professional groups like teachers, lawyers, and
doctors, even when employed by others, were not affected by
unionization. Feelings of independence and of being able to
advance through the exercise of initiative always have dominated
the thinking of professional employees. During the nineteenth
century musicians stood midway between these groups.

The long period of training and experience necessary to per-
form satisfactorily on an instrument provided an aspect of pro-
fessionalism to the work of musicians. Manual skills and dexteri-
ty had to be present but they were subordinate to musical instinct
and intuition. Yet as in the case of other skilled workers, the
greatest efficiency of the musician, especially on wind instru-
ments, usually is achieved at a comparatively early age. The con-

11

ditions surrounding the economic life of the musician were un-
favorable and the opportunities for improving his status were
limited. The standards and codes of the nineteenth century
frowned upon the work of the musician. Entertainers were sup-
posed to represent an inferior social class and they were shunned
in the social intercourse of the community.

Though rapid movement from one social class to another was
still possible, the establishment of trade unions was one of the
first signs of more rigid stratification of classes; it marked the
acceptance of this condition by the wage earners. Many musicians
liked to think that they were part of a professional class but they
were not completely correct because the public was not impressed
with their qualifications. The audience usually expected the
musician to perform a vaudeville act as well as to play an in-
strument.

Orchestras were expected to take part in minstrel shows. Musi-
cians blackened their faces and became end men and jesters.
Music was a public attraction in many parts of the United States
only if it was supplemented by some unusual demonstration. A
pianist would fasten sleigh bells to his legs, bands would rein-
force sound effects with cannon shots, musicians would execute
400 notes in one measure, or singers would sing 600 words and
300 bars of music in four minutes. Freak stunts were part of the
usual routine by which musicians earned a living. During the
nineteenth century, most of the musicians who stuck to music
only, were barely able to eke out an existence. They played at
picnics, in theater pits, in churches, at grange halls, in dance
halls, and at parades. Employment was unsteady and conditions
of work were poor.

Generally, musicians have no permanent employer but con-
stantly are seeking new jobs. In this respect the work of musicians
is different from that of employees in other fields where the em-
ployer hires workers for relatively long periods of time and where
the hours and conditions of work are more regular. Within a short
span of time, a musician may be employed by many men, each
of whom operates a different type of establishment— for example,
theater, night club, restaurant, catering hall, symphony, or fra-
ternal organization. Musicians have to move from one place of
work to another. Usually such travel occurs only within one town
or city but many performers lead an itinerant existence. They

12

search for employment opportunities throughout the country
and thereby create problems for musicians who stay in one
locality.

Music differs also from most other occupations in that a large
number of musicians are not working as instrumentalists all the
time. These men have a regular trade or occupation but play an
instrument to add to their incomes. They are known as the semi-
professional musicians and are distinguished from the group
of professional musicians whose full time normally is devoted
to the rendition of music. (Nonprofessional musicians receive
no income for their performance.)

These peculiarities of the musical field have led to an unusual
method of employing personnel. The hiring system depends
upon a contractor. When a band or orchestra is needed for
any function or engagement, the employer hires a contractor,
who is more familiar with the talent available, to secure the
necessary personnel. The musicians are supervised by the con-
tractor and the employer. Formerly, the generally weak eco-
nomic position of the musician was a severe handicap to him.
Since employment was not steady, he was competing constantly
with his fellows for the available positions. Straitened circum-
stances made him willing to accept a lower price and thereby
tended to force his wages down. In addition, competition be-
tween contractors to secure the engagement from the employer
tended to reduce the remuneration of the musician still further
because the contractor had less money to distribute among the
men. By quoting a lower price to the purchaser of music, the
contractor was forced to lower the wage scale of the instru-
mentalist.

The first musicians unions were not organized to alleviate
adverse economic conditions among the membership. These
unions comprised the elite among instrumental performers.
They maintained an element of exclusiveness by setting rigor-
ous entrance requirements; and inferior performers at first were
not admitted to these organizations. An air of fraternalism pre-
vailed in them. Basically they were social clubs where members
could get together for discussions and entertainment.

In most of these early unions the German element predomi-
nated. Such, for example, was the typical case of the St. Louis
local of musicians where an analysis of the national origin of

13

the 191 members disclosed that in 1888, 78 came from Germany
and only 65 were born in the United States. By 1910, however,
when the local had 835 members, it was found that 660 of them
were born in the United States. Germany fell to the second
rank, contributing only 77 members.2

A large number of the band and orchestra leaders of that
time were saloon keepers.3 Many members of the bands were
recruited from among the beer drinkers in these saloons. In
Cincinnati, the local union of musicians was organized as a
result of the actions of some of the younger instrumentalists
who wished to rid themselves of the arbitrary control exercised
by the leaders. These younger men organized a union in order
to force the bandmaster to come to them when he needed musi-
cians. In order to further strengthen their position, they also
organized a cooperative saloon so that musicians would stay out
of the rival establishments (where hiring took place) ; but this
venture was short-lived.

It is true that these unions were interested in the welfare of
musicians and would take steps to protect their members if the
occasion made such action urgent, but for many years they
were concerned mainly with enforcing certain rules applying
to benevolent programs which they had set up; a program of
death benefits was most typical. The musicians' organizations
were interested in presenting programs for the entertainment
of the public, planning affairs for their own enjoyment, and
engaging in "social hilarity." Only late in the century were
attempts made to enforce performance price lists.

Though Baltimore and Chicago had musicians unions as
early as 1857, the first organization of a group of musicians
whose purposes and objectives were clearly those of a trade
union usually is considered to have taken place in New York
City. In 1863, under the leadership of Henry D. Beissenherz, a
union was formed. The following year, the organization was
chartered under the laws of New York State. (It was customary
for labor unions to incorporate during that era.) In the suc-
ceeding decade, organization was very rapid and many cities in
the East and Midwest formed musical unions.

• National Organizations of Musicians
The local in Philadelphia took the initiative in 1871 and

14

called a meeting of the various independent musical unions in
the country. It was decided to establish a national organization
in order to deal with matters of common interest to musicians
and to tackle the problems caused by the competition faced by
members of each local from traveling musicians and road
shows. The organization, which was known as the National
Musical Association, held several conventions, but it endured
less than ten years. It never comprised more than 17 locals and
its activities were rather limited. It could accomplish nothing
because the constituent locals themselves were lacking in author-
ity and power.

By 1885 many unions of musicians had secured a firmer foot-
hold in their jurisdictions and under the leadership of the
Cincinnati local a meeting was called for 1886 in New York
City. Seven unions were represented— Cincinnati, New York,
Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Milwaukee, and Detroit— and
they agreed to form the National League of Musicians of the
United States. The members of the League remained essenti-
ally independent locals and retained final authority over all
matters in which they were concerned.

The growth of the NLM was rapid. It had 15 locals in 1887,
and by 1896, it had 9,000 members in 79 locals. These units
were scattered all over the United States. The debates in the
conventions held by the League engendered much factional
strife and bitterness over the question of whether musicians
were artists and professionals or whether they were laborers.
Those musicians who claimed they had little in common with
workers in manufacturing and construction activity derisively
called the other faction "stove polishers," "stove molders," and
"shoe makers." The element which considered itself to be
laborers called its opponents "silk hats," "toppers," and "Prince
Alberts." It was not uncommon for delegates at the annual
conventions of the NLM to wear Prince Albert coats, silk hats,
and patent leather shoes. In 1887 the NLM voted down a reso-
lution recommended by its president which declared that musi-
cians were "laborers in the field of music."4

Affiliation with the American Federation of Labor hinged on
this issue. The AFL which had its inception in 1881, was ex-
panding its membership and desired to include all the organ-
ized musicians. The Knights of Labor, a rival national organi-

15

zation of workers, which attained its peak membership in the
middle of the 1880's, also wanted to enroll the musicians. Indi-
vidual locals had the choice of joining either the AFL or the
Knights, or of remaining independent; and all three alternatives
had its adherents. The Knights of Labor, however, soon weak-
ened and became of negligible importance in the labor move-
ment, so that the issue which crystallized for each of the locals
was whether or not to join the AFL. Beginning with the second
NLM convention, in 1887, the AFL regularly invited the NLM
to affiliate with it, but was regularly turned down. The faction
opposing affiliation maintained that musicians had little in
common with other workers or their unions, and that the
musicians union would suffer a loss in dignity and prestige by
affiliation. Those men who desired to join the AFL countered
with the argument that musicians, like other laborers, were
wage earners and that their conditions could be improved more
effectively if they combined with the general labor movement.
The president of the NLM reported to the 1891 convention:
"Concerning the affiliation of the League with the American
Federation of Labor, which has been urged repeatedly, thus
far without success, those for and against appear to be about
evenly divided, with the probability that a majority would
favor affiliation, provided it did not involve a surrender of the
League's independence. It is a serious question, and the ad-
visability of refraining from committing the League to either
side of the questions at issue between Capital and Labor should
receive your most earnest consideration."5

Although a majority of the locals desired to affiliate, the
voting procedure made such a step difficult. The element which
opposed affiliation (that is, the group which considered itself
professional) was centralized in New York and the other metro-
politan areas in the East. It had a much greater membership
than the other faction and therefore heavier voting strength
in the conventions. Furthermore, the newer Western locals,
which were more inclined to affiliate, were generally unable to
afford the expenses of delegates and did not send any. The
New York local, which opposed affiliation, had from 26 to 30
votes in a convention that never had more than 125 votes.

The American Federation of Labor, therefore, undertook to
charter locals of musicians directly, until there would be enough

16

of them so that it could create a national union within its own
ranks. By 1895, a large majority of the locals of the NLM were
affiliated with the AFL either directly or indirectly. Some of
the locals in the League had been chartered directly by the
AFL and other unions of musicians were indirectly connected
with the AFL through affiliation with the central labor bodies
in their respective cities.

•. The American Federation of Musicians

The convention of the AFL in that year authorized President
Samuel Gompers to give the NLM one final opportunity to
join the AFL. The understanding was that a new national
union would be organized if the offer should be rejected. When
the NLM, by a tie vote, decided not to join the AFL, Gompers
issued a call for a national convention of musicians unions to
meet on October 19, 1896. Twenty-six unions representing 24
localities responded to the convention notice by sending either
a delegate or a letter. Of these 26, 17 were in the NLM and
nine were independent. The delegates represented 4,000 mem-
bers, 886 of whom were not members of the League.6 The
convention successfully organized the American Federation of
Musicians, and received a national charter on November 6,
1896. Owen Miller was elected the first president of the new
union.

The AFM desired to avoid jurisdictional difficulties with the
NLM. Some of the unions which were independent of the NLM
had accepted members from jurisdictions claimed by League
locals. In all cases, locals of the NLM were given preference in
joining the AFM over other locals in the same areas. Most of
the NLM locals were soon members of both organizations. The
leaders of the NLM, however, battled those League locals
which had joined the American Federation of Musicians. When
the 1897 convention of the NLM was held, an attempt was
made to bar the delegates from those locals which were also
members of the AFM. But the delegates secured a court in-
junction which ordered the NLM leaders to admit them to the
convention. From that time on, the NLM began to decline, and
it subsequently never was able to regain its former prestige.

The somewhat prolonged struggle which ensued between the
party in the NLM which opposed affiliation, built around the

17

Musical Mutual Protective Union of New York, and the
American Federation of Musicians finally ended with a com-
plete victory by the AFM over the NLM. The National League
of Musicians distributed its funds among its component locals
and was dissolved at its convention in 1904. "Grand Old Man"
Beissenherz, who had been the temporary chairman of the
first AFM convention, presided over the final sessions.

The disintegration of the National League of Musicians was
not a serious calamity to the musicians. The NLM had failed
to assist the locals in improving wages, hours, and other em-
ployment conditions. It never had the opportunity to carry
out what should have been its chief purposes and functions
because it was mainly a forum. The loose nature of its organ-
ization, under which the locals retained most of the authority
and discretion, did not give it any cohesiveness. The only unit-
ing element in the League was the national death benefit scheme
which it had set up and supervised.

The major problem which had faced the NLM was the jeal-
ousy and rivalry among the locals. The weaknesses of the League
all stemmed from this condition. The attempt to establish a
national death benefit scheme which would operate smoothly
was a failure. Complaints were leveled against the assessment
plan because some locals were receiving more money in bene-
fits than they were paying in as premiums. Such unequal dis-
tribution is to be expected under any insurance plan and atti-
tudes of resentment which emerged were not conducive to the
satisfactory operation of the plan.

Each local was distrustful of its neighbors and carefully
guarded its own jurisdiction. The League required member
musicians to seek employment only in their own locality. This
rule was desired by the locals and was aimed at keeping musi-
cians out of the jurisdiction of locals other than the one to
which they belonged. Each local believed that by building a
wall around itself, it would pre-empt the employment oppor-
tunities in its own area. But this did not happen because the
rule was unenforceable; and it became a dead letter. It was
not possible to keep qualified musicians from taking jobs in
areas other than their home base when an employer desired
to hire them.

The effectiveness of the League was even further curtailed

18

because there was no provision for an adequate transfer system.
Musicians had no simple or convenient way of changing their
local affiliation. This worked undue hardships upon them and
weakened the structure and value of the NLM. Musicians who
found it necessary to move about freely practiced an outright
disregard of the rules.

Each union of musicians believed that the device of restrict-
ing the membership of the local would benefit its own mem-
bers. Behind this policy was the mistaken notion that only
union musicians were capable of securing employment. The
unions refused to recognize their own limitations and weak-
nesses during this formative period. Before 1900, they almost
never had control of any sizable segment of the employers of
musicians in any city. The entrance requirements set by the
unions, particularly in the East, were designed to exclude musi-
cians rather than select qualified performers. Examinations for
admission were discriminatory, arbitrary, and unduly difficult;
and initiation fees were exorbitant. Favoritism towards certain
nationalities was practiced. It is no wonder that these prac-
tices increased rather than lessened competition among musi-
cians. Not only was the existence of a nonunion group encour-
aged, but rival unions flourished in many cities.

The voting system of the League was poorly devised. Though
apparently democratic in that all matters were decided on the
basis of a majority of the full membership, the conditions and
circumstances of the organization at that time were not pro-
pitious to the utilization of this voting procedure. Since the
number of votes of each local in the convention was based upon
its membership figures, undue advantage was given to certain
locals. The few largest musical unions were able to dominate
the convention. New York, in combination with a few other
Eastern locals, was able to prevail on most issues. This was
especially true because the smaller Western locals whose views
were closer to those of the general labor movement rarely
sent delegates to the conventions. Instead they handed over
their proxy votes to the larger locals, which were well repre-
sented already. As a result limited interests were served and
national considerations were relegated to a position of sec-
ondary importance.

It would be a mistake nevertheless to assume that these con-

19

ditions brought about the end of the NLM and led to the
organization of the American Federation of Musicians. Rather
the schism between the two groups was mainly the outcome of
a political struggle for control. The AFL desired the affiliation
of musicians. Some of the leaders in the NLM agreed that this
should be done, but others disagreed. In the events which
followed, the faction which desired to join the AFL won. There
was a change in leadership of the national organization of
musicians and nothing more. The American Federation of
Musicians, which originally faced the same problems that weak-
ened the NLM, was able to overcome these difficulties. It then
began a remarkable career in which the interests of its members
substantially were advanced.

The musicians have been fortunate in their leadership, for
able and untiring men have always headed the organization.
In more than half a century of existence, the destiny of the
AFM has been largely in the hands of three men. But all three
have been skilled politicians whose policies and tactics, on
many occasions better described as machinations and maneu-
verings, have enabled them to reach and remain at the top of
the national union. The first leader was Owen Miller, a forceful
individual, who became president of the union when it was
founded. His life is interwoven in the development and early
growth of trade unionism among musicians.

At an early age Miller was forced to seek employment be-
cause of the impoverished condition of his family. The pres-
sure of financial need made it impossible for him to enjoy an
education beyond the public schools. But he was a self-taught
man and his later life showed that he had wide knowledge and
a grasp of affairs. In 1885 he was instrumental in organizing the
St. Louis local of musicians, in which he served as president
and in other capacities until his death. Miller helped form the
National League of Musicians; and he served as president of
the organization during the 1891 term. He favored the affiliation
of the NLM with the AFL and when the NLM refused to do so
he was one of the musicians who helped organize the first
convention of the American Federation of Musicians in 1896.

Owen Miller was active in labor affairs in the state of Mis-
souri. He was a member of the State Senate of Missouri for a
time and one of the leaders in the State Federation of Labor

20

and in local councils. His opinions seemed to be highly re-
spected in labor circles. It is clear that his advice was sought
and accepted by the musicians, and that he wielded a cohesive
influence upon the American Federation of Musicians during
his lifetime. However, the achievements of his administration,
which lasted until 1900, were negligible. Only the problem
connected with matters of jurisdiction was solved. Some of the
locals originally joining the Federation included on their mem-
bership rolls individuals expelled from other locals. This cre-
ated a delicate situation. But the regulation of membership was
turned over to the national union and an amicable adjustment
was reached in individual cases.

In 1900, when nearly 49 years of age, Miller decided to step
down from the presidency of the union. Although there had
been some growth in the size of the organization, its progress
had not been conspicuous. There were few signs to distinguish
the AFM from its predecessor, the NLM. On the other hand,
several of the very large and important Eastern locals had
refused to join. The major factor which led to Miller's decision
was financial. The salary of the president of the AFM was
only $100 while that of the secretary was $750. Yet the burdens
of the president's office were heavy. Miller therefore became
secretary of the union and president of the St. Louis local. He
added to his duties the editorship of the union's monthly maga-
zine when it commenced publication in 1901. In this way his
monetary income was increased. Joseph Nicholas Weber was
elected to succeed Miller as president.

Unlike Miller, Weber was not a native of the United States.
He was born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire on June 21,
1865,7 and came to the United States when 14 years of age. He
traveled widely in his capacity as a musician, playing the clari-
net in various parts of the country. Weber joined the Denver
musicians union in 1890 and soon demonstrated that he was
politically able and adept. He became secretary of the Denver
local and its delegate to the NLM. At the NLM convention of
1891 he favored affiliation with the AFL. In 1893 he joined the
Seattle local and was elected vice president. In 1895, he went
to Cincinnati, where his father, who was a bandleader, oper-
ated a saloon. The younger Weber was elected to the board
of directors of the musicians union there. He then became pres-

21

ident of the Cincinnati local and a delegate to the AFM con-
vention. It is apparent that wherever he went, he soon emerged
as one of the leaders of the local union. He was a conservative
in his ideas and always clung to the view that changes should
be made slowly but steadily.

Weber's first acts demonstrated that he was the actual and
not merely nominal head of the organization. In short order, he
crushed the smoldering resentment over his victory. Opposi-
tion was led by the editor of the American Musician, a monthly
privately owned magazine. Under a contract with the AFM, this
magazine served as the official publication of the musicians
union. The editor, who previously had beaten Weber in an
election held to select the delegate of the AFM to the AFL
convention, was displeased with Weber's elevation, and he
refused to take orders from Weber in regard to the contents of
the magazine. The publication thereupon was suspended as the
union periodical and the editor was expelled from the musi-
cians union. During the next 40 years Weber was never again
seriously challenged regarding his powers as head of the AFM.

Weber recognized that growth of the musicians union would
take place only if the organization successfuly controlled com-
petition in the industry. Musicians, much more than workers
in most other occupations, have been mobile in seeking employ-
ment. Many of them have moved from town to town. If they
were hindered from doing so by the rules of the labor union
which solicited their membership, they did not join the organi-
zation but competed with it. Though the requirements for ad-
mission to the locals had been liberalized somewhat by 1900,
the walls around each of them continued to exist. The AFM
also faced the problem of competition from the traveling con-
cert or military band. These bands sometimes lessened the em-
ployment opportunities of local musicians. Weber saw these
problems and tried to solve them. He was fortunate in that
circumstances arose which made it advisable for him to insti-
tute changes in the rules of the organization.

These circumstances developed in connection with the Chicago-
Denver controversy of 1900. The AFM law at the time was that
bands and orchestras were not permitted to accept engagements
in the jurisdiction of a local other than their own without the
consent of that other local. Violations subjected each offending

22

member in the band or orchestra to a fine, half of which was
paid to the national union and the remainder to the local where
the infraction had occurred. This rule engendered much bitter-
ness among the locals. Its most significant test occurred when a
Chicago band performed an engagement in a Denver park with-
out the consent of the Denver local. The Denver local fined the
members of this band, but they refused to pay and the Chicago
local refused to enforce the fine. As a result the Chicago local was
expelled from the AFM. (It was later readmitted when it agreed
to approve the fine.)

This incident forcefully brought to Weber's attention the fact
that laws which created antagonisms between members or locals
were not conducive to the furthering of the best interests of the
Federation. It seemed at first that the only alternative to this
severe restriction on the movement of musicians from place to
place was a universal membership law which would make a
member of one local automatically a member of all the other
locals and entitle him to the rights and privileges of the mem-
bers of the local in whose jurisdiction he was employed. Such
membership rules, however, were not acceptable to the locals and
could not be adopted.

A compromise was worked out which became known as the
transfer law. Musicians were given the right to transfer from
one jurisdiction to another, in order to seek employment. No
obstacle to such movement could be set up by the local union
in the area to which the musicians had migrated. Although this
law has never been completely palatable to the locals and has
caused much resentment over the years, it nevertheless was re-
sponsible more than any other factor for the rising fortunes of
the union, which began to become apparent at that time. Mem-
bers were permitted to move about, within the framework of the
regulations of the union, and employers could hire union men
who had come from other parts of the country. What formerly
caused severe competition among musicians could be better con-
trolled and regulated under the new policy. The AFM recog-
nized the right of traveling members and traveling bands to
operate within the union framework.

Many of the largest locals had refused to join the AFM
because they feared that the opportunities of their members
would be restricted if union musicians would be prohibited from

23

traveling freely. (Most of the traveling shows that hired musi-
cians and a large majority of the nation's leading instrumental-
ists were concentrated in the East.) The AFM therefore was
forced to charter rival locals in several Eastern cities, though
these unions typically remained of minor importance in their
respective jurisdictions. Rival unionism was not at all unusual
in the United States during this period, but the American Fed-
eration of Musicians energetically opposed all rivals. After pas-
sage of the transfer law Weber undertook to integrate and con-
solidate the musicians unions in the larger cities with renewed
vigor. The situation was more propitious than previously be-
cause some of the fears and doubts of the larger independent
locals had been allayed by the transfer law.

Though this law permitted all union members to come into
the jurisdiction of the larger locals, it also entitled the members
of the larger locals to go elsewhere. Furthermore, the larger
locals recognized that the influx of competing musicians had
been going on, anyhow. Now, at least, transfers were granted
under the supervision of the AFM.

Over-all supervision by the national body was particularly
helpful to a local like New York. Indeed, it would not have been
possible for the New York local to unionize some of the theater
houses, such as Loew, Fox, and Proctor, and the larger hotels,
if it were not for the fact that the national union cooperated and
kept potential strikebreakers from other locals out of New York
City during the critical periods of negotiations. In 1904, Weber
could appear before the ninth annual convention of the Amer-
ican Federation of Musicians and announce that amalgamations
had been completed successfully during the preceding year in
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston, Pittsburgh, and the important
New York locals. The larger locals accepted the agreement which
had been reached several years before on the method of voting
at the convention. Larger locals were given a greater number
of votes than smaller ones, but the maximum vote that could
be cast by any local in a convention election was ten. This com-
promise restricted the power of the larger units and avoided one
of the weaknesses of the NLM.

With the network of locals across the United States relatively
complete, the national union was able to try to raise the economic
status of musicians. Nonunion competition had to be reduced

24

and union working conditions had to be established. The power
of the contractors, who had often dominated the local to the
disadvantage of the rank and file musicians, was reduced sharply.
Band and orchestra conductors, in general, were required to
become members of the union and as a result cooperation from
them was obtained more readily. The union was always ready
to bargain collectively with employers. It did not like to exert
its economic strength by calling strikes. Said Weber: ". . . by far
the most marked progress our organization has made was made
by reason of its readiness to confer with the employer and settle
controversies over the conference table."8

But even at the turn of the century the union was manifesting
signs of unilateral action in fixing conditions of employment
which have reappeared again and again throughout its history.
When its power has enabled it to do so, this union has tended
to lay down the law to employers without requesting their
acquiescence and without consulting them. Back in 1904 a New
York theater manager complained: "I notice that the union does
not make any distinction between good and bad musicians. The
bad ones, and they are many, get just as much pay as the good
ones. Besides their regular pay they charge $2 extra for every
holiday. There not being a sufficient number of legal holidays to
suit them, they make holidays themselves. Easter Monday, St.
Patrick's Day, and the eve's of New Year's, Washington's birth-
day, Thanksgiving and Christmas are all holidays in the eyes of
musicians."9

Despite the resentment expressed by numerous employers, the
union continued to flourish. Indeed, by 1905, the growing trade
union of musicians had developed a position of more complete
control over its business in the United States and Canada, to
which it had extended its interests in 1900, than that occupied
by any other union in the American Federation of Labor.10
The achievement is outstanding when consideration is given to
the status of workers and labor unions 50 years ago. At the turn
of the century it was the general practice of management to
oppose trade unionism and union men vigorously. Physical
violence in labor relations during that period and the succeed-
ing years was common. Discrimination against employees for
union membership was not only lawful, but zealously pursued by
employers. Yellow-dog contracts, blacklists, lockouts, and in-

25

junctions were regular weapons used against union members. It
is a remarkable fact that under these conditions the union of
musicians was able to secure complete control over the profes-
sion. For outside of employment on the railroads and in the
building trades no other area of enterprise was strongly union-
ized. Moreover, on the railroads and in construction work, many
distinct unions shared the membership.

A limited amount of dualism remained in the unionization
of musicians in scattered sections of the country until the late
1930's, but the AFM was powerful enough to make the closed
shop a characteristic of the working conditions of musicians in
the United States. Quite early in its history, the AFM provided
in its bylaws for the automatic expulsion of those members ap-
plying to the courts for injunctions. This rule helped the union
prevent a weakening of the organization that could result from
judicial intervention. The musicians union wholeheartedly ac-
cepted its leadership. The organizational success of the union
at that early date enabled the leaders to turn their attention to
the problems connected with nonunion competition and with
increasing the employment opportunities of musicians.

THE UNION GAINS <^

PRESTIGE AND STATUS • ^*

"Owing to the rules of the Pressmen's Union of St. Louis,
Mo., the plant is compelled to employ a pressman all
the time, whether he is needed or not."

OWEN MILIAR

• The Changing Scene

As the American Federation of Musicians grew, Weber's pres-
tige increased too. The salary of $100 which he received in the
beginning was not particularly attractive but the power that went
with the position of president appealed to him. At first his
office was located in his home but in 1908 it was set up in sep-
arate quarters in New York. As the revenues derived by the AFM
increased, Weber was able to obtain a higher salary, furnish a
more luxurious office, and secure adequate clerical assistance.
His political sagacity was evidenced as he steered along a path
that was rife with factionalism. Weber was a politician of the
first order and he played his cards wisely. Because the union
was successful he received the benefit of every doubt from the
membership. Throughout his long tenure of office, however, he
was not able to escape bitter and severe censure from various
elements in the union. In 1912 Weber declared to the conven-
tion of the AFM that he would not run for re-election as presi-
dent because of the general criticism expressed by the member-
ship regarding his motives and his honesty. A petition signed by
every delegate to the convention induced him to alter his de-
termination.

The spells of sickness and the nervous breakdowns from which
Weber had always suffered, were becoming more acute. He re-
luctantly decided to step down from office in 1914 because of his
failing health and was designated president emeritus. Frank
Carothers was chosen president. Weber, however, could not re-
sist the lure of activity and the power which he had yielded.
Without fanfare he was re-elected president of the AFM in 1915.

27

Immediately, his opponents renewed their campaign of per-
sistently challenging his motives.

Although by the end of the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, the AFM had settled the issues of artist versus worker, local-
ism versus universality, and exclusion of membership versus
expansion of membership, the first quarter of that century
brought about many changes in the status of musicians and in
the field of musical entertainment. Forms of musical rendition
which were typical means of public diversion at the beginning
of the period became obsolete or of minor importance as the
years went on. The era was marked by the passing of the legi-
timate road show, the partial passing of burlesque, the decline
in the use of music at picnics and excursions, the wane in the
importance of the monster balls held by fraternal societies, and
the adverse effects of prohibition on the employment opportuni-
ties of musicians. The epoch was also characterized by the disap-
pearance of the traveling concert or military bands which had
been the prime attractions in the amusement parks and theaters
and which had been led by such outstanding conductors as
John Philip Sousa, Arthur Pryor, Victor Herbert, and Giuseppe
Creatore. These bands had utilized the services of hundreds of
AFM members.

Other forms of musical diversion came to the fore. New types
of music, known as ragtime, jazz, and swing became prominent.
After a tenuous reception by the public, they became well estab-
lished and popular. Though the employment opportunities of
the older members were lessened because of their inability to
adapt themselves satisfactorily, the AFM profited from the inno-
vations. The traveling dance orchestra or name band had its
origin about 1910 in connection with these developments. Pre-
viously performances by dance bands were rarely given beyond
the neighboring areas and if played in territory adjacent to the
home base, they were considered out-of-town engagements. The
players returned home after every concert. Name bands, today,
travel from place to place, and often do not return to their
home base for many months. The popularity of the name band
has continued to increase.

The AFM has been a highly complex organization, for it has
had to deal with a diversity of employers. It has been required
to negotiate with employers hiring musicians for operas, musical

28

comedies, burlesques, motion pictures, symphony orchestras,
vaudeville shows, concerts, dances, parades, and receptions. Some
of this musical work may be considered to be permanent. The
portion which represents only seasonal employment includes
work in summer resorts and in municipal parks. The remainder
is of a miscellaneous nature. In the midst of all these intricate
and difficult relationships, the union was confronted with three
major problems of competition. First, there was the question of
the respective roles of the national union and the locals. The
jurisdiction and powers of each had to be decided definitively.
Secondly, the influx of foreign musicians, in so far as it served
to undermine standards and curtail employment opportunities
in the United States, had to be resisted. Thirdly, unfair compe-
tition from the bands organized by the armed forces had to be
eliminated.

• The Struggle with the New York Local

During the 30-year period following the establishment of the
American Federation of Musicians, the union was able to gain
substantially improved working conditions from employers all
over the United States; but, more important, the national or-
ganization conclusively was able to assert its hegemony over the
local unions.

Some of the larger and more powerful locals had remained
uncooperative and intractable after becoming affiliated with
the American Federation of Musicians. Although the AFM slowly
increased its membership and gradually was recognized as the
spokesman of musicians by employers, it was not until the re-
calcitrance of the New York local was broken in the early 1920's
that the domination of the national union was assured. Up to that
time it was not clearly evident whether the national or the local
would prevail in a test of strength between them.

When the AFM was organized in 1896 there were 16 distinct
musicians unions in New York City but except for a few all of
these were small and relatively unimportant. One of them, how-
ever, was the most important local union of musicians in the
country. This local was the Musical Mutual Protective Union
of New York, which had played a leading role in the NLM and
which had fought against the establishment of the AFM. When
the MMPU refused to affiliate, several minor unions in the city

29

combined and formed local 7, AFM. Local 7 soon was expelled.
The New York charter then was given to local 41, which imme-
diately undertook to recruit the members of the MMPU. At
first, the MMPU had 3,000 members and local 41 had 400 mem-
bers but early in 1901, 1,000 members of the MMPU joined
local 41. This group of a thousand, which belonged to both
organizations, tried to bring the remaining Mutual musicians
within the fold of the AFM.

The rivalry between these two New York locals was intense and
for several years union musicians were incapable of dealing ef-
fectively with many employers because of the uncertainties
associated with the divided jurisdiction and control. However,
in July 1903 the MMPU and local 41 amalgamated. The new
organization received a charter from the AFM, and was called
local 310. The predominant element in the new local was the
MMPU. The MMPU had been incorporated under the laws of
New York State and therefore was entitled to a certain amount
of freedom from interference in its internal affairs. Though the
AFM requested local 310 to yield its state charter, this action
was never taken by the local. The achievement of unity in New
York City, however, was extremely important in furthering the
establishment of control over employment opportunities by the
musicians union.

Local 310 was an important unit of musicians. It included
many of the country's leading instrumentalists and was cog-
nizant of its prestige and strength. There was constant friction
between this local and the national union because the local re-
fused to subordinate its own interests to those of the AFM or
of the other locals. The national was not anxious to bring about
an open rupture or to provoke the local to secede so that fre-
quently it did not press its prerogatives. Over the years, however,
the prestige of the AFM suffered because the refractoriness of
the local was known to employers and to the union's members.

The leadership of the New York local did not hide its anti-
pathy to the national heads of the union and the local leaders
felt pleased when they could set little obstacles in Weber's way.
For many years Alexander Bremer was president of the New
York local. He had been one of the most vitriolic opponents to
the establishment of the AFM during the NLM days. In 1918,
Bremer, then president of 310, was alleged to have expressed

30

sympathy with the German cause. Upon the advice of Weber he
was expelled from the local.1 This incident showed that the New
York local, despite its independence, nevertheless was subject
to the influence of the national union. At the same time, it is
known that Bremer's reported attitude in this matter was ob-
noxious to many of the members in his local.

In 1920, local 310 demanded an increase in the wages of
musicians in the New York theaters. When the employers could
not settle the matter with the local, they appealed to the na-
tional union to adjust the dispute so that a strike would be
averted. Weber entered the negotiations and reached an agree-
ment with the employers. His action, however, crystallized resent-
ment against the AFM among New York musicians. Several
hundred members in the local were dissatisfied with the arbi-
trary way in which the national officers had stepped in, and disap-
proved the terms of the settlement. This faction formed a club
within the local known as the "Quorum Club," ostensibly to
guarantee the presence of a quorum at every membership meet-
ing of the union, but actually to gain and maintain control of
local 310. At the next election it succeeded in gaining a majority
on the board of directors of the local by concentrating its votes
on a few candidates, but it was unsuccessful in an attempt to
win the presidency.

The president of the local soon was in conflict with his board
of directors and when he acted in violation of the rules of the
local, the board suspended him from office. He appealed to
Weber and Weber set aside the action of the board. But the
members of the board disregarded Weber's order and ejected the
president from a subsequent meeting. As a result, they were ex-
pelled from the union. Since such action, if enforced, would mean
the loss of employment to the directors, they appealed to the
courts to set aside Weber's expulsion order. The decision handed
down by a New York court was that Weber had no right to in-
terfere in the internal affairs of local 310 because it was incor-
porated under the laws of the state. The court said: "If the
union itself [local 310] had committed any act which was repug-
nant to the purposes of the federation, the right of affiliation
might have been withdrawn."2

The members of the board of directors of local 310 became
bolder after their reinstatement by order of the New York Su-

31

preme Court. They decided not to receive transfer cards de-
posited by members of other locals. This action, however, violated
the bylaws of the American Federation of Musicians. Local 310
was given a hearing and then suspended by the national execu-
tive board early in July 1921.

Plans were made by local 310 to organize a rival national
union, but they never materialized. The strike which the local
called in the New York theaters was unsuccessful and the union
suffered a serious defeat. Employment conditions in New York
were becoming demoralized. New York theater owners had to
decide whether to deal with the AFM or with the New York
local. By a narrow margin they agreed to negotiate with Weber
and the national union. This move by the employers decided
the issue and spelled the defeat of the Musical Mutual Pro-
tective Union.

When the possibility of a rapid influx of musicians from all
over the country became likely during the period in which no
unit of musicians recognized by the national union functioned
in New York City, some of the instrumentalists acted quickly to
forestall chaotic conditions. They presented a petition from
more than a thousand musicians in the city and requested the
AFM to charter a new local. The national union agreed to do
so but only after the petitioners stipulated that the officers of
the new local were to be appointed by the national union and
that the rules and regulations of the local would be subject to
the approval of the AFM executive board. Local 802 in New
York City was then chartered on August 27, 1921.

Before long almost all of the members of the MMPU had
joined local 802. Though the MMPU never had more than
8,000 members, local 802 encompassed 12,000 musicians shortly
after being formed. The increase came about mainly because of
the nominal initiation fee of two dollars which had been set.
Musicians who had refused to join when the entrance fee was
high hastened to take advantage of this opportunity. Local 802
took over control of the labor relations of musicians in the city.
Most of the members of the MMPU continued to maintain their
connection with that organization because the MMPU owned
property (mainly, a building) valued in excess of a half million
dollars.

A few of the ringleaders in the Quorum Club were not per-

32

mitted to join local 802 and these disgruntled members applied
to the courts for an order to reinstate local 310 in the AFM and
to dissolve local 802. The New York courts, however, were not
hospitable to the contentions of the plaintiffs and ruled that
the AFM had acted in accordance with its rights.3 Nevertheless
court litigation of this issue cost the AFM and local 802 the
sum of $250,000. At the height of the struggle Weber had to
be protected by city detectives but eventually the unions became
reconciled. The Musical Mutual Protective Union changed its
name to the Mutual Musical Corporation and for several years
leased the building which it owned, to local 802. The Mutual
Musical Corporation was dissolved in 1947 and its property was
divided among 900 persons— 600 members and 300 heirs of
members.

The events in the dispute between the American Federation of
Musicians and the New York local had reverberated throughout
the organization but their aftermath was beneficial to the na-
tional union. It was established decisively that local rules were
valid only if they did not conflict with those of the AFM. Since
then, the organization has been much more cohesive and the
authority of the national officers has been more apparent. Weber
had won one of the major victories of his career.

• Competition from Foreign Musicians

Establishment of the principle of national supremacy over
the local was an internal matter within the scope of union poli-
tics. Much more difficult were the attempts to regulate the im-
portation of foreign musicians and to prevent the competition
of military and naval bands. The existence of these conditions
tended to negate the organizational efforts of the union and
made it more difficult for the AFM to establish control over the
musical industries.

The musicians union was anxious to enlist all American in-
strumental players within its organization. But there was no
desire to increase the number of musicians unduly. The device
of restricting the number of workers available for employment
in specific occupations and thereby enabling such workers to
gain more concessions from employers was well known to labor
unions and practiced by many of them. Traditionally, the
American Federation of Labor has opposed immigration, for the

33

immigrant has been considered as a source of competition to the
laborer in the United States. The musicians gave their complete
support to this notion, and they favored a governmental policy
which would impose very limited immigration quotas.

The half century preceding 1910 was one in which millions
of persons were entering the country. The American people, in
general, did not desire to cut off this influx, for the spirit of
boundless economic opportunity was still characteristic of the
times. Labor, however, turned its attention to those groups of
immigrants which were a direct and immediate threat to labor
standards. Unlike Europe where the abundance of labor has
tended to depress wages, wage rates in the United States, as in
other new countries where workers have been relatively scarce,
always have been comparatively high. These higher wage rates
have attracted the foreigner to American shores.

It was not too difficult for unscrupulous individuals to under-
mine American wages, hours, and working conditions, and at
the same time benefit personally, by deliberately importing
aliens, on a contractual basis, to work for wages lower than
those to which workers in the United States were accustomed.
Such activities were possible because of the marked disparity
between American and European wages. Recognizing the harm-
ful effects emanating from these circumstances, in 1885 Congress
passed a law forbidding an individual from importing and con-
tracting with aliens to perform labor in the United States. In
1907, a proviso was added that skilled and unskilled contract
laborers were not to be admitted to this country. The labor
movement was solidly behind the alien contract labor legislation.
The musicians were in full agreement with these laws but
nevertheless they did not benefit from them, because the Attorney
General ruled that musicians were not included within the
scope of the enactments. Musicians, he declared, were artists and
professionals, not laborers. Under the legislation, contracts could
be entered into for the purpose of importing alien artists.

Though the musicians union did endeavor for many years to
bring about a reversal in the pronouncement of the Attorney
General, it also undertook to use its own economic pressures to
combat the entry of foreign musicians. It refused to stand by
idly while hundreds of musicians were brought in from vari-
ous parts of Europe under contract. Members of the American

34

Federation of Musicians involved in bringing over alien instru-
mentalists were subject to fines and other penalties. Agents and
employers of the imported individuals were put on an unfair
list, and union members were barred from working for them.
Contract labor musicians were excluded from membership in
the union; under the rules only citizens or those who had se-
cured first papers were eligible to join.

It was in connection with this issue that Walter Damrosch was
fined by the union in 1905. Damrosch came to this country in
1871, at the age of nine. Soon, because of his musical talent, he
had achieved a reputation as an eminent conductor. He joined
the MMPU of New York, but when he attempted to hire a non-
union violoncellist in 1893, he was nearly expelled from the
union. The matter, however, was adjusted.4 In 1903, Damrosch
became director of the New York Symphony Orchestra and
undertook to reorganize it. The wood-wind section was par-
ticularly weak, and feeling that the musicians best-able to play
those instruments were to be found in France, Damrosch went
there and brought back five players. It was his contention that
New York musicians were unsatisfactory performers on wood
winds and that better players were necessary to enable the New
York orchestra to compete successfully with the nonunion Bos-
ton Symphony Orchestra. The other members of the New York
orchestra were all in the union and they refused to play with
the five Frenchmen. The New York local then decided that the
five could play only as "soloists," since, at that time, under such
circumstances they were not required to be union members.

Public opinion and the New York press were behind Dam-
rosch and excoriated the musicians union, but the French instru-
mentalists could not play. Damrosch appealed to the national
officers in 1905, and they were more amenable to his arguments
and the public pressure. The men were permitted to enroll in
the New York local and play with the orchestra. But for violat-
ing the laws of the AFM in bringing over alien musicians, Dam-
rosch was fined a thousand dollars. Damrosch paid the fine.5

The union was highly critical of foreign bands which were
brought to this country by agents and employers. The union
strongly opposed the entry of Giuseppe Creatore and his band
of 55 men from Italy in 1902. Several years later, Creatore unsuc-
cessfully tried to take the Italian musicians out of the Philadel-

35

phia local of the AFM.6 The American Federation of Musicians
fought a plethora of imported Royal Italian bands which
seemed to be playing everywhere.

The Federation of Musicians also tried to bring to an end the
productions of the French Opera Company of New Orleans. This
company contracted for the services of foreign musicians and
paid their transportation costs to the United States. The musi-
cians were paid wages far below the union scale. They played
three months in New Orleans and three months on the road,
after which they were free to drift. If they returned to Europe,
they had to pay their own costs of transportation. If they re-
mained in the United States, they were ineligible to join the
AFM since under the rules of the union, contract labor musi-
cians could not be accepted. Some of these men continued to
play for the company in succeeding seasons. The AFM itself
occasionally undertook to finance these musicians back to Europe,
in order to get rid of them. The union declared that it was will-
ing to admit a musician who came to this country of his own
volition and with an intent to find employment by his own
efforts, but that it would not admit alien contract musicians,
unless the circumstances were exceptional. In 1908, with the aid
of President Theodore Roosevelt, the union was able to prevent
importation of musicians by the Metropolitan Opera House.7
Except in Boston, the AFM was strong enough to prevent the
symphony orchestras from bringing in foreign musicians.

The secretary of the AFM wrote constantly to the musicians
unions in France, England, and other European countries warn-
ing them of the difficulties of obtaining employment in the
United States and of the high cost of living here. The foreign
unions seemed to appreciate the problem of competitive wages
and always promised their cooperation. As the years passed,
competition from foreign bands gradually became negligible. A
Congressional law in 1917 re-enacted the ban on the immigration
of contract laborers, and this statute was interpreted by the Sec-
retary of Labor, through the Bureau of Immigration, to include
ordinary musicians. Only instrumental soloists were admitted
under the provision permitting the entry, under contract, of
artists.

Nevertheless in spite of favorable Congressional action, court
decisions modified the intent of the legislation of 1917. The

36

meaning of artist was gradually expanded, so that many bands
and orchestras were admitted to this country under that desig-
nation. Finally, an amendment was passed in 1932, which spe-
cifically prohibits the entry of alien instrumental musicians
under the category of artist, unless they show distinguished merit
and ability.8 The long battle of the AFM was ended. No further
importation of alien musicians has taken place. Problems with
regard to refugee musicians which arose in the early 1940's were
quite different, because the refugees entered under a quota, had
no employment contract in advance, and were eligible to join the
union.

Ironically, the contract labor laws were applied by the United
States to prevent the movement of musicians from Canada into
this country. The AFM, which had many members in Canada,
did not especially desire to block their entry into the United
States but could not induce the authorities to permit Canadian
contract musicians to enter. The Canadian government, on the
other hand, at first did not bar contract labor musicians from
admission. An order in council in 1929, however, prohibited
labor under contract, in general, from entering Canada. This
was interpreted by Canadian immigration authorities to mean
that, with the exception of concert groups and outstanding solo-
ists, foreign musicians could enter Canada under contract only
if the same number of Canadian musicians were employed on
the same engagement and for the same hours. After the second
World War the general order was suspended because of the need
for skilled workers.9 This action caused a movement of traveling
cocktail and tavern groups of musicians into Canada; though
similar privileges were not available to Canadian instrumental-
ists. Leaders of the AFM have been attempting to get the gov-
ernments of the United States and Canada to work out a reci-
procal arrangement in connection with this problem.

On the domestic scene the hostility of the union to a practice
similar to contract labor was manifested by its fight against
colonization. Although the union adopted the transfer law which
permitted the free movement of musicians from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction in seeking employment, union rules did not permit
an employer to bring in single musicians from other locals nor
for an individual member who intended to go to an area under
the jurisdiction of another local to contract with an employer

37

for a job in advance of his arrival. This practice was known as
colonizing and was outlawed by the AFM. One of the contentions
of local 310 at the time of its expulsion was that it refused to
accept the transfer cards of members seeking admittance to the
territory within its jurisdiction because those members were
colonizers. The ban did not apply to traveling dance bands.

• Competition from the Army and the Navy

Elimination of the competition of other musicians was the
main task of the AFM during the first two and a half decades of
this century. For in addition to the competition of contract aliens
the union was faced with the pressing issue of competition from
groups within the country. Rival unionism never was a serious
problem to the musicians union. Although nonunion competi-
tion from unorganized workers and from bands of children, ama-
teurs, fraternal orders, and institutions were more important,
even these activities were not significant. But competition from
musicians employed by the federal government gave rise to the
most widely publicized grievance of the union during this period.
This issue related almost entirely to the bands of the army and
navy, although occasionally other units were involved. In 1915,
for example, the Letter Carriers Band of Omaha received a city
contract to play in the public parks because it had accepted a
wage scale lower than the one indicated in the union bid; and
the resulting dispute with city officials and the Postmaster Gen-
eral was settled only with great difficulty.

The union cannot perform its economic functions of improv-
ing the wages, hours, and working conditions of its members
effectively, if it is unable to prevent undercutting of its price
schedules. Elimination of this practice required the union to be
in a position where it could exercise disciplinary control over
the musicians who played for a price under the wage scale. The
musician in the armed forces acted in the role of undercutter.
But these men have not been permitted to join or remain active
members of the American Federation of Musicians since the
union has not been in a position to exercise control over their
actions.

Historically, the musician enlisting in the army was allowed
to take outside engagements providing the engagements did not
interfere with his other duties— which involved playing at guard

38

mount, rehearsal, dress parade, and evening concert. This sched-
ule, however, actually made it impossible for the enlisted musi-
cian to compete seriously with the civilian. But since the rate of
pay was low a sufficient number of competent musicians did not
enlist in the services; despite the relatively greater economic
security which these men would have had if they had done so.
The Secretary of War in James Madison's cabinet, as an induce-
ment to attract musicians, permitted commanding officers to grant
regular "leaves of absence" to the band. This action made pos-
sible the acceptance of other opportunities of employment. Ci-
vilian musicians filed protests with the War Department against
such competition as early as 1824, but these protests were un-
heeded.

It was not until 1885, that the War Department issued an
order, which was reinforced by a circular letter in 1897, pro-
hibiting army bands from engaging to play at prices dispro-
portionately lower than those of other bands performing similar
services. This order seemed to meet the most serious objections
of the local unions, except that in the course of the next 30
years, hundreds of cases were tabulated by the NLM and AFM
in which the order was violated.

The first convention of the National League of Musicians,
which met in March 1886, passed a resolution protesting against
army competition; later that year General Philip Sheridan,
who was in charge of the United States Army, ordered the
confinement of army bands to their military duties. Immediately
thereafter, however, the Secretary of War abrogated this order.
Under the renewed pressure of the musicians, the Secretary or-
dered that the military bands stationed at the recruiting depots
of the army (St. Louis, Missouri; Columbus, Ohio; and Gov-
ernor's Island, New York) had to remain at their reservations
except by special permission. But the competition of all other
army bands and of all naval bands persisted. The succeeding
Secretaries of War ignored the confinement order, and the lim-
ited concession to civilian musicians thus became a dead letter.

The musicians took their case directly to President Theodore
Roosevelt at the White House late in 1903 and he promised
some redress, but the competition from military bands con-
tinued. The AFM convention of 1903, however, already had
passed a resolution that no union musician was permitted to

39

play at any function where a government service band also was
employed or engaged. This resolution was partially successful
in achieving its objective and was of great benefit to the AFM
until the passage of legislation in 1908, and even thereafter.

Lack of cooperation from the executive branch of the govern-
ment led the musicians to turn their attention to Congress. Some
attempts were made by Congressmen in the 1880's to obtain
passage of bills barring enlisted musicians from competing with
civilians. At first, these efforts were unavailing. Finally in 1908,
with the aid of Congressman Richard Bartholdt, a Republican
member of the House, the musicians obtained what they had
desired. Congress included provisions in both the army and navy
appropriations bills forbidding army and navy musicians from
competing with civilians. The pay of army musicians was in-
creased and navy musicians received the benefit of a general
increase to enlisted naval personnel.

These bills were approved in the middle of May. At the end
of May, the Secretary of the Navy requested an opinion from
the Attorney General, as to whether the Act applied to the
United States Marine Band. In November, after a delay of more
than five months, the Attorney General, Charles J. Bonaparte,
replied that the Marine Band was exempt from the provision
barring competition from naval bands, since it was not a naval
band.10

The union fought the exemption of the United States Marine
Band and the violations of the law committed by army and navy
bands. For many years complaints against the infractions of the
1908 provisions were made to the appropriate administrative
officials, though generally without avail. In 1916, Democratic
Senator James A. Reed succeeded in attaching an amendment to
a bill increasing the size of the army. The amendment prohibited
enlisted musicians of the army, navy, and marines from engag-
ing in any task which would conflict with the opportunities of
civilian musicians. The bill became law in 19 16.11

This law was enforced strictly under the administration of
President Wilson. Beginning with the inauguration of President
Harding, competition from naval bands again developed, al-
though the union did not complain of any army infractions. At
Weber's request, Samuel Gompers, president of the AFL, pro-
tested the Navy's interpretation of the law to President Coolidge

40

in 1924. But Coolidge's noncommittal reply was that he would
favor remedial legislation. It was not until 1934 that the Navy
ended the practice of allowing its bands to compete with civilian
musicians. The American Federation of Musicians has not ob-
jected to the use of enlisted bands for military purposes and on
military occasions or in patriotic and charitable activities which
are national in scope and nonpartisan and nonsectarian in char-
acter. In the last 10 years, local and isolated cases of competition
from bands of the armed forces have occurred and the AFM only
recently has succeeded in getting the matter adjusted at the
higher levels.

During the first World War the AFM put forth efforts to im-
prove the status of the military bandsmen. The union favored
a program under which musicians would serve in a capacity
where their musical talent would be utilized, the size of the band
would be enlarged, and bandleaders would be raised to com-
missioned rank. Sometimes, an army bandleader was not even a
noncommissioned officer. Near the end of the war, General John
J. Pershing ordered that United States army bands in France
should be increased from 28 to 50 men and that the leader of the
band should be raised to the rank of first or second lieutenant
depending upon the length of his army experience as band-
leader.

The strength of the union enabled it to force a gradual, but
substantial, upward movement in wage rates during the second
decade of the twentieth century. The main countermove on the
part of employers was to reduce the number of musicians they
employed. The problem of unemployment which emerged both
from this action of employers and from the growing membership
of the union was solved by the advent of the war. Many mem-
bers of the musicians union in the United States and Canada
enlisted or were drafted into the armed forces. This process re-
duced the number of available civilian musicians and brought
about a better balance between the demand for and the supply
of musical services.

The American Federation of Musicians had developed from a
puny organization in 1896 to one whose power and prestige were
unrivaled in the labor movement by 1925. It exercised unques-
tioned and complete control over its internal affairs after the
New York local was subdued. And by that time, with the aid of

41

Congressional alien contract labor laws and restrictions on mili-
tary and naval bands, it largely had eliminated competition from
musicians who were not members of the union. But though it
tightened its restrictions on employers, it complained of cer-
tain union practices which affected its own printing plant. Plain-
tively Owen Miller reported to the AFM convention: "Owing to
the rules of the Pressmen's Union of St. Louis, Mo., the plant is
compelled to employ a pressman all the time, whether he is
needed or not."12 This was a practice which locals of the AFM
themselves subsequently adopted.

Nevertheless, the musicians' chief problem from a competitive
force was yet to arise. It developed from various technological
advances.

ENTER JAMES CAESAR PETRI

LLO • J

". . . Petrillo ... is, to my almost certain knowledge and
to my strong conviction, not a crook."

WESTBROOK PECLER

• Petrillo's Early Life

"... Petrillo ... is, to my almost certain knowledge and to my
strong conviction, not a crook."1 Westbrook Pegler, who does not
generally think highly of labor leaders, condescended to make
this statement about Petrillo. Even though it is expressed in
negative terms, it may be assumed that Pegler made a relatively
exhaustive inquiry into the most unfavorable aspects of Petrillo's
life. Yet Petrillo met Pegler's test of honesty. Who is Petrillo?
Where does he come from? How did he get his power? What
does he do with it? The answer to these questions will go far
towards explaining the attitude and position of the American
Federation of Musicians today on many issues.

James Caesar Petrillo was born in Chicago on March 16, 1892,
and spent almost all of his first 50 years in that city. He was
raised in an environment dominated by misery and violence but
he seemed to thrive under those conditions. Early in his life,
Petrillo became connected with the work of the labor movement
in the field of music; and with the prevalence of gangsterism and
hoodlumism in the Chicago area for many years, he found that
a person had to be tough in order to get ahead in union politics.
James C. Petrillo, whose youthful experiences with strong-arm
methods and tactics proved to be of great value to him, was of
that mold. He has maintained a fondness for such rough actions
to this day, even though he no longer has to employ them.

In order to understand Petrillo, it is necessary to depict the
conditions prevailing among the musicians in Chicago. A Chicago
Musical Union was formed in 1857, but it disbanded in 1865
because of the competition of other fraternal societies and because

43

of the demands of business interests on the time of its members.
It is doubtful whether the purposes of this organization were
similar to those characterizing a trade union today. A local of
musicians was established in 1864 but it remained in existence
only a decade. The first permanent union in Chicago was or-
ganized in 1880. Soon several rival unions of musicians were in
existence though none showed any substantial growth. When the
AFM was established, one of the locals in Chicago, which had
about 750 members, received the charter numbered 10. But it
withdrew from the AFM in 1898 and was replaced almost im-
mediately by an amalgamated unit of several locals— the Chicago
Federation of Musicians— which then totaled 1,400 members.
The details of the Chicago-Denver controversy of 1900 and the
expulsion and readmission of local 10 already have been nar-
rated. The union charter thus dates from 1901. The following
year a local of Negro musicians was chartered in Chicago as
number 208. Local 208 never has been completely independent,
since it has had to abide by some of the rules of the white local.

From 1900 to 1937, the most prominent case of dual unionism
among musicians in the United States was found in Chicago.
The American Musicians Union, which attempted to establish
a national labor union, had its strongest base there, and for a
time its membership was as large as that of the Chicago local of
the AFM. These two unions struggled bitterly with each other to
control employment in that city. Generally, local 10 was more
successful because of the advantage which it derived from its
affiliation with the AFM. The AFM could bring pressure to
bear on the employer, if the employer had other business con-
nections in the field of music outside of Chicago. The American
Musicians Union tried to get the courts to force members of
the AFM to work with its own members, but it was not success-
ful.

As the membership of the Chicago Federation of Musicians
expanded, it became necessary for the local to obtain larger and
more adequate quarters. The Chicago Musicians Club therefore
was incorporated to acquire property. The union soon was able
to acquire a building for $75,000 on a 99-year lease. Member-
ship in the Club was limited to persons already in local 10 and
provided a social link among the musicians. In 1933, during

44

Petrillo's regime, the local moved into a new two-story building
which cost over a hundred thousand dollars to construct and
which was paid for in cash.

Petrillo's father, who came to this country from Italy and
settled in Chicago, worked for the city as a sewer digger. He
raised a family of five children. His only other son, Caesar James,
is a dance band conductor and trombone player for CBS. James
Caesar was not a bright boy. Although he attended the Dante
Elementary School for nine years, he never got beyond the
fourth grade. "They bounced me around," he complained. "One
year I would be in the fourth grade and next year in the third.
They drove me nuts! After nine years I give it up."2 It is not
unexpected, therefore, that he never gained a good command
of the English language, although he has shown improvement
over the years. Profanity and blasphemy are liberally interspersed
in his conversation and he uses adjectives only on formal oc-
casions.

When Jimmy was eight years old his father bought him a
trumpet, but despite much practice he never learned to play it
well. For eight years he played on the Chicago Daily News
band. He also played a trumpet in the Hull House band where
he received free music lessons. But he was an ambitious boy.
He sold newspapers, ran elevators, drove a delivery cart, and
sold peanuts and papers on the railroads. Later he opened a
cigar stand and he helped to run a saloon. Petrillo showed cour-
age and pugnacity. He did not avoid fights, and it is reported
that he once beat nine boys, one at a time, in two hours of con-
tinuous fighting. Petrillo formerly took part in the annual
Chicago affair in which executives who were sometime news-
boys, sold newspapers on the streets for one day in order to
bolster a Christmas fund.

At 14 he organized his own four-piece dance band and although
he was under the minimum age limit, was permitted to join
the American Musicians Union by special dispensation. He
played at dances, at weddings, at picnics, in beer gardens, and
on band wagons. It was not uncommon for some of these en-
gagements to break up in fights. This represented a typical
example of existence for many Chicago musicians.

Before long, Petrillo "lost his lip" and switched to politics.
Though he also had tried to play the drum, he never had learned

45

to do so well. He was more successful in his political endeavors
within the union. After several years, he had established him-
self as a powerful figure in the AMU. In 1914 he was elected
president of the union at the age of 22. He served in that office
for three years with mediocre success and then was defeated for
re-election. Petrillo was so disappointed by the defeat that he
resigned from the American Musicians Union and early in 1918
joined the Chicago local of the AFM.

• Petrillo in the Chicago Local

The political activity within the local was his main interest
and he was assigned the task of organizing the musicians in the
Chinese restaurants. The task was difficult since Chicago was
torn by labor wars and racketeering. But Petrillo already was
accustomed to rough tactics. His methods were not tactful but
they were very effective and in a short time he unionized most
of those restaurants. As a result he was elected vice president in
1919.

The Chicago theater strike at the end of 1920 was marked by
much intimidation and many threats of violence. The local was
torn by internal strife and dissension. One faction was respon-
sible for assaulting and inflicting a severe beating on the presi-
dent of local 10, Joseph F. Winkler, early in 1922,3 for exploding
a bomb in the offices of the union, and for blackmailing the
board of directors. It was during this period of internecine diffi-
culty that Petrillo was elected president of the local. The year
was 1922.

One of the first important actions undertaken by the new
president was to require radio stations to pay musicians. Pre-
viously musicians had played over the airwaves merely for
the advantages which such publicity gave them. Petrillo de-
scribed his negotiations with the stations: "They told me to
see their lawyer. The lawyer was usually an ex-Judge So-and-
So. He had a lot of books on the table to prove the Government
owned the air. I said, 'I know the Government owns the air.
What I want to find out is who pays the musicians!' We won the
fight."4 In 1924 the porch of Petrillo's home was wrecked and
the windows blown out by a bomb.

In 1927, the Chicago local went out on strike against the
theaters in what represented the biggest walkout in the history

46

of the AFM. An attempt to secure an injunction restraining
Petrillo was blocked in the federal courts by his lawyers,
Clarence Darrow, Donald Richberg, and David Lilienthal. The
union gained its demands after four days. Under threat of a
strike, Petrillo also was able to complete the task of unionizing
the hotels in 1931. He won wage increases from the restaurants,
theaters, opera, and symphony. He negotiated the first musi-
cians' contract with a radio station when he signed with WMAQ.

Chicago's most important jobs for musicians soon were con-
trolled by Petrillo. Although there was a rival union and many
nonunionists in the city, the Chicago Federation of Musicians
gradually gained more control. Scores of conductors of dance
bands joined the union after being subjected to strong pressure.
Petrillo had to clash with many notables in order to protect
the interests of the musicians. When Charles G. Dawes was Vice
President of the United States, during the second term of the
administration of Calvin Coolidge, he was touring through
Europe and became interested in some Hungarian musicians.
The La Salle Hotel imported them for an engagement on
Dawes' recommendation. Petrillo was furious. "Where do those
foreigners get off coming in here when my boys are walking
the streets? Who does Dawes think he is?"5 Petrillo threatened
to cut off the hotel from the radio and from the services of his
musicians but he relented and permitted the Hungarian musi-
cians to stay for six months when the hotel agreed to hire mem-
bers of local 10 for all functions held in the hotel. This dispute
apparently left no hard feelings between Petrillo and Dawes
because in 1929, Dawes made a contribution of $1,000 to sup-
port a series of outdoor band concerts sponsored by the Chicago
musicians union.

Petrillo also tangled with Benito Mussolini. The sponsors of
an Italian jubilee scheduled for Chicago in 1931 arranged to
have a nonunion band. Petrillo cabled Mussolini that his consul
in Chicago had failed to cooperate with the union. The response
which he received was not favorable, although an Italian band
and a union band both played at the jubilee. During the same
year Chicago elected Anton J. Cermak as mayor. Cermak
planned to use a high school band at his inauguration cere-
monial. This meant that professional musicians would not be

47

employed. But as the new mayor also was to broadcast over the
NBC network, Petrillo warned the radio station that he would
call a strike if it allowed that broadcast to take place. The high
school band was withdrawn and a band of 50 musicians from
local 10 led the inaugural procession.

Late in 1931, Petrillo was held up and robbed of $1,900 as
he was returning home one night. As a result he increased the
number of bodyguards which surrounded him. Later, the city
of Chicago assigned two detectives to stay with him while he
was in the city. Chicago continued to give him this special
protection until the end of 1945. When he traveled at night he
had a half-dozen men with him. For a time he rode in a bullet-
proof car and had bulletproof windows in his office. Reporters
found bullet marks on the rear window of his car when he
traded it in for a new one in 1936. Towards the end of 1933
there were rumors that Petrillo had been kidnaped by the
Touhy mob in June, and had been ransomed by the union for
$100,000. Two members of the local filed a suit to secure an
accounting of the funds of the local four days before the union
election in December.6 In the few days that remained, Petrillo
had accountants audit the books of the local and certify that
they were in perfect order. Then he spent several thousand
dollars to notify the membership of the result and to advertise
in the newspapers. His two opponents were defeated decisively
in the election for the presidency and the suit filed against him
was thrown out of court for want of prosecution. One of Pe-
trillo's opponents for the presidency suddenly lost the job he
had held in a theater. He was not able to find another position
for several years and when he did it was in another state. Since
the balloting in 1933 Petrillo has been unopposed in local
elections.

James Caesar Petrillo lived a hectic life during the depression
years, but the local prospered. Union affairs involved him in
many difficult problems and required numerous decisions, but
he met and made them all. Petrillo was concerned with the
economic opportunities of musicians at a time when unemploy-
ment was high and when very few musicians had full-time jobs
in their profession. Although Chicago had employed about
2,000 musicians in its theaters before the coming of the sound

48

films, by the mid-1930's only 125 jobs remained. In order to
increase employment, Petrillo tried to get the city of Chicago to
give free summer concerts in the public parks, but he was un-
successful. He therefore decided to get on one of the park
boards. Governor Henry Horner of Illinois appointed Petrillo
to the West Park Board in 1933, upon the recommendation of
Mayor Cermak. After Chicago's park boards were merged,
Petrillo was put on the new board by his friend, Mayor Edward
J- Kelly.

The park board however refused to appropriate any money
for concerts. The Chicago local, in presenting free concerts,
spent many thousands of dollars in 1935 to pay musicians.
Millions of persons attended those highly successful concerts.
The city reconsidered its opposition and then decided to sub-
sidize them. The union continued to bear part of the cost and
until 1943, it paid the soloists. Much employment has been
provided by this project.

Petrillo has supported the Democratic party in politics. The
Chicago local made a substantial contribution to Roosevelt's
campaign in 1936 and then welcomed the President with a 300-
piece band when he came to that city. In 1939, Petrillo cele-
brated Mayor Kelly's re-election in an affair at the Chicago
stadium by "requesting" the appearance of 19 of the country's
leading name bands and four leading symphony orchestras.
When, however, Chicago politicians of the Republican and
Democratic parties had tried to play recorded music from sound
trucks during the election campaign of 1932, Petrillo threatened
to force them off the radio. Music for political rallies in Chi-
cago now is provided by live musicians.

As Petrillo tightened his control over the affairs of the musi-
cians of Chicago, he began reaching out on a wider scale. At the
1927 convention of the AFM he was defeated for election as a
member of the international executive board, running fifth in
a field of five. Four years later Petrillo, who already had re-
ceived the praise of Weber for his conduct during the Chicago
theater negotiations, was defeated by Charles L. Bagley for the
vice presidency of the national union, in the race to choose a
successor to William L. Mayer. Bagley is still the union's vice
president. However, in 1932 Petrillo was elected to the executive
board and his power on a national scale began to grow.

49
• Petrillo at Odds with John L. Lewis

A serious challenge was presented to the musicians of Chi-
cago by the organization of the CIO. John L. Lewis, of the
United Mine Workers, who headed the CIO, was searching for
a union of musicians which would affiliate with the CIO. In
1937 he invited the American Musicians Union, which com-
prised 2,500 members in Chicago, to join his federation as the
nucleus of a new national organization. Petrillo acted quickly.
He temporarily waived the initiation fee of the Chicago local,
which was $100 for new members, and almost all the musicians
in the AMU joined his organization. On this occasion the
Chicago Federation of Musicians also absorbed the Polish-
American Musicians Union. These developments marked the
end of any competitive threat which had faced the AFM from
rival unionism. Subsequent attempts by the CIO to organize
musicians were failures.

The clash between Lewis and Petrillo had begun in 1936.
William Green, president of the AFL, was a member of the
United Mine Workers. In 1936, when the AFL suspended the
CIO unions, one of which was the Mine Workers, it appeared
as if Green would hold no membership in any AFL union.
Petrillo came to his aid and made him a member of the musi-
cians union. During 1944, however, Green expressed his opposi-
tion to a series of Midwestern strikes by the AFM against the
broadcasters because labor had given its pledge not to strike
during the war. On that occasion, Petrillo attacked Green for
failing to clean out racketeering in the AFL and told him to
keep out of the internal affairs of the musicians union.

One rash act committed by Petrillo was corrected by the
pressure of public opinion. Late in 1939, Petrillo ordered the
theaters to eliminate all mention of the name of John L. Lewis
from two plays being performed in Chicago theaters. In George
White's Scandals, Lewis was named in a skit performed by
Willie Howard; and Lewis also was referred to in several lines
of The Man Who Came to Dinner. The theaters complied but
the country's press attacked Petrillo. Critics called him a censor.
A national issue was avoided only when Petrillo hastily with-
drew his order and the lines were restored in the two plays.
He recalls: "They said I was un-Constitutional and all that

50

stuff. I never had nothing like that in my mind.7. . . I just
thought I'd push Lewis around a little."8

In June 1949, Petrillo renewed his quarrel with Lewis. In an
address to the delegates of the AFM convention, Petrillo criti-
cized Lewis for ordering the miners not to work during the
period when Congress was considering labor legislation. He said:
"So far as I'm concerned— and I invite the press to record this—
I think John L. Lewis is nuts. I say to him: 'You are not a faith-
ful labor leader, nor are you faithful to the people of America.'
There it is. Somebody had to say it, so I did. I have a right to
say it— I'm a sincere labor leader. . . . I'll take him on here— on
the radio— any place in America."9 Later that month, Petrillo
sent telegrams to several United States Senators and other high
government officials criticizing the intransigent position of
Lewis in regard to the repeal of the Taft-Hartley law.10

• The Situation in Chicago

The Chicago Federation of Musicians has grown and pros-
pered under Petrillo's leadership. For many years it was the
second largest local of musicians in the United States and only
recently it has fallen to third rank, but it remains the most
powerful and aggressive local in establishing and maintaining
employment opportunities in its jurisdiction. Petrillo pioneered
in developing the standby in the field of music. (A standby is
a musician who is engaged to be present on a certain occasion
though he is not expected to render any services.) The practice
has been utilized by the union especially when the employer
desired to use a nonunion musician, but it also has been used
when the employer has hired a union musician from another
jurisdiction. Sometimes a standby fee has been paid to the union
but no musicians have been required to appear for work.

Close scrutiny by Congress of various practices by the musi-
cians union has made the AFM less inclined to use the standby.
Standbys have been eliminated completely from the radio by the
Lea Act of 1946. Formerly Petrillo frequently utilized this device
whenever amateurs or children were employed as musical per-
formers. Petrillo also succeeded in adopting a related make-work
scheme. Employers, particularly in the theaters, are required to
hire a minimum number of men for an engagement. There is
little doubt that on many occasions fewer musicians would

51

suffice for the purposes of the producers. He has eliminated free
rehearsals and he has banned the practice whereby musicians have
played without pay in a public place for their own amusement
on occasions when other musicians might have been hired.
When Alec Templeton and Tommy Dorsey played some music
while waiting for studio pictures to be taken after a broadcast,
Petrillo sent the advertising agency which handled the show a
bill for $33 overtime.

Petrillo is a tough man to deal with. Formerly, he accepted a
compromise only as a last resort; though frequently his opening
demands during negotiations merely are maneuvers to secure
a more strategic bargaining position. His word is good and all
employers who have dealt with him admit readily that his oral
promise is just as satisfactory as a written contract. Nor has he
ever violated or broken contracts. Petrillo does not tolerate
performers who are not doing their best, or who appear late or
who get to work in an inebriated condition. These players are
warned and fined, if the circumstances warrant such action. The
policy of the AFM has never been to guarantee jobs to specific
musicians. Each man stands or falls on his own merit.

At the head of the Chicago local stands the president with
wide discretionary powers. There are six other members on the
board of directors elected by the musicians. This board acts on
all matters not specifically provided for in the bylaws. The union
has a trial board of nine men, a body of original jurisdiction,
which hears all charges of violations of wage scales and union
bylaws. This board is elected by the members and like the other
officials has a five-year term. The president may appoint a group
of assistants to aid him in conducting the affairs of the local.11

The revenues of the local are derived from initiation fees of
$50, annual dues of $16 or $20, and an income tax on the
earnings of musicians, the rate depending on the amount earned
per week. The tax is highest on radio engagements. The union
also derives funds from fines. It pays death benefits to its mem-
bers, has a hospitalization plan, and operates a relief depart-
ment.

Despite public criticism of Petrillo, the members of the local
support him wholeheartedly and enthusiastically. He has raised
the wages, reduced the hours, and improved the working con-
ditions of the union members by significant and substantial

52

amounts. The musicians feel and believe that if there is anyone
who can get something for them, that man is Petrillo. There is
little likelihood that the membership will turn him out as long
as he wants his Chicago job. Formerly, complete reports were
made to the local on operations and activities in the Inter-
mezzo, the monthly publication of the local; but this newspaper
has not been published for several years. The union has flour-
ished during Petrillo's tenure in office. His attempts to enlarge
the jurisdiction of the union, however, by including radio an-
nouncers and sound effects men proved to be abortive.

Since he was elected to the presidency of the national union,
Petrillo has spent much time in New York, where the main
headquarters of the AFM are located. He prefers Chicago to
New York. Of New York he says: "What a town! Everybody in
it's a lawyer. I get to town and sit down, and bam!— there's a
dozen lawyers, all try in' to serve a paper on me."12 He is the
highest paid labor leader in the United States. He receives
$26,000 as president of the local plus a contingency fund and,
until 1944, a sum sufficient to pay the income tax on this
amount. In addition, he has been provided with an automobile,
a chauffeur if he desires one, and formerly with bodyguards. On
occasion, the local has given him presents of various kinds, such
as the money to pay for a trip to Europe with his wife, and a
$25,000 summer home in Wisconsin. He can get anything he
wants. Since his election to the presidency of the national union,
he has received in addition a salary of $20,000 plus a contin-
gency fund and expense allowances which amount to many
additional thousands of dollars.

As a family man, Petrillo is a proud father and devoted
husband. He was married to Marie Frullate in 1916. One of
their sons, Lester, died from football injuries two decades
ago. The eldest, James J., is the financial secretary of the Chi-
cago local of the AFM. He has another son, Leroy, and a daugh-
ter, Marie. In May 1951, Petrillo set up the Lester Petrillo
memorial fund for disabled musicians in memory of his son.

Petrillo generally remembers his own humble beginnings and
appreciates the effects of poverty. Sometimes, however, he has
become too emotional in an attempt to demonstrate his patriot-
ism and loyalty to the United States. During the second World
War he required all orchestras to play the Star Spangled Banner

53

before and after every program. Subsequently, in testifying
before a Senate committee in 1943, he magnanimously said:
"Senator, the A. F. of M. is second to none in patriotism. If we
are needed in the factories, we'll go, including myself."13

James Caesar Petrillo looks and acts tough.14 He is only five
feet, six inches in height, but weighs about 190 pounds. During
the years in which he has fought for the musicians, he has de-
pended only to a slight extent on aid and support from other
labor organizations. The only union which occasionally worked
with Petrillo was the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees, whose notorious Chicago leader during the 1930's
was George E. Browne. Together they were better able to raise
wages in the theaters of Chicago to the highest level in the
country.

Petrillo's behavior and actions can be appreciated only in
connection with his environment and background. His boyhood
and youth, passed in the city of Chicago during an era of
violence, racketeering, and labor wars, were marked by personal
difficulty and strife. Petrillo found his place amid that turmoil
and made his mark. Times of stress call for tough leaders. Pe-
trillo played his part well. As his grip on the industry and on
the union became more secure, his attitudes mellowed notice-
ably. Nevertheless, employers are not yet in a position to take
advantage of this apparent mildness. Above all, in evaluating
the man, his honesty and his integrity have impressed his op-
ponents. Joseph H. Ream, the executive vice president of the
Columbia Broadcasting System, told a committee of Congress
in 1948: "So far as I know . . . Mr. Petrillo is always a gen-
tleman."15

THE MUSICIANS A

ENCOUNTER TECHNOLOGY • *

". . . nothing will destroy the usefulness of an organiza-
tion surer than to set its face against progress no matter
how unfavorable we may at present consider same to our
interests."

JOSEPH NICHOLAS WEBER

• Motion Pictures with Sound

At first, the strength of the musicians union lay in its control
over instrumentalists in the theaters. Before the development of
the motion picture industry, the theater orchestras were found
mainly in the combination houses where the dramas, musical
comedies, and farce comedies were performed. Many additional
musicians were employed in the burlesque and vaudeville
theaters. Throughout the country' there were about 1,000 houses,
but the bulk of theatrical employment was provided by about
200 orchestras, each containing, on the average, eight men.
(Rarely did a theater orchestra have as many as 15 men.) It
was the theater musicians, numbering only a few thousand,
who held the most permanent and most desirable jobs in the
field of music. Until 1926, they were the most powerful and
important element in the musicians unions.

Rendition of music was profoundly changed by the develop-
ment of two inventions of the late nineteenth century. These in-
ventions, the recording of sound and the motion picture, were
both the work of Thomas A. Edison. Though the origin of the
record goes back to 1877, its commercial possibilities and uses
were not recognized until 1900. The formation of several Euro-
pean companies at that time for the exploitation of this inven-
tion was soon followed by similar developments in this country.
The American celebrity recordings began in 1903 and during
the subsequent decade the emphasis of musical records was on
singing rather than on instrumental presentations. But the
fidelity of the tone constantly improved and made musical re-

55

productions more worthwhile. In 1913, it was possible to begin
orchestral recording. This type of presentation proved to be
exceedingly popular.

The effect of these events on the musicians was salutary. The
public accepted the record and the phonograph, and they
became important household appliances. The result was a wider
understanding and appreciation of the various forms of music.
The use of records did not curtail the number of jobs available
to musicians. Though there were probably many occasions and
celebrations when records were substituted for live musicians,
the effects of these situations on employment opportunities
were more than counterbalanced by the musical education of
large numbers of people and the ensuing demand for musical
performances. The utilization of records in competition with
living musicians did not become a major problem until the
1930's when the radio industry began to place extensive depend-
ence upon the disks.

Recorded music, however, developed in another way in
connection with motion pictures. The kinetoscope was invented
in 1889 and five years later the first showing of motion pictures
took place. Until 1910 motion films were a novelty and were
used mainly as an auxiliary feature of vaudeville. But the
appearance of the multireel picture in 1909 assured the success
of the industry.

One of the first groups to benefit from the introduction of
motion pictures was the musicians for the performance of music
was necessary to relieve the monotony of pictures which were
then unaccompanied by sound. The programs of the picture
houses divided themselves into two classes. In one category
vaudeville attractions were supplemented by pictures and the
regular orchestra was retained. In the other group only pictures
were shown but these were accompanied by music. During that
early period, stages were not especially built or furnished for
the presentation and many stores and halls were turned into
motion picture houses.

During the second decade of this century a wave of theater
building swept the country. The number of theaters in most
towns and cities multiplied. In many instances, the supply of
musicians, especially of organists, became inadequate. But the
increased demand soon brought on an increased supply, and by

56

the middle of the 1920's an equilibrium had been reached in
connection with the employment of musicians in the theaters.
The motion picture industry had been responsible for a tenfold
increase in the number of musicians employed in the theaters.

Various picture house managers, but particularly Samuel L.
Rothafel (better known as Roxy) , favored the use of large
orchestras, so that in many cases the ensemble approached sym-
phonic proportions. In 1926 there were 22,000 players employed
in the pits of theaters throughout the country. They were hired
to play appropriate music during the course of the picture.

The existence of the musicians' jobs depended upon the fact
that the pictures were silent. Neither music nor words were
rendered mechanically. Words were suggested by the addition
of titles or brief statements thrown on the screen explaining the
action. Music was added by the live musicians. Scientists, how-
ever, were engaged constantly to find a method by which the
production of both words and music by mechanical means
could be achieved.

The theater musicians comprised nearly a fifth of the total
membership of the American Federation of Musicians in the
1920's and their solid support gave the union much of the
power which it exerted. Suddenly, in 1926, the musicians were
struck by the first blow from mechanical music. The potency
of the blow was of such force that it nearly shattered the union.
Warner Brothers introduced the Vitaphone to New York City
audiences. The Vitaphone is a device which synchronizes a
disk of phonographic music with the action of the picture by an
attachment placed in the booth of the operator. The following
year, Fox Film Corporation gave its first public demonstration
of Movietone. This invention records the sound on the same
film with the motion picture.

Although the installation of sound equipment in the theaters
throughout the country was delayed by several factors, even-
tual utilization of the new devices was inevitable. The leaders
of the union hoped desperately that sound projection was a
passing fad which would be abandoned by the public after a
short trial. Furthermore, Weber did not know what to do and,
under those circumstances, he did nothing. The existence of
union contracts with the theaters in the United States served to
cushion any immediate substantial adverse effects on employ-

57

ment. In many cases, the contract extended for several years
and the theater was not able to eliminate the orchestra even if
it had that desire. In other cases, however, the theater was able
to purchase the contract from the union. The public, in general,
did not protest when motion picture orchestras were replaced.

The economics of the situation was the decisive element in
bringing about the replacement of musicians. The cost of main-
taining an ensemble of only 15 men at an average wage of $60
a week, was $46,800 a year. This figure excludes the salary of
the conductor. The cost of installing sound apparatus was
from $13,500 to $15,000 for a house seating 2,500 to 3,500; and
$9,000 for a house with a capacity of 750 to 1,250 persons. Even
when the costs of operations are added the saving to theater
owners was obviously enormous. By 1929, 2,000 theaters had
been wired for sound pictures.

There were still over 19,000 musicians employed in the
theaters in 1929 and they were receiving almost $1,000,000 a
week in wages. The next year there were fewer than 14,000 men
so employed and the weekly wages had declined to less than
$700,000. Since 1930, the number of musicians employed in the
theaters has hovered around 5,000. As the volume of unem-
ployed AFM men increased, the power of the musicians union
waned. Regretfully, Weber admitted in 1931 that the union had
lost its ability to strike successfully. Not a single theater could
be closed by the refusal of musicians to work. The substitution
of sound pictures for silent films and orchestras had been
effectively achieved by the theater owners.

The displaced musicians were unable to find other desirable
employment in the field of music. In 1929 there were 20 appli-
cants for every vacancy in symphony orchestras, though three
years prior to that time it was difficult for a symphony manager
to induce a good theater player to change his job. It is true
that the production of sound films opened up approximately
200 new jobs. The studios needed musicians to record the music
for the synchronized sound films. But only musicians of the
highest caliber could be used for these jobs paying $500 a week.
The average unemployed theater musician was not equipped
to engage in the delicate work involved.

The scarcity of these recording jobs did not deter many hun-
dreds of musicians from traveling to Los Angeles in the hope

58

of being engaged by the motion picture industry. Almost all
were disappointed and disillusioned. After staying for a while,
they had to retrace their steps homeward, often being forced
to borrow money in order to meet expenses. Weber therefore
gave the Los Angeles local special authority to refuse transfer
members the right to work in motion pictures.1 The union
desired to curtail the heavy influx of men into that region be-
cause it knew that their chances of securing jobs were negli-
gible.

The weakened condition of the union was aggravated by
internal dissension, internecine strife, and external pressures.
Important elements in the musicians union favored taking the
bull by the horns in attacking the problem. Many locals, but
particularly the one in St. Louis, wanted musicians to stop
recording. They felt that such action would eliminate the pro-
duction of sound films and restore the theater jobs. The Com-
munists in some of the larger locals proposed that the union
should amalgamate with the other entertainment unions in
order to gain strength.2 Weber, however, opposed these factions
because he believed that it was impossible to block technological
advances permanently. Said Weber: ". . . nothing will destroy
the usefulness of an organization surer than to set its face against
progress no matter how unfavorable we may at present consider
same to our interests. . . ."3

It was Weber's belief that since the public would make the
final decision a propaganda campaign could succeed in molding
and turning public opinion against sound pictures. On the other
hand, he feared that any decision to stop recording for films
would only lead the motion picture interests to guarantee an-
nual salaries to men who would leave the Federation. It did
not appear that it would be too difficult to induce many quali-
fied men to resign from the union in exchange for the high
scale offered by the film industry. The Communist arguments,
the union heads maintained, were intended merely to disrupt
the AFM and were criticized in those terms. The Communists
had taken advantage of the difficulties of the union to inflame
the members against the leadership, but these radical agitators
were unsuccessful. The AFM took a strong position in opposi-
tion to the Communist movement during the entire decade of
the 1920's.

59

Weber's grip on the organization, even during this critical
time, was complete. His program was carried out in its entirety.
The AFM conventions of 1928 and 1929 refused to bar mem-
bers from playing for mechanical music machines. Instead
Weber's propaganda program was adopted. He was authorized
to spend considerable sums of money to develop and organize
opinion against sound pictures. But as the program was being
put into effect the difficulties of the musicians were augmented
by the increasing severity of the economic depression. The de-
pression further complicated the employment problem of
musicians.

The American press generally has been antagonistic to labor
unions. The musicians union however was more highly respected
than most other labor organizations. The union was known to
carry out faithfully all the provisions in the contracts which it
negotiated. The conservative attitude of its leaders had been
demonstrated to the satisfaction of businessmen by the experi-
ences of many years. Newspapers rarely criticized the AFM
severely. In this respect Weber was fortunate, for success in
molding public opinion required the active cooperation of
many newspapers. The project he undertook, however, afforded
him of itself a partial means of gaining the support of the press.

The publicity campaign against sound movies or "dehuman-
ized entertainment of canned music" began in earnest in 1929.
The implications that the struggle was one of workers against
machines were avoided. Instead the union expressed its opposi-
tion on a cultural and educational plane and offered the
opinion that mechanical music tended to debase the art. News
stories were released by the union to the press and special
articles were prepared for labor newspapers. General criticisms
of technological improvements, by other labor leaders were
reproduced.

Late in 1929 a systematic advertising campaign was launched.
Cartoons ridiculing sound pictures became a regular feature in
the distribution of criticism. A publicity firm was engaged and
advertising space to present the message of the AFM was
bought from 798 newspapers and 24 magazines. The huge ex-
penditures on advertising were responsible partially for the
favorable attitude taken by the press towards the union cam-
paign. Large numbers of editorials supporting the union's

60

contention that the public should shun mechanical music ap-
peared in the American press.

That the methods adopted by Weber to combat the inroads
of sound pictures on the employment opportunities of musi-
cians were not approved by the entire membership, has been
indicated already. Petrillo, it appears, did not agree with the
union's arguments against sound pictures. He was not con-
cerned particularly with the fact that music was being debased.
Instead, as early as 1929, he expressed the main argument against
mechanical music, which subsequently was adopted and is
now used by the American Federation of Musicians. He con-
tended that unlike other cases of technological displacement,
the musician himself was creating the mechanical device used
to replace him and in effect, therefore, the musician was de-
stroying himself.4 Petrillo argued that the musician had a right
to protect himself in these circumstances. Though Petrillo
reiterated this argument consistently, it was not generally used
by the AFM until he became president.

Early in 1930, the union announced in newspapers through-
out the country that it was creating a Music Defense League.
In order to join, a person was required merely to sign and send
to the union a coupon published in any of the hundreds of
papers or dozens of magazines carrying them, in which opposi-
tion to the elimination of living music from the theaters was
expressed. No obligation of any kind was assumed by the signer.
Eventually, over three million coupons of membership in the
Music Defense League were received by the AFM.

Perhaps the major accomplishment of the Music Defense
League was that it retarded the contraction of employment in
the theaters. The success achieved was quite limited, however,
as employment in the theaters declined to 4,100 musicians in
1934. The Music Defense League campaign cost the union
nearly a million dollars over a two-year period. The propaganda,
however, was effective in maintaining public interest in living
music. Some support for this conclusion may be derived from
an investigation conducted by the inquiring reporter of a New
York newspaper in which five of the six people questioned stated
that they would prefer to see the return of picture house or-
chestras.5 Costs, however, were the decisive factor and the
cinema industry was not impressed by mere expressions of pref-

61

erence. Moreover, the position of the union was further
weakened by the constant improvements in the production of
the music for the sound films.

• The Union in the Depression

During this period the national organization encouraged its
locals to undertake a project aimed at increasing the public's
appreciation of music. It hoped that the project subsequently
would create additional jobs for musicians and would relieve
some of the unemployment which existed. The project, called
Living Music Day, was operated on a local basis. The musicians'
local union in any city first secured the cooperation of a local
newspaper. This was relatively easy because of the favorable
relationship which had been built up during the advertising
campaign. The newspaper agreed to print a Living Music Day
supplement on a selected day. This supplement contained the
advertisements of local merchants, each of whom noted that he
was sponsoring a concert in his store on that day. The local
unions supplied the bands and orchestras to the merchants
without any charge.

The locals were expected to gain increased employment op-
portunities from the publicity. A Living Music Day was con-
ducted in more than 120 cities and much favorable publicity
resulted. Indeed, so widespread was the publicity, that a Living
Music Day was held in Johannesburg, South Africa. It is not
clear whether there were any important effects on employment
even though a few occasional jobs subsequently resulted— partic-
ularly in connection with merchandise shows, style openings,
and other business and civic events. As a general conclusion, the
project was not successful because the original intention of the
union to make this event an annual affair was never carried out.
Very few locals were willing to repeat the undertaking.

It should not be forgotten that external factors were super-
imposing difficulties on the problems faced by the union. For
the effects of the depression beginning in 1929 continued to
become more serious until 1933. Employment opportunities in
almost all industries were contracting and unemployment was
mounting throughout the country. Many labor unions declined
substantially in membership and were considerably weakened;
some went out of existence. The musicians suffered also from

62

these general adverse effects. The prevailing economic conditions
reinforced the problems arising from technological change.

Some locals in the AFM attempted to alleviate unemploy-
ment through various devices. Petrillo's local in Chicago paid
out union funds to unemployed members who were assigned
to play in the parks and charitable institutions of Cook County,
Illinois. In addition, hundreds of baskets of goods were distrib-
uted each week to unemployed members of the Chicago local.
The New York local also aided its needy members. Through-
out the United States, many unemployed musicians were
assisted.

The election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as president
ushered in large-scale changes in the American economy and
brought about direct governmental attempts to mitigate the
general distress which had been caused by the depression. The
activities of the federal government primarily affected musicians
through the operations of the National Recovery Administration
and of the relief programs. Under the NRA, codes of fair com-
petition were drawn up in each industry which, among other
things, fixed maximum hours of work and minimum wage
rates. The musicians, however, generally opposed operating
under the provisions of these codes. Though their union had
been greatly depleted in strength during the preceding five years,
it was still strong enough to maintain hours, wages, and work-
ing conditions which were far superior to those enjoyed by
other industries. For example, only rarely did a musician on
a steady engagement work more than 40 hours a week; so that
a code which set a 40-hour maximum work week was of no
benefit to the musicians. The union had little to gain by accept-
ing a code which specified working conditions for industry
which were inferior to those it enjoyed already.

The AFM was willing to depend on its own economic
strength to achieve its objectives. It feared that if it subscribed
to any code containing a minimum wage lower than that which
musicians were getting, a tendency to cut wages would be
established. Though the musicians union was interested in the
radio code, hotel code, and shipping code, it only joined the
legitimate theater code. It soon withdrew from that code, how-
ever, when the representatives of industry requested an amend-
ment that disagreements between labor and management should

63

be resolved by arbitration. The union did not desire to be
guided by the decisions of outsiders. Most of the codes drawn
up left the musicians free to negotiate in their accustomed
manner.

At the request of the government, the union undertook to
stagger employment in the theaters in order to spread the work
among a greater number of musicians. Theaters replaced those
musicians holding steady engagements every fourth week. An
unemployed musician was used as a substitute. The program,
however, was designed so as not to increase the cost of music
to employers. Shortly thereafter, however, the program was
abrogated when it was found that, on a national scale, the
staggering policy was unsuccessful. Protests by employers, who
objected to the disruption of a well-knit and unified orchestra
which resulted from substitution, and discontent among the
musicians, who were forced to yield some of their work, led to
the abandonment of the plan, in 1934; upon the consent of the
Administrator of the NRA. Individual locals were permitted
to continue to stagger employment if they were so inclined.
Though staggering was common in various industries at that
time and was endorsed and approved by a large number of
labor unions, it was not applied by the musicians to any other
musical field after it failed in the theater.

The relief activities of the federal government were examined
carefully by the musicians union. Outright doles to musicians
were endorsed heartily by the union. The administration of
work relief projects, however, raised some significant issues. The
union desired that musicians employed on relief jobs sponsored
by the Work Projects Administration should perform work
in which they would use their skill, instead of other unrelated
work. This proved to be unfeasible on many occasions because
some of the responsible administrative officials did not fully
support the idea that musical performance should constitute a
relief activity.

During the last half of the 1930's the union fought all attempts
to reduce the rate of pay of musicians employed by the WPA
and objected to Congressional cuts in relief appropriations. It
felt that expansion, rather than contraction, of relief work was
in order. At the peak of WPA activities, 12,500 members of the
AFM were employed by the agency, and an additional 2,500

64

musicians on the rolls were nonunion members and music
teachers.

The union of musicians had passed through a period in which
its very existence had been at stake. The decade 1926-1936 was
one in which it could not do much more than hold its own. But
despite numerous setbacks the AFM was held together by its
leaders. Although technological displacement of musicians and
the effects of the depression were still serious in 1936, the eco-
nomic power of the AFM had passed its low point and was
on the rise.

The eighteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States which had been adopted in 1920 had made serious in-
roads in the employment of musicians, for it had brought an
abrupt end in the sale of liquor; and many establishments
which had depended on such sale and simultaneously had been
employing musicians were forced out of business. But the re-
peal of the eighteenth amendment by the twenty-first amend-
ment, in 1933, was a herald of returning opportunities of em-
ployment in night clubs, cafes, and restaurants serving liquor.
The membership of the union, which had reached a peak of
146,326 in 1929 had declined sharply until 1934 when it stood
at 101,111. Then it began a slow but steady rise, and subse-
quently, for a number of years, it showed a tremendous accele-
ration in growth.

The ability of the union to overcome what appeared to be
imminent financial collapse was the single most important factor
in giving it renewed vigor and in helping it to re-establish its
position. The expenditures of the union had been rising over
the years, but the income did not keep pace with the outlay
during the depression. In 1932 the main sources of income
available to the union were per capita taxes, fines, and condi-
tional membership fees. The per capita taxes collected during
those years had declined, however, because of the reduced
membership. The chief item of expenditure was salaries and
wages of officers and employees. These payments did not de-
cline. As a result the general fund of the union showed a
substantial deficit after the operations of 1932. This was also
true in 1933.

Under these circumstances, a change of lasting importance
was inaugurated in union finances. The laws of the union still

65

required traveling orchestras to charge a fee of 30 per cent over
the local scale so that the travelers would be at a disadvantage
when competing with local musicians. This money was for-
warded to the union and held until the completion of the
engagement; it was then returned to the traveling musicians.
For many years, however, it was clear to the officers of the
Federation that evasion of this law was notorious. Double con-
tracts were used and leaders often loaned the amount represent-
ing 30 per cent of the engagement price to the members of the
orchestra for temporary payment to the union. National officers
therefore urged the repeal of the law. Said the treasurer of the
AFM: "I will not go on any further with the detail of this
'nightmare,' but I would ask the Convention to take under
serious consideration the question of abolishing the entire 30%
law. I am of the firm opinion no one is getting it except those
few who would get the same price if the law did not exist."6
Local unions, however, demurred from agreeing to such action.

Finally a compromise was reached and was put into effect in
September 1934. The finances of the organization had been im-
proved somewhat by 1934, because for the preceding two years
a two per cent tax had been levied on traveling orchestras; this
tax was deducted from the 30 per cent fee sent into the treasurer.
But both the 30 per cent levy and the two per cent tax were
given up. Instead, a 10 per cent surcharge over local price lists
was instituted as the minimum scale for traveling orchestras.
This 10 per cent was paid to the local which then forwarded
the money to the national treasurer. At the end of the engage-
ment four per cent was sent back to the local, three per cent
was returned to the band member, and the remaining three per-
cent was kept by the national union. The enforcement of this
rule was much more practicable because the 10 per cent sur-
charge was not as obnoxious to employers as the 30 per cent
levy had been, and attempts to evade payment therefore were
not too frequent. The success of this plan soon was established.
The general fund was balanced easily beginning in 1935; and
the 10 per cent surcharge remained the most important bud-
getary item of the next decade.

The campaign to increase employment in theaters was in-
tensified in 1936 and 1937. Previously dependence had been
placed on appeals to the public. The new pressures were

66

exerted directly on the motion picture houses. Though under-
taken only by the individual locals throughout the country,
these drives received the support of the international union.
The most spectacular events and demonstrations occurred in
New York City. Huge picket lines paraded before the leading
picture houses of the city in an effort to induce the management
to hire live musicians. Near the end of its campaign, the New
York local concentrated its efforts against the RKO chain. The
drive culminated in a theater sit-in strike at the RKO Palace by
200 members of the union.7 No permanent gains, however, were
registered by the musicians as a result of these efforts.

The losses sustained in theater employment have never been
recovered. At one time musicians had been employed in 4,000
motion picture houses, but in 1950 only 458 theaters employed
them though there were 9,635 houses with a seating capacity of
500 or more persons. Of these 458, 57 used men on a 52-week
basis.8

Employment of Musicians in Theaters in 1950

Number Earnings of Musicians

Type of Performance of Musicians

(dollars)

Burlesque 171

526,898

Dramatic and Musical 1,471

2,818,127

Opera and Ballet 808

1,008,405

Organ 18

56,310

Vaudeville and Presentation 1,617

2,656,980

Total 4,085

7,066,720

• Musical Records and the Radio Industry

Gradually the American Federation of Musicians formulated
more complete policies regarding the mechanical reproduction
of music. Primary emphasis was shifted from the theaters to
other employers and dispensers of music. The union desired to
gain greater control over juke boxes, wired music, and radio
stations. It had failed to attain any influence in connection with
the distribution of phonographic records.

The commercial success of the radio industry was not assured
until after it already had been in operation for several years.

67

The broadcasting industry had its origin in 1920 when the
results of the Harding-Cox election were announced on the first
nonamateur program, but it was not until 1922 that the first
commercially sponsored program took place. The national net-
works, NBC and CBS, were organized in 1926 and 1927. In the
latter year Congress established federal control over the radio.
This authority was exercised through the Federal Radio Com-
mission until 1934; and then the Federal Communications
Commission assumed jurisdiction over regulation of the industry.

During the early 1920's musicians began appearing on radio
programs. They were not paid for their services, but neverthe-
less felt that the publicity which they received by having their
names mentioned on the air was more than adequate compensa-
tion for their efforts. Soon, however, the musicians union, on
a local basis, established wage scales for radio work and the
musicians were expected to adhere to them. Radio stations then
found that musical records frequently could be used as a sub-
stitute for the personal appearance of performers. It became a
common practice to play recordings with the specific intention
of misleading the public into the belief that a live rendition
was taking place.

The increased use of music records and the misrepresentation
as to whether the program was recorded led to the first vigor-
ous protests by the AFM, in 1930, to the Federal Radio Com-
mission. The rules of the governmental agencies supervising
radio always have required that when records are played they
must be announced as such. The union also attempted to pre-
vent the broadcasters from using phonographic records by
having the phrase "for home use only" inserted on the face of
each record. The union then encouraged the institution of
tests suits in the courts to determine whether a station could
disregard the afore-mentioned condition agreed to between the
recording companies and the performing artists. During the
early cases the union's contentions prevailed. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania ruled that musicians had the right to
prevent the unauthorized use of their recordings.9 But the
federal courts overruled the state courts. The circuit court of
appeals decided in 1940 that the property of the orchestra
leader in the performance ended with the sale of the records,
so that radio broadcasting companies could not be restrained

68

from using the records in broadcasts.10 It appeared that musicians
could not establish property rights in recordings without spe-
cific Congressional legislation (such rights have been given to
the record manufacturers in England) . In the United States,
motion picture producers, on the other hand, have had copy-
right rights to their pictures since 1912. Furthermore, the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers has had
the right to collect royalties for the use of the songs written
by its members. The AFM has opposed the right of ASCAP to
make these collections, though it has favored giving a similar
power to musicians.11 Since, however, the union did not have
any legal control over the use of musical records by the radio
industry, it was forced to take more direct action.

Throughout the 1930's the most vociferous opposition to
recordings was expressed by James C. Petrillo. It has been indi-
cated already that he was the first to stress that musicians were
destroying their own employment opportunities by making
records. But he was also responsible for the first economic pres-
sure exerted against the broadcasters in connection with record-
ings. In 1931, the Chicago local called a strike of Chicago radio
musicians effective at midnight of New Year's Eve. One of the
purposes of the strike was to prevent the use of records in com-
mercial broadcasting. But the strike was settled when the
stations agreed to reduce the working hours of musicians.

In December 1936, Petrillo took the lead again. He announced
that effective the following February 1, in order to end the
menace and threat to employment which had been brought
about by canned music, the Chicago Federation of Musicians
would not permit its members to make any recordings or tran-
scriptions without special permission from the executive board
of the local. He recognized that the result might be only to
shift recording work from Chicago to other jurisdictions, but he
maintained that the musicians could not afford to wait any
longer before undertaking an attack on the problem of recorded
music. "Someone had to start the move," said Petrillo, "and I
believe all other Locals will follow."12 He was not discouraged
by the fact that musicians in Chicago would suffer some im-
mediate loss of employment.

Though Weber may have doubted the widsom of such drastic
action by Petrillo, he was forced to approve it. For by the time

69

the June convention rolled around in 1937 some persons felt
that Petrillo had become a strong challenger for the presidency
of the AFM. At the convention, therefore, Weber commended
Petrillo's plan; and then the AFM again endorsed and re-elected
its president. Weber received a mandate from the convention to
begin a fight on the encroachments of mechanical music.

Weber called in representatives of the radio, transcription,
and record companies for conferences. He made sure that they
would come by setting a date on which a nationwide radio
strike would go into effect if the broadcasters did not attend.
He also threatened to halt all recording work by musicians. The
union, however, was ready to give up its plan to ban recordings
provided it could increase the employment of musicians in the
radio stations. Many more than a majority of all radio stations
did not employ any musicians, but depended for their music on
recordings and on network programs. Neither the radio strike
nor the record ban ever was put into effect because the un-
folding events led first to postponement and then to aban-
donment.

The union formulated demands under which every radio
station using musical records would place on its payroll a num-
ber of musicians acceptable to the AFM. These musicians all
were to be union members. Furthermore, no station could
transmit any musical program to another station that did not
employ musicians. Hundreds of radio stations were represented
at the conferences. The representatives of the industry were
willing to compromise but for a time they maintained that the
stations ought to be permitted to broadcast without any re-
strictions as to the destination and that it was the union's job,
not industry's, to get the small stations to hire more musicians.

After 14 weeks of intense negotiations the AFM reached an
agreement with the key stations of the three networks (ABC
was not yet in existence) and with the independent network
affiliates. The networks and their affiliates had been spending
$3,500,000 yearly in wages for musicians. They agreed to spend
an additional $2,000,000 on staff musicians, a quarter of this
amount being assigned to the key stations of the networks. In
1938, such quota agreements also were reached by the union
with unaffiliated stations negotiating through the National
Committee of Independent Broadcasters. The unaffiliated sta-

70

tions agreed to expend for staff musicians an amount equal to
five and a half per cent of 1937 time sales over $15,000, except
that stations whose income did not exceed $20,000 were ex-
empted. The terms of these agreements, which were valid for
two years, provided that staff musicians could be used in both
sustaining and commercial programs, that stations should not
pay rates for musicians higher than those paid by advertisers,
and that orchestra leaders' salaries should be counted in the
quota.

Subsequently, the Department of Justice advised the parties
that the agreements were illegal so that when they expired in
1940 they were not renewed. A precarious armistice existed
thereafter; but although the number of radio stations increased,
the number of staff musicians declined. Late in 1938 the AFM
began licensing companies making recordings and transcrip-
tions. These licenses were contracts by which the companies
agreed to employ only union members, in return for which the
AFM permitted its members to make records. No musician,
however, could work for a company that did not have a license.

• Other Technological Displacement

The opinion of the Department of Justice reopened the con-
flict between the AFM and the radio broadcasting industry.
Simultaneously, the union was grappling with other problems
raised by mechanical music. The union has had no opportunity
to prevent the competition of juke boxes. Though many of the
more than a half million juke boxes in operation are located in
small establishments and have not displaced live musicians, it
may be inferred from the fact that so many machines have been
introduced in cafes and restaurants that the jobs of hundreds
of musicians have been eliminated. Many of the two- or three-
piece bands formerly found in the small towns are no longer
used.

The exercise of control over wired music, supplied by the
Muzak Corporation, has been somewhat more successful. This
•ervice consists of a specially prepared transcription played in
A central station and sent over the wires to those desiring this
music. Under the contract executed between the company and
the New York local of the AFM in 1938, the company stipu-
lated that it would not make its facilities available to any

71

establishment if such action would cause the replacement of
live musicians. Since wired music is used in many places which
might employ small orchestras, in various instances musicians
have been displaced. This is particularly true of the hotel salon
ensemble and the restaurant string orchestra. The union, how-
ever, has feared to exercise its full rights under the contract
because Muzak Corporation might substitute ordinary phono-
graph records for the special records it now uses. Wage rates paid
by the Muzak company were not covered by the local contract,
since they are based upon the scales set by the national union.

The union fought a technique by which a great portion of
the music used on sustaining programs was not paid for by the
radio station. The stations arranged with hotels and restaurants
to pick up, by a system of remote control, music played at those
establishments. In return, the hotels and restaurants received
free advertising when the station announced the place of origin
of the music. Musicians, for a short time, received extra pay
from the station when it picked up the program. Today, in the
jurisdiction of the New York local the hotel pays each musician
involved in the remote control broadcast a fee of three dollars
above the scale. The money is turned over to a radio remote
control fund which is used by the local for the relief of needy
members. One of the novel ideas which might have injured the
union but which never caught on was a plan to make a film of
a band, throw the film on a screen in a hotel restaurant, and
play the recorded music of that band. In another area of tech-
nological advance, the American Federation of Musicians suc-
cessfully negotiated with the film industry to prevent "dubbing,"
the practice of transferring music from one picture to another.

• The Decline of Weber

The years between 1926 and 1940 were times of strain for the
American Federation of Musicians. At the opening of the period,
the union was at peak strength. It completely controlled the
rendition of professional music in the United States and domi-
nated most of the American employers of musicians. Then there
came a sudden weakening of the union and a substantial decline
in membership, which shook the organization to its very founda-
tion. But by 1940 the AFM had recovered most of its former
strength and its position was as firm as ever. The musicians

72

union had met and had overcome the twin blows resulting
from mechanization and depression. Other unions also passed
through a cycle during those years, but in few cases were the
effects as vigorous or as significant. Some unions were not able
to survive even the effects of one of these forces.

Throughout all this time, Joseph N. Weber remained in un-
disputed control of the organization. His political acumen and
foresight were manifested continually and his annual re-election
was a matter of course. Indeed, even during the period when
musicians were suffering from heavy unemployment, Weber's
salary was increased substantially and his expense allowances
were multiplied. There was considerable criticism, but it gen-
erally was sporadic, often was incoherent, and never was consoli-
dated. To some extent Weber's control over the AFM was made
possible by the rivalry and jealousy between locals. (In 1929
he had been elected a vice president of the American Federation
of Labor.)

The musicians union had followed the general practice of
labor unions and had remained neutral in politics. But during
the period of the New Deal, Weber broke with precedent and
supported Franklin D. Roosevelt openly and enthusiastically.
It is a curious historical fact that Franklin Roosevelt had been
denounced vigorously by this union back in 1914. As Acting
Secretary of the Navy he had answered a communication from
the Chicago local of the AFM with a routine letter expressing
the views of his Department regarding the United States Marine
Band. The union then announced that Roosevelt was un-
familiar with the problem and claimed that ". . . Roosevelt . . .
was particularly pernicious in his hostility to civilian musicians
and could always be depended on to find some technicality or a
loop-hole through which the Marine Band and other bands of
the U. S. Navy were enabled to continue unfair competition."13

But time was moving on, and Weber was getting older. In
1935 he had passed his seventieth birthday. His illnesses and
nervous breakdowns had continued to plague him. Almost
always the AFM paid Weber's doctor bills and vacation bills.
In 1934, the convention of the union ordered Weber and his
wife to take a vacation in Europe for eight weeks. It was on the
occasion of this voyage that he became better acquainted with

73

James C. Petrillo. They traveled to Europe together, as the
Chicago Federation of Musicians had authorized Petrillo and
his wife to take a trip, too. Weber soon was aware of Petrillo's
ambition and he knew that Petrillo would succeed him as
president.

The clash between these men was soon in the open. Petrillo
was younger and tougher. As an exponent of more direct action
in solving the mechanical music problem he was more aggres-
sive than Weber. Petrillo's ban of recordings in Chicago had
forced Weber to move more quickly to prevent criticism. Pe-
trillo, however, was dissatisfied with the action taken by Weber
and the other members of the international executive board in
dealing with the representatives of radio and phonograph
recorders during the negotiations of 1937 and 1938. He said so
outspokenly, and when he was overruled by his colleagues on
the international executive board, he boycotted the meetings
of the board.

In a front-page editorial in the union publication, Weber
attacked Petrillo.14 Weber denied the correctness of the general
impression that Petrillo was the strong man in the union. He
was angered particularly at a newspaper statement that: "Pe-
trillo is the 'tail that wags the dog.' What he does for the musi-
cians in Chicago sets the standard for the fiddlers, trumpeters,
flutists and accordion players all over the country." Though
Weber admitted that the musicians of Chicago were the highest-
paid men in the union, he berated Petrillo for being "a self-
appointed so-called strong man" and accused him of "dispens-
ing hot air."

As Petrillo's stature increased it became evident that it was
only a question of time before he would replace Weber. In 1937
the AFM had set up a trust fund of $250,000 for Weber and his
wife. The beneficiaries were entitled to the interest earned by
the fund, though this money was deductible from Weber's salary
as long as he remained on the union payroll. Finally, at the
convention of 1940, the forces behind Petrillo were sufficiently
strong to convince Weber to retire. Weber was eased out grace-
fully from the presidency; he had served for 40 consecutive
years, except for one year when he had been in retirement.
Weber was made honorary president and general adviser to

74

the union for the remainder of his life and was voted an annual
salary of $20,000. He held this position until his death on De-
cember 12, 1950, at the age of 85.

Petrillo was elected unanimously as president of the Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians on June 15, 1940. Petrillo was 48
years old at the time.

THE SUPREMACY OF C

THE NATIONAL UNION • **

"Senator Clark of Idaho. . . . But would you not say
pretty generally that Mr. Petrillo dominates the conven-
tion of the Federation of Musicians?
Mr. Padway. I would say exactly the opposite; he does not.
Senator Clark of Idaho. I am glad to have your expres-
sion on that."

• Centralized Control

During a hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Inter-
state Commerce Committee in 1942, Senator D. Worth Clark
asked Joseph A. Padway, attorney for the American Federation
of Musicians, whether Petrillo controlled the legislative sessions
of the AFM. Padway vehemently denied that such was the fact.
"Senator Clark of Idaho. . . . But would you not say pretty
generally that Mr. Petrillo dominates the convention of the
Federation of Musicians? Mr. Padway. I would say exactly the
opposite; he does not. Senator Clark of Idaho. I am glad to have
your expression on that."1

Both Clark and Padway were aware that Petrillo exercised
considerable discretion and power as head of the musicians
union. Padway, however, was able to express his opinion with-
out equivocation because all of Petrillo's acts as president had
been performed within the framework of the constitution and
regulations of the union and had been approved by the mem-
bers. Nevertheless, an examination of the constitution and by-
laws establishes the fact that power is centralized and vested
mainly in one man— the national president. Petrillo has com-
pletely dominated the union. Yet the members of the union
rarely have evinced criticism of their constitution and only
occasionally have they complained regarding the bylaws and
standing resolutions. The members have been behind Petrillo
because he has improved their working conditions and has de-
voted himself zealously to work for their benefit. Petrillo himself

76

passionately has denied that he exercises absolute power. He
testified before a committee of Congress to that effect in 1948.
"Mr. Hoffman. . . . You know very well, and everyone in this
room knows you are the absolute dictator as to what these locals
shall or shall not do. Mr. Petrillo. I object to that question. That
is not a fair question. Mr. Hoffman. That is a matter of opinion.
Mr. Petrillo. I am not a dictator and I don't dictate to the
locals."2

The union of musicians always has been strongly centralized
and controlled. The first president, Miller, was elected four
times and then decided not to run again. Weber held the office
for the next 40 years, except during the one year in which he
was not a candidate. The authority he exercised over the affairs
of the union may be appreciated from a remark he made, when
he was ready to retire: "It is with great pride that I am in a
position to say that almost all of the recommendations I ever
made to the Federation were enacted into laws and almost all
of them have achieved the constructive results I expected of
them."3 Petrillo was elected unanimously in 1940 and similar
action has been taken each time he has stood for re-election,
except in 1949. That year, because of widespread criticism of
the lack of democracy in the union's elections, Petrillo was
opposed for the presidency at the national convention; but
he won overwhelmingly. Indeed, there have been few occasions
in the more than 50 years of annual elections, when the dele-
gates to the convention have had a choice among candidates
for any of the top offices of the AFM.

The American Federation of Musicians of the United States
and Canada consists of locals of musicians and of the musicians
themselves. In 1936, the union extended its jurisdiction to
copyists, arrangers of music, and orchestral librarians. During
the early period of organization both the area of coverage and
the membership were expanded until musicians all over the
United States, Canada, Alaska, and Hawaii were included. In
1951, the musicians of Puerto Rico affiliated with the AFM. For
many years the number of locals has remained approximately
constant, although the number of members still is increasing.
Until September 1943, some regions in the United States were
not in the jurisdiction of any local. But at that time the AFM

77

decided that all neutral territory would be assigned to some
local, so that coverage of the country has been completed.

The AFM holds an annual convention in June, and except
in 1943 and 1945 when the conventions were canceled because,
as a war measure, the government had requested organizations
to limit their use of transportation facilities as much as possible,
these yearly meetings have taken place since 1896. Each local
may send up to three delegates, depending on its membership.
The convention is primarily a legislative body and theoretically
the supreme organ in the union. It elects the officers of the
national union— the president, vice president, secretary, treas-
urer, and five members of the executive committee, one of
whom must be a resident of Canada. All these officers collectively
constitute the international executive board.

Though each of the structural units of the AFM has its func-
tions, the powers of the president are so immense that strong
central control is established. The relevant provision of the
president's authority is in article I, section 1, of the bylaws,
which states: "Duties of President. ... It shall be his duty and
prerogative to exercise supervision over the affairs of the Fed-
eration; to make decisions in cases where, in his opinion, an
emergency exists; and to give effect to such decisions he is
authorized and empowered to promulgate and issue executive
orders, which shall be conclusive and binding upon all mem-
bers and/or Locals; any such order may by its terms (a) enforce
the Constitution, By-Laws, Standing Resolutions, or other laws,
resolutions or rules of the Federation, or (b) may annul or set
aside same or any portion thereof, except such which treat with
the finances of the organization and substitute therefor other
and different provisions of his own making, . . ."4 Numerous
specific duties are detailed, but this general provision gives the
president absolute control. These vast powers have been as-
signed to the president of the AFM since 1919, and although
they have never been utilized to the disadvantage of musicians,
the president has no clear check on his discretion. In almost
all cases where the president has had to make hasty decisions
he has consulted and received the unanimous approval of the
executive board.

A variety of problems connected with musical entertainment

78

are of a local nature and a considerable amount of decentraliza-
tion of authority and power has been necessary in this labor
union. However, the union is so constituted that the national
organization may wield control over the actions of the local.
The national may intervene whenever it feels so inclined, and
it has done that in the past. In addition to the enormous
powers of the president, the union has several means of guiding
locals and members. The International Musician, the monthly
publication of the organization, has been published since July
1901. It contains much pertinent information regarding union
matters. The latest regulations of the AFM are included in a
prominent place in the magazine, but material of educational
value to musicians also is featured. Minutes of the meetings
of the international executive board and proceedings of the
conventions are included. There are three regular columns
which focus attention on groups ostracized by the musicians
union. The journal publishes a list of suspended and expelled
members, a national defaulters list comprising the names of
employers who have not fulfilled their contracts, and an unfair
list containing the names of employers who refuse to deal with
the union or have violated some of the rules. Union members
may not work for, or with, any persons or organizations named
on any of these lists. Each member receives a copy of the
International Musician. Several years ago, the magazine was
revitalized by the appointment of a managing editor.

The president has appointed eight traveling representatives
who visit local jurisdictions to establish better contact between
the locals and the Federation. They conduct investigations
ordered by the president. In addition, an officer is appointed in
each state of the United States and in each province of Canada.
These representatives protect the interests of the AFM at the
state, provincial, and district conferences which are held peri-
odically by groups of territorially adjacent locals to discuss
regional problems.

The constitution of the union provides that musicians are
members not only of the local which they join, but of the
national as well. This provision was inserted to give the na-
tional more direct control over the musicians. Formerly condi-
tional members were accepted by the AFM directly when they
resided in an area that was unassigned to any local. Since the

79

entire country is now within the jurisdiction of some local, all
applicants must join a local union.

Officers of the AFM have the power to prevent any local
from violating laws of the national union. Relations with em-
ployers which are purely local matters are negotiated and
approved by the locals themselves, but all contracts specify that
they are valid subject to present and future rules and actions
of the AFM. This provision has enabled the national union to
pull the locals out on strike even when the local had a con-
tract. Both the president and the international executive board
have the power to remove from office a local officer who inter-
feres in any way with the purposes, objectives, or affairs of the
American Federation of Musicians.

Although it appears that the annual convention has final
authority on all matters concerning the union, this is not strictly
correct. The compromise provisions worked out at the time of
the formation of the union and written into the constitution
specify that locals are permitted one vote for each hundred
members, but no more than ten votes, in all elections. On mat-
ters affecting changes in the laws of the AFM, each local may,
upon roll call, cast as many votes as it has members. But all
laws which have been so passed are referred to a convention
committee consisting of the executive board of the AFM and
the chairmen of all committees appointed at the convention.
This group may sanction or veto the law and its action is final.5
Since chairmen of committees are appointed by the president,
the final decision need not have the support of a majority of
the delegates. However, this rule which permits the desires of
the convention delegates to be circumvented, never has been
applied; because roll call votes have not been used.

The power of the union impinges on the employer in ways
other than through negotiation. Many employers must be mem-
bers of the union and others must be licensed by the union.
Such requirements are effective in promoting control over the
industry. Some employers of musicians, such as bandleaders,
play instruments themselves, and they therefore must be mem-
bers of the union. The first group which was required to obtain
licenses from the union, in order to deal with the members,
was the bookers. The demand for jazz orchestras in the 1920's
led to the establishment of booking offices which furnished em-

80

Number of Locals and Membership in the American Federation
of Musicians in Selected Years6

Year

Convention

Number of Locals

Membership

1896

1

26

4,000

1897

2

51

5,979

1898

3

77

9,152

1899

4

91

9,563

1900

5

117

10,176

1904

9

372

37,490

1905

10

402

40,741

1906

11

402

44,451

1907

12

428

47,198

1908

13

481

50,635

1909

14

511

56,961

1910

15

536

56,565

1917

22

703

83,992

1928

33

780

146,421

1929

34

743

146,326

1930

35

736

139,398

1931

36

716

126,423

1932

37

703

118,364

1933

38

684

108,271

1934

39

675

101,111

1935

40

672

102,385

1936

41

641

105,013

1937

42

644

111,960

1938

43

685

124,221

1939

44

712

130,794

1940

45

723

134,372

1941

46

721

137,005

1942

47

718

134,853

1944

48

696

146,772

1946

49

693

181,794

1947

50

704

216,469

1948

51

711

232,370

1949

52

705

237,535

1950

53

698

239,777

1951

54

701

240,269

1952

55

702

242,167

81

ployers with such bands. Competition between different bookers
who sought to gain the commissions paid by musicians for the
jobs to which they were referred led to cutting of wage scales.
Beginning in 1936, the union has required booking agencies
to obtain licenses. These licenses have been confiscated in indi-
vidual cases for violation of rules. Recording companies were
licensed from 1938 until 1943.

• Bargaining Relationships

The union wage policy of the musicians differs from that of
most other unions. Usually the output of a plant is directly
proportional to the number of workers employed. But musi-
cians normally are hired to work as a unit. The income derived
by the employer of a band or orchestra is largely independent
of the precise number of musicians in the unit. The union
therefore must pay particular attention to the number of
musicians employed as well as to the wage rates which they
receive. Minimum numbers of musicians are set by locals for
different occasions. Where locals have feared that courts would
object to contracts which specify a minimum number of men to be
employed, they have sometimes worked out sliding scales to induce
employers to hire more musicians. At other times, the union
has bargained with the employer for a sum of money to be
spent for musicians rather than for a specific wage rate. It is
significant that though the AFM always has favored the closed
shop, it never has tried to dictate to employers the specific
musicians to be hired and it never has attempted to protect the
jobs of particular instrumentalists. The employer has been free
to hire and fire on the basis of merit without any regard for
seniority.

The ability to control the members, the locals, and the em-
ployers with whom musicians must deal has enabled the AFM
to achieve outstanding success in governing employment in the
musical field. Improvement of the wages, hours, and working
conditions have been steady and at times even spectacular.
Though most of the negotiations are done on a local basis, the
national sometimes helps the local. The national itself, how-
ever, supervises employment conditions for specific groups of
musicians. Traveling bands and orchestras are supervised and
controlled by the AFM directly. Many of the problems of travel-

82

ing musicians and bands have been considered in connection
with the growth of the organization. This group of instrumental-
ists includes not only members of name bands, but those in
traveling theater companies, grand operas, symphonies, fairs,
circuses, and rodeos. Very frequently wages are not negotiated
for these musicians, but determined unilaterally by the AFM.

The national union also has concerned itself particularly with
radio, recording, and film musicians. The problems raised by
radio and recorded musical presentations are of great impor-
tance to this union and they are discussed in connection with
technological change. The status of musicians in the film indus-
try has never been a serious problem because negotiations satis-
factorily have solved most of the matters in dispute.

The musicians union has depended on its own strength in
improving the working conditions of its members in the motion
picture industry. Although the Hollywood studios are techni-
cally subject to the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles local, the
AFM has maintained direct control over the motion picture
industry from the time it successfully prevented the influx of
musicians into Los Angeles during the period when heavy unem-
ployment resulted from the introduction of sound films. As
musicians continued to improve their status in the industry,
the Los Angeles local, in 1938, prohibited the use of sound
track in any picture but the one for which the music was
prepared. This made valueless millions of dollars of sound
track held by the studios. The producers reduced the size of
orchestras partially to combat the effects of the prohibition of
dubbing— that is, the rerecording of music from other film.

The first written contract between the film industry and the
AFM was signed in 1944. It covered the eight major pro-
ducers, and prescribed a minimum number of men to be em-
ployed in each studio on an annual basis. Dubbing was banned,
doubling on two instruments was permitted only if the musi-
cian received additional pay, distinctions between work done
at rehearsals and in actual performances were eliminated, night
work was assigned premium rates, and the remuneration of the
leader was increased.

The contract was renewed in 1946, but provisions of sub-
stantial advantage to the musicians were incorporated. The

83

three largest producers, Loew's (MGM) , Twentieth Century-
Fox Film, and Warner Brothers, each agreed to employ 50 men
on a yearly basis. Paramount Pictures undertook to use 45
musicians; and Columbia Pictures, RKO Radio Pictures, Re-
public Productions, and Universal Pictures guaranteed to hire
36 musicians. Wages of film recording musicians, orchestraters,
arrangers, leaders, and copyists were increased by 33 per cent
and a two-week vacation with pay was granted by the industry.
Not only was a clause inserted in the contract which prohibited
the use of the musical sound track for any purpose other than
to accompany the picture for which it originally was made,
but the track could not be used on television. If the producer
leased or sold the film, these restrictions had to be assumed by
the buyer. The contract was extended for a year in 1948 and
was renewed again in 1949 and 1951. At the beginning of 1952
the agreement was renegotiated for a two-year period; the most
important change was the provision for a 15 per cent wage
increase.

The major studios employ many additional thousands of
musicians on a casual basis. These men are film recording
musicians, side line musicians, orchestraters, copyists, and li-
brarians; and they make up featured units of name bands,
hillbilly bands, and cowboy bands. The terms of the contract
are applicable to the entire United States and to Canada. New
York City itself provides casual employment for thousands of
musicians in the film industry.7

In addition to the eight major studios, the motion picture
industry contains a large number of independent producers,
who in many instances do not have facilities of their own for
the production of pictures. When the AFM turned its atten-
tion to the smaller companies, they banded together. Four
groups of independents were formed. One agreed to employ
40 musicians on an annual basis; these men could be utilized
by all members of the group. The other three each agreed to
employ orchestras of 20 men. Musicians may work only for
companies which have signed agreements with the union. The
basic wage rate for a single session of three hours or less is
$39.90 per man. In 1948 a new contract for one year was
signed under which the independents agreed to employ musi-

84

cians for at least 35,000 man-hours during the year. This repre-
sented a union setback. Beginning in 1952, separate pacts were
signed with each independent producer.

The American Federation of Musicians was one of five unions
which formed a Motion Picture Internationals' Committee in
the movie industry to deal with employers. The carpenters,
painters, electrical workers, stage hands, and musicians suc-
ceeded in gaining a union shop in Hollywood in 1926 when
they signed the Studio Basic Agreement with nine employers.
The joint committee which includes also five representatives of
the employers, functioned well for a time in adjusting griev-
ances and settling disputes. Later the painters dropped out
and were replaced by the teamsters. Subsequently, the com-
mittee was torn by strife in a jurisdictional dispute between
the carpenters and the stage hands.

• Relationships with Other Unions— Jurisdictional Disputes and

Cooperation

The musicians union has had little in common with much of
the rest of the labor movement. William Green told the musi-
cians that they are different from other unionists who work
with their hands.8 Since the activities of musicians are so
unique in the labor movement, the AFM has had few conflicts
with other unions on a nationwide basis. The number of alli-
ances and cooperative actions which it has undertaken has
been equally small. Dealings with other unions generally have
been limited to those unions engaged in some other phase of
entertainment.

Only four major disputes with other unions on a national
scale have developed in the long history of the AFM; the dis-
agreement with the American Guild of Musical Artists will be
considered in another connection. A serious misunderstanding
with the Metal Polishers Union (AFL) existed in 1912 and
1913. The metal polishers demanded that musicians should be
required to buy and play only those instruments bearing the
label of the polishers union. The AFM rejected this demand,
claiming that musicians must be permitted to buy the most
suitable instruments. The American Federation of Labor sup-
ported the AFM in this matter. The dispute ended when the

85

musicians agreed to help the metal polishers unionize the plants
of the manufacturers of musical instruments.

A second and more recent dispute has had profound impli-
cations. The power and control exercised by the AFM have
been so great that the union rarely has had to use the machinery
created by Congress to protect the rights of labor. The musicians
have not had to call upon the National Labor Relations Board
for assistance. One jurisdictional dispute, however, involved
not only the NLRB, but the courts as well. A federal court
established a principle that would have altered the interpreta-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act, had that law not
been amended.

The controversy involved the operators of turntables, known
as platter turners. These persons place phonograph records on
the turntable, adjust the table for speed according to written
instructions, and remove the records after they have been
played. The operators require neither musical nor technical
skill. The National Association of Broadcast Engineers and
Technicians, an independent union of radio engineers, has rep-
resented the platter turners outside of Chicago at the National
Broadcasting Company and the American Broadcasting Com-
pany since 1940. In Chicago, Petrillo and the AFM had gained
control over the turntable operators in 1927. (The AFM rep-
resents the platter turners working for the Columbia Broad-
casting System both in Chicago and St. Louis.)

In 1942, the NABET notified the broadcasting companies of
its desire to represent the platter turners in Chicago, but was
informed that this was not possible since the companies had
contractual arrangements with the AFM. The companies, NBC
and ABC, subsequently renewed their contracts with the Chi-
cago Federation of Musicians in 1944, and the AFM continued
to exercise jurisdiction over the platter turners. The AFM,
however, also had made demands. It had asked the broad-
casters to hire musicians as platter turners throughout the
United States. All the large broadcasting companies agreed
and Petrillo estimated that at least 2,000 more jobs for musi-
cians would be created. The union of broadcast engineers was
infuriated and countered this move by initiating representation
proceedings before the NLRB. It also filed a notice of intention

86

to strike. The Board then conducted hearings and decided that
platter turners at NBC and ABC should be included in the
unit of musicians in Chicago, but in systemwide units of engi-
neers and technicians, elsewhere. Although the AFM consented
to the certification of the NLRB, it threatened the National
Broadcasting Company and the American Broadcasting Com-
pany with strikes if they recognized the award to NABET.
Early in 1945 the National Labor Relations Board, to whom
the case returned, found that the companies had violated the
Wagner Act by their refusal to bargain with NABET and
ordered them to bargain upon request.9

The Board petitioned the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for enforcement of its order. The decision of the court
upheld the order requiring the companies to bargain, in spite
of the fact that the employers maintained that reprisals were
threatened by the AFM. Although the broadcasting companies
had requested the court to issue a restraining order against the
musicians union, the court refused to do so, but said: "If an
attempt to prevent the companies from complying with our
order should be made it would seem that the ordinary con-
tempt procedures available against a person with knowledge of
the decree although not named in it would enable the court to
protect its order."10 It seemed that though the Norris-La
Guardia Act of 1932 had barred the federal courts from issuing
an injunction or restraining order in cases arising out of a labor
dispute, the court was ready to proceed against a union whose
objective was to negate a decision of the NLRB, even though a
labor dispute was involved. The NLRA had granted neither
the Board nor the courts any specific power to act against
unions. The matter was never tested beyond this stage, since
the AFM bowed to the court's decision. The Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 has made this question academic,
because the union now may be restrained.

The most recent controversy involved the American Guild
of Variety Artists. It began in 1948 when AGVA, an affiliate
of the AFL, undertook to expand its membership. The AFM
and AGVA had an understanding that when a member of the
musicians union sang, danced, or told stories in a floor show
of a night club or on the stage of a theater he was eligible to
join AGVA. The Guild tried to get such performers to sign

87

AGVA contracts for the engagements. On August 5, 1948, the
AFM dissolved the agreement with AGVA, warned AFM mem-
bers that they might sign only AFM contracts, and prohibited
musicians from joining AGVA without the permission of the
national office.11

In December, Gus Van, the president of AGVA, appeared
before the international executive board of the AFM in an un-
successful effort to adjust the dispute. The controversy increased
in bitterness at the beginning of the following year when the
musicians union charged AGVA with raiding tactics. By Sep-
tember the AFM ordered all members of the AFM who were
also members of AGVA to resign from the latter organization,
even if they also performed as actors. It served notice on book-
ing agencies that if they insisted that musicians should join
AGVA, the license of the agency would be revoked.12 This
ruling forced Tony Lavelli, an accordion player, and Victor
Borge, the pianist, to resign from AGVA under the implied
threat by Petrillo to strike the orchestras at the places where
they were entertaining. Borge explained: "It is easier for me
to get along without the AGVA group than it is to do without
an orchestra. ... I can't take any chances."13 Subsequently, at
least 50 artists, including Vaughn Monroe, Artie Shaw, and
Spike Jones resigned from AGVA.

The American Guild of Variety Artists applied to the New
York State Supreme Court at the beginning of October 1949
for a temporary restraining order prohibiting the AFM to
prevent Guild members from carrying out their contract obli-
gations. The treasurer of AGVA said in an affidavit that
Petrillo was ". . . obviously overcome with ambition and
delusions common to the dictators."14 William Green, address-
ing the AFL convention in St. Paul, Minnesota, criticized AGVA
for going to court instead of attempting to settle the dispute
within the house of labor. The Supreme Court later refused to
issue a temporary restraining order, but before the matter of a
permanent injunction could come to trial AGVA withdrew its
suit in order to resume negotiations with the AFM.

The international executive board of the musicians union
left the matter of concluding an agreement with AGVA in the
hands of Petrillo in January 1950. In May, an understanding
was reached between the AFM and AGVA. Performers who

88

act on some occasions and play an instrument on others would
be eligible to join both unions. Instrumentalists who only inci-
dentally act or serve as masters of ceremonies must belong only
to the AFM. Actors, on the other hand, who play an instrument
during a small portion of the act belong in the jurisdiction
of AGVA.1*

The American Federation of Musicians occasionally has
made monetary contributions to support striking unions. In
1910, it helped striking streetcar workers in Philadelphia. The
most important link with another union, however, has been a
long and pleasant relationship of nearly 30 years with the
International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees
(AFL) . IATSE comprises the stage hands and the motion pic-
ture operators. In 1913 these two unions signed a national
agreement of cooperation and assistance, although agreements
on a local basis already had been negotiated. On many occa-
sions over the years, each of these unions supported the other
during periods of critical relations with employers and each
conducted numerous sympathetic strikes in the theaters at
the request of the other. Together they supported the Actors
Equity strike of 1919, which enabled the actors to organize
successfully. However, the New York courts denied the right
of IATSE to strike in sympathy with the AFM, when an
opera company utilized electrically transcribed recordings of
the musical score to produce the orchestra accompaniment.
In 1941, the Court of Appeals said: "For a union to insist
that machinery be discarded in order that manual labor may
take its place and thus secure additional opportunity of em-
ployment is not a lawful labor objective."16 The dispute was
not settled, however, until 1945. Nevertheless, in spite of the
close relationship between the AFM and the IATSE, the agree-
ment between them was abrogated in 1942 when satisfactory
terms of a new pact could not be worked out. Over the course
of the years, the AFM has not needed much support from other
unions.

• Finances of the National Union

The strength or weakness of a union frequently may be
judged from its financial condition. The AFM has attained the
status of financial integrity and independence. Current income

89

is more than adequate to meet the expenditures and the net
worth of the union continues to rise. Finance operations are
divided among three funds, the general fund, the theater de-
fense fund, and one which now has only slight importance, the
recording and transcription fund. The main source of revenue
of the AFM is derived from the ten per cent tax levied on
traveling orchestras, of which the three per cent kept by the
national union amounts to well over three-quarters of a mil-
lion dollars annually. The other important receipts in the
general fund are the per capita tax on the locals, interest on
investments, fines levied on members and locals, subscription
fees to the International Musician, and taxes from radio en-
gagements. The radio tax, a charge of 15 per cent, is paid by
traveling orchestras or guest conductors who play a commercial
radio engagement over a radio network in another local's
jurisdiction. The tax is based on the local's scale price and a
fifth of the amount collected is the share which goes to the
local. Traveling orchestras, however, may not play any radio
engagement which is purely local in character, without the
permission of the local which has jurisdiction.

The important expenditures from the general fund are for
the annual convention, salaries and expenses of officers, print-
ing costs, rent, legal and auditing expenses, public relations
and research expenditures, and per capita taxes to the American
Federation of Labor, to the Union Label Trades Department
of the AFL, and to the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada.
The surplus in the general fund is about two and a half mil-
lion dollars.

The surplus in the theater defense fund is more than two
and a half million dollars. This fund was originally created, in
the early 1920's, to provide a source of money which could be
used to pay strike benefits to theater musicians. Two per cent
of the salary of all theater musicians was paid as a tax to the
union; and in 1929 this levy was also imposed on those musicians
making sound pictures. Locals receive five per cent of the
amount collected. Over the years, however, the size of the fund
continued to swell because the volume of strike benefits paid
was small. In 1946 the convention removed the tax from musi-
cians employed in the theaters and the international executive
board reduced the rate paid by those making sound pictures to

90

one per cent. This fund is utilized so sparingly that it continues
to grow rapidly.

The recording and transcription fund has fluctuated widely
in amount. It comprised the moneys paid to the union by the
recording and transcription companies and was based on the
sale of records. The fund reached a peak of several million dol-
lars, but has nearly been exhausted as the AFM allocated the
money to the locals so that they could present free public con-
certs and provide employment for musicians. Under contracts
with the recording and transcription companies, negotiated at
the end of 1948, a new fund outside of the control of the union
has been established.

The AFM has achieved and maintained an excellent record
in presenting the membership with all the pertinent data re-
garding the union's financial transactions. Expenditures made
by the AFM were considerably more itemized until the end of
1936, but nevertheless the reports are still fully satisfactory for
most purposes. The financial strength of the union has been an
important factor in the exercise of control over the members.
The union has never had any national insurance schemes,
though it unsuccessfuly attempted to establish an old musicians'
home in 1903. The AFM has made provision for the payment
of strike benefits on all occasions when it calls musicians out on
strike and especially for payment of benefits to striking travel-
ing musicians. The ability to make such payments has earned
the respect of the members and the employers. The mere avail-
ability of the money frequently has removed the necessity of
striking to gain objectives.

The AFM has fixed the maximum initiation fee which locals
may impose at $50. Though it does not tell the locals what
dues to charge, it has levied a per capita tax of a dollar and
sixty cents per member per year upon the locals, but this
amount also covers subscriptions to the International Musician.
This sum is one of the lowest union per capita fees levied by any
international. Since many musicians are not professionals and
derive only occasional income from music, the AFM and its
locals have had to depend largely on other sources of income.

Since the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, the
identity of the employer of musicians for purposes of paying
the various taxes under this Act has not been clear. The union

91

has contended that the person who hires the leader is the em-
ployer. Some of the persons affected by this rule have not always
acquiesced. However, for many years all leaders but name band
leaders were exempt from the taxes. By a decision of the United
States Supreme Court in 1947, however, all leaders were deemed
to be employers for purposes of social security taxes as long as
they organize an orchestra and hold it available for limited
engagements.17 Organized orchestras as well as name bands are
included, regardless of the prominence or income of the leader.
As a result, the leader, rather than the purchaser of the music,
has become responsible for the taxes.

The subsequent interpretations of the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue of the United States Treasury Department have
varied. But near the end of 1947, he decided that, on the basis
of the court's ruling, the only leaders whom he would not con-
sider employers are leaders of staff orchestras in radio stations
and theaters and leaders of orchestras organized by an estab-
lishment or person to play permanently at that establishment
or for that person.18 This interpretation has been challenged
unsuccessfully by the union.

In order to compensate the leaders for the increased financial
burden which the decision of the United States Supreme Court
imposed upon them, the AFM authorized the locals to alter the
form of the standard contract so that either the purchaser of
the music would agree specifically to accept liability for retire-
ment taxes, unemployment taxes, and income withholding
taxes; or, as an alternative, the locals were permitted to increase
the wage scales so that a sum of money adequate to cover the
tax liabilities of the leader would become available to him.19

• Sundry Problems

On a national scale, the AFM has been enmeshed in various
problems only some of which were related to music. Apart from
its stand on immigration which has been considered in con-
nection with the importation of musicians, the AFM followed
the line adopted by many other unions in the 1920's and ex-
pressed its strong denunciation of Communists and commu-
nism. Communists, Fascists, and Nazis are ineligible to join the
union, and members may be expelled for holding such views.
Unfortunately, however, the AFM had to depend upon the sup-

92

port of Father Charles E. Coughlin in order to make an editorial
comment regarding the concentration of wealth in the United
States.20 On the other hand, Petrillo indicated in 1949 that he
would not permit Wilhelm Furtwaengler, German conductor
charged with having figured in Nazi concerts during the second
World War, to conduct the Chicago Orchestral Association.21

Petrillo has argued that individuals have the right to free
speech. The cross-country trip of Senator Robert A. Taft at the
end of 1947 enabled many organized workers to express the
bitter resentment which had been aroused by his sponsorship of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Every time he
stopped along the route to deliver a scheduled address, Senator
Taft was met in force by labor pickets. The president of the
Des Moines local inquired of Petrillo whether a band of 26
pieces hired to play in connection with one of these speeches
should take part. Petrillo replied, in effect, that musicians should
pass through the picket lines if necessary to fulfill the band
engagement. He declared that Americans have the right of free
speech, even if their ideas and opinions are disagreeable.22

The affiliation of Negro musicians has been a more delicate
problem. Though in most Southern regions, Negro members
must be affiliated through subordinate locals, this practice was
followed also in many Northern cities. Some locals in the North,
accepted Negroes on a basis of equality. In others, they were
forced into subsidiary locals whose policies and activities were
determined by white locals. It was only at a time when the
federal government was fighting the practice of discrimination
against the employment opportunities of Negroes that the inter-
national executive board, in 1944, canceled the charters of 12
colored locals operating under control of white locals in their
jurisdictions and chartered them directly. In 1940, the New
York local forced the Decca Company to withdraw from sale a
record which the local claimed was degrading to Negroes, en-
titled "WPA." During 1942 and 1943, Negro and white musi-
cians working for the Ringling Brothers circus went on strike
for higher wages. The national union refused to settle the
strike when the owners agreed to raise the wages of the white
musicians. The union demanded that the wages of both groups
should be increased. Eventually the salaries of the white musi-
cians were raised from $47.50 to $54.00 per week while those of

93

the Negroes were increased from $26.50 to $30.50. In 1946, the
AFM convention canceled its outing in St. Petersburg, Florida,
after it was advised by local officials that the color line must be
observed in that city on all visits made by the delegates. Today
the AFM has more than 50 colored locals, of which the largest,
the one in Chicago, has over a thousand members.

Public attention has been directed in recent years to facts
which have established that some musicians have utilized drugs
and narcotics to improve their performances. In 1947 the con-
vention of the AFM gave the international executive board
power to expel all members convicted of being drug addicts.

The musicians union has not maintained a consistent policy
regarding the teaching of music in schools and the musical
training and education of children. Although it has not per-
mitted children to be used in professional bands and in com-
petition with adult musicians, it has been undecided as to
whether music should be taught in the public schools. The
union has been somewhat fearful that the stimulation of musi-
cal interest among public school students unduly increases the
number of potential musicians. Even today the policy of the
organization on this matter is uncertain.

The tactics and policies of the American Federation of Musi-
cians has enabled it to succeed in gaining control of musicians
in the United States and Canada. But it has never been very
important in Canada. Although it began chartering Canadian
locals in 1900, it was not until the Toronto convention in 1913
that a resolution was adopted changing the emblem of the
AFM. All reference to nationality was removed, for the old
emblem had contained the figure of the flag of the United
States. In 1946, the union had only 6,713 members in Canada,
and in 1947, it had 8,108 members. In 1951, there were 30
locals and more than 10,250 members in that country.

The American Federation of Musicians has to some extent
been organized along the lines of the medieval guilds and has
exercised control over purchasers of music, leaders, conductors,
bookers, and musicians. At all points, the person who wants to
have any dealings with professional musicians comes in contact
with the AFM. The national union permits the locals to exercise
much discretion but it intervenes whenever it feels that such
action is necessary.

THE JURISDICTION AND /I

OPERATION OF A LOCAL • ^

"During the past ten years we have not granted a single
concession."

WILLIAM FEINBERC

• The Consolidation of the New York Local

The greater proportion of contacts between the employer and
the union occur on a local basis; fewer meetings are held be-
tween employers and the national officers. The power wielded
by the organized musicians may be understood only if the ac-
tivities and functions of the locals are examined. The AFM
includes locals of all sizes. The 31 largest locals, each having a
thousand or more members, cover all the important jurisdictions
in the country. There are hundreds of medium-sized locals,
which though lacking the prestige and authority of the larger
ones, constitute the heart of the Federation. Small locals, those
with a hundred or fewer members, are dominated by the na-
tional, a condition which permits the national to exercise con-
trol over the affairs of the union. The more than 200 small
locals, however, do not contribute significantly to the progress
of the union.

These different-sized units are not comparable in the scope
of their activities. The larger the local, the more complicated
is its structure and organization, and the more numerous are
its functions and operations. The larger locals are located in
the more populous cities, where a greater number of musicians
is needed because the types of performances are more diverse
and the occasions on which music is used are more frequent.
Although a description of a large local necessarily would not
be typical of the AFM, it would indicate, however, the range
and complexity of the tasks performed. Obviously a local with
50 or 60 members could not be very active in labor relations
and its dealings with employers generally would be highly
informal.

95

Membership in the 20 Largest Locals of the American
Federation of Musicians, 195 l1

State or

City

Province

Local

Membership

New York

New York

802

30,964

Los Angeles

California

47

13,456

Chicago

Illinois

10

11,850

Detroit

Michigan

5

5,013

Philadelphia

Pennsylvania

77

4,889

San Francisco

California

6

4,543

Cleveland

Ohio

4

2,503

Milwaukee

Wisconsin

8

2,476

Pittsburgh

Pennsylvania

60

2,377

Boston

Massachusetts

9

2,367

Toronto

Ontario

149

2,270

Miami

Florida

655

2,179

Newark

New Jersey

16

1,897

Montreal

Quebec

406

1,887

Seattle

Washington

76

1,864

Minneapolis

Minnesota

73

1,744

Washington

District of

Columbia

161

1,539

St. Louis

Missouri

2

1,477

St. Paul

Minnesota

30

1,345

Kansas City

Missouri

34

1,288

The New York local, the Associated Musicians of Greater
New York, Local 802, AFM, is by far the largest union in the
Federation. It is a well-rounded organization and demonstrates
how an efficient unit should operate. The early history of the
organization of musicians in New York City already has been
described in connection with the National League of Musicians
of the nineteenth century and the struggle between the locals
and the national during the first part of the twentieth century.

When local 802 was organized in New York in 1921 the
national union made certain that it would retain control of
the new unit. The constitution of the local was framed to pro-
vide that a majority of its governing board would be appointed
by the national union. The declared objective of this arrange-

96

ment was to eliminate the possibility that a situation would
recur in which the group in power could violate the laws of
the AFM. But there were many persons in the local who were
anxious to gain autonomy. As the New York unit grew and as
the years passed, the demands upon Weber and the inter-
national executive board by these members became more vocif-
erous and their cries for autonomy became louder. Weber was
adamant, however, and refused to relinquish control.

Some of the musicians who demanded home rule, and who
had been opposed to Weber from the days of the struggle of
1920 and 1921, complained to Congress. A Congressional com-
mittee was investigating industrial and labor racketeering in
the early 1930's and upon the request of musicians it held a
hearing on the relationship between the national union and
local 802.2 The unfavorable publicity resulting from the in-
vestigation forced Weber to modify his position and he decided
to permit the local to elect its own officers at the end of 1934.
They assumed office in 1935. The president, however, remained
an appointee of the AFM for another two years, and retained
the power to veto all local actions which in his judgment vio-
lated the laws of the national. Much of the success of the local
dates from that time when the membership repudiated the
officers appointed by Weber and elected those men who had
fought for autonomy. Edward M. Canavan, the appointee who
had ruled the local as chairman of the governing board became
one of Weber's assistants and until he retired in 1950 was one
of Petrillo's assistants. The traces of animosity between the
national union and local 802 still are evident though complete
formal cooperation between them exists. At the 1951 convention
of musicians, Charles R. Iucci, secretary of the local, was
elected to the international executive board. This marks the
first time that local 802 has had a member on this board.

The elected officers of the local include the president, the
vice president, the secretary, the treasurer, nine executive board
members, nine trial board members, and a number of delegates
to conventions and labor bodies. All have terms of two years.
The nine executive board members together with the four major
officers constitute the full executive board, the highest body in
in the local. General supervision over the affairs and property
of the local is vested in the executive board. It has the power

97

to approve or disapprove all contracts and all leaders who hire
members of the local for professional engagements and it may
demand payment from the employer in advance.

The trial board of nine members has original jurisdiction
over all cases involving infractions of the local laws and reg-
ulations, and over all violations of wage scales and working
conditions. Charges against members or employers may be
brought by any union member. Appeal from the decision of
this board may be taken to a membership meeting or to the
international executive board. The members of both local boards
receive $125 a week. They must devote full time to the affairs
of the local and may not accept any professional engagement
during their tenure of office.

The biennial election of officers arouses the keen interest of
the membership and involves a vigorous campaign and election.
Candidates and their supporters engage in much political activ-
ity and electioneering. Balloting is supervised entirely by the
Honest Ballot Association; the local itself has no jurisdiction.
From 1935 until 1953, one group was able to retain control of
the organization, and in general gained each victory by a
substantial margin. This party has represented the more con-
servative element in the local, but nevertheless has introduced
many progressive ideas. A second party represents a more leftist
point of view and comprises a greater proportion of the younger
musicians, including many of the veterans of the second World
War. To some extent this group, not holding office, has been
able with convenience to propose greater benefits for the mem-
bership and stronger resistance to employers. A third faction
comprises the Communists, their sympathizers, and the more
radical veterans, but has been relatively weak. Although charges
were made by the losers that there were irregularities in the
method by which the Honest Ballot Association conducted the
elections of 1942 and 1944, these claims could not be substan-
tiated. Court action to upset the election of 1944 was withdrawn
by the plaintiffs. The conflict within the local usually gives
way on matters in which the national union is concerned, how-
ever, and even the extremists usually support the international
president, James C. Petrillo.

By the middle of 1948 it was clear that renewed internecine
strife on a major scale had broken out in local 802, preliminary

98

to the biennial elections. The group in power accused its
opponents of being led and dominated by Communists. It
enacted a rule that all candidates for office must sign affidavits
that they are not Communists. The membership meetings of the
local became exceedingly bitter. The operator of the hall rented
by the local to conduct these meetings protested to the union
that fighting between members had occurred, that police and
detectives had to be summoned on several occasions because of
disorders, and that his property had been damaged. The exec-
utive board of the local set aside several decisions made by the
members, but on an appeal to Petrillo by the insurgents some
of the rulings of the local board were overturned.

Richard McCann was re-elected president of the local in
December 1948 but by a mere majority of 89 votes out of a
total of more than 10,500 ballots cast. The opposition group
claimed that the election results had been tampered with,
despite the fact that balloting had been under the control of
the Honest Ballot Association, and asked the international
executive board to set aside the vote. The AFM, however,
turned down the appeal.

The friction in local 802 continued. In the autumn of 1949,
two members of the local who had distributed leaflets maintain-
ing that McCann was a defender of "Ernest Bevin's policy of
antisemitism" were expelled from the local by the trial board
after being brought up on charges. At the beginning of 1950,
however, a membership meeting of the local at which about
900 persons were present overruled the trial board and reinstated
the two musicians. McCann then appealed the reversal to the
international executive board. Though the board sustained the
appeal, it nevertheless refused to expel the two members of
local 802. Just before the local elections in 1950, McCann
decided to retire. His party, however, continued in power until
1953, when some high offices were won by opposition leaders. At
the convention in 1951, Petrillo took note of the conflict
within the local and indicated that something would have to
be done about the Communist agitation there.

Most of the members are satisfied that local 802 is operated
democratically. The important activities and decisions of the
local are reported in the monthly publication, the Official
Journal, now entitled Allegro. Detailed minutes of the meetings

99

of the executive board are included in the bulletin. The secre-
tary must make a semiannual report to the members and the
treasurer must submit a detailed quarterly certified statement
setting forth the financial condition of the local. The member-
ship generally is lethargic. Though the union schedules a meet-
ing each month under a constitutional provision, and advertises
it widely, a quorum rarely is present. Five hundred members
out of the more than 30,000 in the local constitute a quorum,
but in 1946 only three meetings were held. Indeed, this number
was so unusually high only because it was a year marked by
strikes. In 1947, poor attendance by members made it possible
for only one membership meeting to be held. Today it is still
very difficult to assemble a quorum. The power to approve
proposed changes in the price lists and bylaws, which is vested
in the members who take part in the monthly meetings, is con-
ferred upon the executive board when a quorum does not
appear. The officers of the local generally have been able to
carry out their own programs.

• Collective Bargaining

Musicians are hired by many kinds of employers. They are
used in symphonies, in theaters, in operas, for recordings, for
wired music, in hotels, for dances, for funerals, in the open air
and indoors, and on land and sea. Engagements are considered
steady if musicians are employed on five days a week for at
least one week or on three days a week for two or more weeks.
All other types of tenure are single engagements. Because of
this diversity of employment conditions, the rules and laws of
the local must be complex.

New York City practically is a closed shop for professional
musicians. Since musicians are educated and developed without
any relation to union policies or to training programs by em-
ployers, the union must admit them on relatively easy terms or
else face competition from nonunion musicians. The examin-
ing committee which passes on the qualifications of applicants
acts in a purely perfunctory manner. The New York local, like
the others in the AFM, is open to membership. Although the
important employers of musicians have been unionized for
many years in New York, a campaign to organize the smaller
and the occasional employers was undertaken by the new

100

administration in 1935. To aid in this task, a branch office was
opened in Long Island, New York, as an adjunct to the main
Manhattan office, because the local has jurisdiction over Nassau
and Suffolk counties as well as over the five boroughs in the
city. The campaign was highly successful in achieving union-
ization.

The local does not negotiate with all who desire to hire musi-
cians. Instead it sets the price in advance and an employer must
pay the scale fixed by the local or go without musicians. In
dealing with the important and organized employers, the union
does bargain collectively. Among such employers are the theater
operators, hotel owners, motion picture houses, symphonies,
and opera houses.

Local 802 has fought hard in negotiations with the employ-
ers. William Feinberg, formerly secretary of local 802, in sum-
marizing the activities of the local, wrote in 1945: "During the
past ten years we have not granted a single concession. On the
contrary, every time a contract has come up for renewal, we
have fought for and obtained improved conditions."3

Collective bargaining with the theater owners is typical of
the labor relations of local 802, although employment of musi-
cians for this type of work is particularly peculiar to New
York City. New York City has 30 legitimate theaters all of which
are represented by the League of New York Theaters. Among
the represented theaters, 15 are operated by the Shubert interests,
four by City Playhouses, and 11 are independent.

The local and the League negotiate a wage scale and some
working conditions, though most of the conditions of employ-
ment already have been determind by the union in its rules.
The value of the trade agreement from the point of view of the
employer is that it gives some stability to the industry and pre-
vents the union from making constant changes.

Plays are classified as dramatic, musical, or drama with music.
It is in connection with the latter category that controversy
arose. Some people were shocked when local 802 decided to
consider such plays as Maurice Evans' Hamlet, Androcles and
the Lion, Shakespeare's Henry VIII, Shakespeare's Tempest,
and Happy Birthday to be musicals. The producers asked the
union to designate a third category for plays with more music
than the usual overture, entr'acte, and exit march of the drama,

101

but less than the usual score of standard musicals. Music in these
plays is not incidental, but an integral part of the production.
The union obliged and designated a category known as drama
with music, in which the musicians remain in the pit through-
out the show, but the employer avoids the necessity of hiring
the number of men required in a musical. On several occasions
the international executive board has set aside decisions of the
local with regard to the classification of specific plays.4

The rules of the union designate the number of men to be
hired for each type of play. Musical plays given in theaters
seating under a thousand persons must utilize a number of
musicians determined specifically by the executive board. If
the theater holds between a thousand and 1100 people, 16
musicians must be employed. Larger theaters must use at least
22 men. Dramas with music take six musicians and pay the
wage scale of the musical. Dramas having incidental music em-
ploy four men, but at a lower scale. If no music is included in
the play, musicians need not be hired in New York City;
although in other jurisdictions a minimum number of men
must be employed regardless of whether there is music in the
play. In January 1951, the National Labor Relations Board
ruled that the demand by a local of musicians that a theater
employ a greater number of men than the operator desired did
not violate section 8 (b) (6) of the Taft-Hartley law— the
featherbedding provision— as long as the union actually was
seeking to increase employment. In May 1952, a lower court
reversed the Board.5 On March 9, 1953, however, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the Board's decision.

The union has imposed additional regulations upon the
theater operators. At least four union men must be employed
when mechanical musical devices such as records and radio
music are utilized in the play. The union requires that the con-
tract for the season should be signed by the theater before
Labor Day. Otherwise a penalty wage scale applies and wages
are increased considerably. But those theaters paying a penalty
scale during one year must continue to do so if the same play
is performed, even if the contract for the following year is signed
before the September deadline of that year. The number of
musicians in a musical may not be reduced by the producer
during the first six weeks of the run even if originally set above

102

the union's minimum, but subsequently may be cut to the
minimum if notice is given two weeks in advance. The leader
or contractor receives one and a half times the scale of the
ordinary musician and the conductor one and three-quarters
times the scale. In practice, the remuneration of the conductor
almost always is much more than the minimum.

One related incident which aroused national attention oc-
curred at the Mansfield Theater in January 1942, during the
performance of the play, In Time to Come. The producer
utilized recordings to play the Star Spangled Banner and other
musical selections in the play. Local 802 demanded that four
musicians should be hired by the producer, since under its
rules dramas with incidental music must employ at least that
number. When the employer refused to hire musicians because
he maintained that they were unnecessary, the local threw a
picket line around the theater. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, who
had tickets for one of the performances, refused to cross the
picket line. In her daily column she expressed surprise at the
union's demand.6 This incident focused national attention on
the practices of requiring standby bands and of enforcing
featherbedding demands used by the musicians union.

Some of the requirements and regulations of the local are
obvious illustrations of featherbedding, but the union has been
powerful enough to impose such conditions on the employers.
The League of New York Theaters bargains to determine wage
scales paid by theater operators. The scale for traveling theater
musicians, over which the local does not have jurisdiction, is
fixed by the AFM. The national union fixes the scale, it does
not negotiate.

The local is faced with the problem of preventing kickbacks.
Sometimes employers have an understanding with musicians
that part of the salary is to be returned. On other occasions,
each musician hired gives part of the wages which he receives
to the leader. Many such cases have occurred and continue to
occur in the theaters and other types of musical employment
even though it is a violation of the laws of the State of New
York.7 Progress has been made by the local in eliminating this
practice, but intensification of the kickback occurs as economic
conditions deteriorate and unemployment among musicians
increases. Kickbacks are not unusual today. The union requires

103

that copies of all contracts entered into by musicians must be
filed at its office, and the union itself now is a party to all
agents' contracts. There is a standard union form of agreement
which must be utilized and which helps the local police the
industry. The requirement that contracts must be filed is par-
ticularly important to the union because of the prevalence of
small employment units where irregularities and violations of
union regulations are most likely to occur.

Only with great difficulty did the union organize the dance
field. Years of militant pressure, boycotting, picketing, and
policing were necessary. Hotels, cafes, night clubs, and taverns
are grouped in Class A, Class B, or Class C depending on their
ability to pay. Each class has its own wage scale. Single engage-
ments, which occur mainly in catering halls and hotel ball-
rooms, came under the union scale slowly, and only after many
leaders were expelled and many agents and bookers had their
licenses revoked. Today all major ballrooms are required to
employ a minimum number of musicians on all occasions when
music is utilized.

The scale on the general single engagement in the larger
establishments is $15 per man for a three-hour period during
the day or $20 on weekdays and $24 on Saturdays for four hours
of evening performance. Rehearsals must be paid for separately,
and overtime is computed at the rate of five dollars per hour
on weekdays and six dollars per hour on Saturdays. Scales on
steady engagements vary widely depending on the type of per-
formance, but those musicians holding permanent positions
are among the highest paid group of workers.

Though the caterers who owned or had concessions in the
different establishments at first were reluctant to come to terms
with the union they began to adjust themselves to the new con-
ditions once they made agreements. Each caterer had a group
of preferred leaders whom he had recommended to customers
engaging his establishment to run an affair. The local considered
this practice to be monopolistic and attempted to eliminate
the influence of the caterer in determining which musicians
should be employed. It prohibited caterers from giving leads
to those interested in hiring musicians. The caterers protested
to Petrillo, however, and the international executive board
overruled the local.8 As a result, the caterer may recommend a

104

band or an orchestra to the customers, but he is prohibited

from forcing them to accept his designations.

A serious conflict developed between the musicians and the
hotel operators in 1946. Musicians' wages in hotels had been
rising rapidly and the hotel owners, through the New York
State Hotel Association, refused to grant the full increase de-
manded by the union that year. Local 802 struck in over 50
hotels in New York City. Petrillo immediately brought the
national union to the support of the local. He pulled out the
musicians from hotels in Chicago and several other cities which
were linked by common ownership to the hotels involved in
the New York strike.9 The Muzak Corporation cut off wired
service to those hotels and the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (AFL) assured local 802 that it would not
install any juke boxes. After two and a half weeks the union
gained most of the demands it had presented. But the strike
cost the local over $80,000, of which more than $26,000 were
spent for strike benefits and over $37,000 were paid out to
pickets. Additional smaller gains have been made since that
time. In 1951, the National Labor Relations Board reaffirmed
its policy that hotels are not subject to the Taft-Hartley law.10
This ruling permits the union to impose featherbedding provi-
sions providing the state law does not ban the practice.

Local 802 bargains with the independent radio stations in
New York City. In the spring of 1950, the most important
stations in this category agreed to contribute three per cent of
the scale paid to musicians into a fund to finance health and
hospitalization insurance for musicians. Radio station WINS,
however, refused to agree and dropped the eight musicians
which it had employed from its payroll. The union struck
against the station and placed WINS on its unfair list.

WINS asked the court for a restraining order against the
picketing. This request was granted in April. In May, the court
approved a temporary injunction against the union because it
did not find that a labor dispute existed. Subsequently, how-
ever, at the end of September the New York State Supreme
Court refused to grant a permanent injunction and ruled that
the union may picket the station.11 It held that the musicians
were involved in a dispute with the station. It was not until
April 1951 that the strike was settled. WINS agreed to rehire

YOUNG JIM PETRILLO IN 1919

PETRILLO WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN AND GLADYS
SWARTHOUT AT A FREE CONCERT SPONSORED BY THE
AFM IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

*fc

iWP wr

PETRILLO GREETS PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
AT AN AFL CONVENTION

105

eight musicians at the previous wage scale and to pay into the
fund the same percentage which the other stations were con-
tributing.12

• The Attack on Unemployment

In an industry where much of the employment is of a casual
nature and where many thousands of persons are not profes-
sionals, there usually is a considerable amount of unemploy-
ment. Local 802 has used various tactics to increase the em-
ployment opportunities of its members. The union has en-
couraged summer band concerts in the public parks. With the
cooperation of the city, with grants from a foundation, and
with the support of various merchants and business concerns,
these concerts have been given annually since 1938, in increas-
ing numbers. Considerable employment and income have been
provided for many musicians.

Since 1947, the moneys allocated to the local from the record-
ing and transcription fund and more recently from the music
performance trust fund— the funds based on the payments made
by the record and transcription companies— have provided many
jobs for union members. The musicians have spent these funds
in sponsoring thousands of free public concerts. Many different
types of performances have been held.

Local 802 has attempted to eliminate the practice by which
musicians play without remuneration. Rigorous control is exer-
cised over rehearsals and the musician generally must be paid
when performing in them. The union recently has established
the general policy that no free music may be supplied by any
musician to any organization on any occasion unless the other
goods and services utilized at the function, such as food, hotel
space, printed materials, and waiter service, are also obtained
without any cost by the organization making the request for
the music.

On several different occasions the local has made attempts
to spread the available work among a larger number of musi-
cians. For a time, doubling on instruments was prohibited.
Today the practice is permitted, but penalty rates are imposed
on the employer. The local tried to prevent those with steady
jobs and in the higher salary range from taking additional work,
but the protests were so loud and sustained that this plan was

106

abandoned. Furthermore, eleven members of the union were
given permission by the international executive board to take
the case to court. As a result the local enacted a resolution that
any members having steady engagements of five or six days in
any week may not play on any of their off days. Though the
executive board attempts to enforce this rule very strictly, in-
fractions have been common. No penalties have been imposed
because members are lax in bringing charges against the
violators.

Membership in Musicians Unions
in New York City for Selected Years13

Year

Local

Membership

1903

310

3,500

1913

310

5,100

1921

310

8,000

1921

802

12,000

1928

802

15,500

1930

802

17,000

1934

802

15,273

1937

802

17,766

1940

802

21,335

1943

802

22,092

1945

802

24,686

1947

802

28,771

1950

802

30,560

1952

802

30,746

Local 802 has been successful in reducing the seven-day work
week of musicians to one of five and six days without permitting
employers to cut wages correspondingly. In the last few years
it has also been able to induce several groups of employers to
grant vacations with pay. This victory marked a milestone in
the history of the musicians union. Many of the concessions
won by the local have tended to increase the employment op-
portunities of musicians.

Like the other locals, 802 has grown rapidly in the last 15
years and the problems of unemployment thereby have been
intensified. As a result, an old and troublesome grievance has

107

been revived. As the number of transfer members coming to
the New York local has mounted, local 802 has expressed its
opposition to the policy of the national which permits the
unrestricted movement of members of one local into the juris-
diction of another local. However, there is little that it can do
to bring about any changes in the bylaws of the AFM.

While the union definitely discriminates against nonmembers,
there is no discrimination because of race, color, or religion.
For many years, Negroes have constituted about ten per cent of
the membership. The local has no special problems connected
with racial or religious antagonisms, even though cliques based
along such lines exist. On the other hand, every effort is made
to eliminate the competition of expelled and nonunion mem-
bers. At the end of 1948 the local prohibited student bands
from performing at college games played at Madison Square
Garden. It held that the matches were business ventures for
profit, and that professional musicians should be employed.14

The union has appointed stewards and business agents to
police those employers whose labor practices are questionable
and to organize the unorganized. The Official Journal of the
union which contains much information of value to the mem-
bers and is one of the better union publications in the United
States, publishes a supplementary unfair list of local 802 and a
list of expelled members. It has printed photographs of musi-
cians who played in an establishment at a time when it was
being picketed, under the caption— dishonor roll. These musi-
cians have been barred from membership by the local.

In pursuing its objectives, local 802 occasionally receives help
from other unions. It has been indicated already that the
electrical workers agreed to cooperate during the hotel strike of
1946. The musicians local had an informal alliance with the
waiters, cooks, and bartenders during the period when intensi-
fied pressure was applied to unionize hotels and night clubs.
On a more general basis, regular delegates are elected to the
New York State Federation of Labor, to the Central Trades
and Labor Council, and to the United Hebrew Trades. Dues
are paid to the Negro Labor Committee and to the Jewish Labor
Committee.

Difficulties were encountered in relations with the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters (AFL) in 1941. The New

108

York local of teamsters announced that when out-of-town bands
arrived at theaters in taxis and buses, their instruments would
have to be carried across the sidewalk by union teamsters at a
charge of ten dollars in the daytime or twenty dollars at night.
The musicians refused to agree to this procedure, and the
teamsters threw picket lines around the theaters. Petrillo ordered
his men to disregard the pickets. "Can you imagine them guys?"
he said. "They was being unreasonable!"15 The policy of the
local has been to permit members to use their own judgment
whether to cross picket lines set up by other unions. Musicians
are not ordered to do so by officers of the local.

The musicians union has no control over the training of
instrumentalists. At any time, many thousands of persons who
are capable of earning their livelihood as musicians do not
choose to do so. If opportunities in the field of music become
more favorable— and they generally have been since the end of
the war— new members join the local to take advantage of eco-
nomic conditions. The test given by the examining committee
is generally no obstacle to admission and the new men soon are
seeking jobs and therefore tending to increase unemployment.
It is difficult to estimate how many members of the local are
unemployed because a large number of them are not profes-
sional musicians and may have jobs in different types of pro-
duction and enterprise. The membership of the local has
expanded rapidly and has kept pace with the growth of the
national.

• Finances

The financial operations of the New York local, which are of
considerable magnitude, have helped to establish a favorable
record for the local. When autonomy was achieved in 1935, the
bank balance of the local was just over $3,000 while the total
amount of unpaid bills was nine times as large. Reorganization
of the finances helped achieve a sound and stable position.
Like the national, 802 publishes comprehensive financial figures.
Quarterly and annual statements, audited by certified public
accountants, are printed in the Official Journal. At present the
surplus of the local, which has been declining for several years,
is about $425,000. At the beginning of 1952, the local increased
the annual dues by $8, though on previous occasions the mem-

109

bers had refused to authorize a change. The local has for some
time been seeking means to enlarge its revenues, so that the
annual deficits may be eliminated.

The receipts of the local are derived from various sources.
All applicants for membership must pay an initiation fee of
$50. The dues of $24 a year which members pay constitute the
single main source of revenue. Though these payments are con-
siderably lower than those levied in other national unions,
especially when account is taken of membership privileges
derived by musicians, the local has imposed a one per cent tax
on the scale price of all engagements. This tax is levied also on
the salaries paid to officers and employees of the local who are
members of the AFM. This method of raising money is equit-
able because many musicians are not employed constantly at
the trade. Hence they have no tax to pay during the time they
are not working as musicians. In addition, the levy is imposed
only on the scale established in the price list so that those
earning above the scale need not pay on the amount in excess.
This tax does not affect the top artists of other locals who play
in the New York jurisdiction, and although the solo artists of
local 802 are expected to pay the tax, no issue is raised if they

do not.

Thousands of dollars are collected annually as fines for the
late payment of dues, fines imposed by the trial board, initiation
fees, and reinstatement fees. Investments yield some interest
and dividends, and advertising in the journal accounts for a
few thousand dollars. Local 802 receives its share of three taxes
imposed by the AFM-traveling band tax, radio tax, and theater
tax. Union receipts during the year exceed a million dollars.

The union provides a variety of benefits to the members. All
regular members are protected with a thousand dollar life in-
surance policy even if they contribute nothing more than the
annual dues. The insurance is paid by the Union Labor Life
Insurance Company. Indigent and unemployed members are
provided with relief. Originally relief was financed by a relief
and organization fund which derived its income from a three
per cent tax imposed on all engagements. But in 1943 this tax
was abolished by the membership. However, at the insistence
of the union leaders the one per cent tax already described was
substituted; though this income is not used for relief.

110

Members over 50 years of age, who have been in the union at
least ten years and are in need, are eligible to receive relief.
They receive up to seven and a half dollars a week. The money
in the relief fund is derived from the radio remote control
charges. The local reserves the right to require recipients of
relief to perform work around the office, and assigns them to
do clerical work or to serve as doormen, investigators, or pickets.
Senile members receive donations. At the peak, 2,000 musicians
were on relief, but even during the prosperous year of 1947,
800 of them were being assisted. The figure has remained rela-
tively stable since then.

Members on the relief rolls, and some who are in financial
need, are entitled to the benefits of the medical and hospitali-
zation plan. The local pays the Manhattan General Hospital
$20,000 a year, so that relief members may obtain without any
charge, district doctor service, hospitalization, specialist care,
X rays, medicines, and vaccinations, whenever necessary. Form-
erly, members not on relief were eligible to take part in the
medical plan if they paid a special fee, but they were barred
subsequently because the scheme did not work well and because
the hospital was not favorably disposed to their participation.

Union lawyers are available to members whenever they have
difficulty in collecting wages and salaries. The local has a spe-
cial department which performs the task of collecting claims
and remitting the money to the appropriate members. A vet-
erans bureau was established in the union to assist members dis-
charged from the armed forces who have personal problems.
Unlike the AFM, local 802 has no standard provisions regard-
ing strike benefits. Although strike benefits usually are paid
when the members are called out, the executive board of the
local determines the amount as each specific occasion arises.

The Associated Musicians of Greater New York, Local 802,
presents a picture of a thriving and active organization; but it
recently has been pervaded by fear and despair that the in-
creased use of recorded music is making the musician obsolete.
Though its activities and operations are quite extensive, basi-
cally it attempts to raise and protect the wage scales of the mem-
bership. The New York local typifies operations in their most
complex form. Few other locals in the AFM engage in activities

Ill

on so vast a scale. But in its own way, and within the framework
of the rules and regulations of the AFM, each local must solve
similar labor problems. A description of the methods used by,
and the behavior of the New York local helps to gain an under-
standing of how other locals manage their affairs.

PETRILLO REMOVES TWO THORNS • '

"He's [Petrillo] a very able man in his line. For his
union he did a splendid job."

SERGE KOUSSEVITZKY

• The Change in National Leadership

Weber had the qualities needed by a good leader and he was
able to build the union from a small organization into a huge
and successful enterprise. But by nature he was cautious and
slow to act. It was his policy generally to gather, sift, and weigh
the facts in each situation carefully before making any major
decision. As a result, many tasks which should have been under-
taken and problems which should have been considered, but
which were not critical at the moment, were pushed aside. Only
in an emergency did he show boldness and daring.

Persons who knew Petrillo expected more aggressive action
from the musicians union after the change in leadership in
1940, and they were not disappointed. Petrillo has been more
willing to take a chance and more likely to act impetuously. He
has been more familiar with what he wants than Weber had
been. It was not long before employers, union members, and
the public realized this.

Petrillo had taken up the struggle against the mechanical
reproduction of music and musical recordings in his own local
in the 1930's, but his success in this matter had been quite
limited, for he had tried to deal with a national problem on a
local level. Nervertheless, his exceptionally successful leadership
of the Chicago local and his outspoken statements somewhat
had annoyed Weber and a few other leaders in the AFM, and
they had rebuked Petrillo severely. But he had remained un-
daunted.

Although the other national and local officers of the Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians understood that the unrestricted
use of records might reduce the employment opportunities of

113

musicians, they had not been able to decide what should be
done. Weber and his assistants were not sure how to proceed.
They agreed that the musicians could not undertake a fight to
block the production and utilization of recordings. As a close
student of labor history, Weber was familiar with the decline
and demise of unions, like those in the glass industry, which
had fought technological advancement. But though the AFM
sought a solution to this problem for nearly 15 years, it did not
succeed in finding one. No means of control were discovered,
that were both practical and legal.

The new president was ready to throttle the recording in-
dustry. It was clear to him that musicians were losing work
and that job opportunities were being curtailed as a result of
the use of records. Now, for the first time, he had the whole
organization of musicians behind him, and he prepared to fight
the recording companies. It was Petrillo's belief that, as a
general principle, the production of musical recordings must be
terminated. There were, however, in 1940, two important weak
spots in the plan he had formulated to ban recordings which
he had to overcome before the program could be undertaken.

• The Dispute with the American Guild of Musical Artists

Two major groups of musicians were not controlled by the
musicians union at that time. First, solo instrumentalists and
their accompanists were not members of the AFM and, second-
ly, the members of the Boston Symphony Orchestra had never
been unionized successfully. These two gaps in the exercise of
control over American musicians by the union had to be closed
if success in the elimination of recordings were to be attained.
Otherwise, the companies would be able to produce a large
number of musical disks by utilizing these nonunion sources of
music. Within days after his election to the presidency, Petrillo
turned his attention to the removal of these obstacles to his
plan.

In 1896, the AFM had been given, in its charter from the
American Federation of Labor, exclusive jurisdiction to organize
performers on musical instruments. But the musicians had not
seen fit to organize the instrumental virtuosos of their profession.
The musicians believed that this group could be organized
only with great difficulty and that no advantage was to be

114

gained by having them in the union, since these artists were
neither competing with ordinary musicians nor lowering stand-
ards. Subsequently, when the American Guild of Musical Artists
was organized as a labor union in 1936, it tried to enroll concert
and opera singers mainly, but accepted and encouraged solo
instrumentalists, accompanists, and symphony orchestra con-
ductors to join. Only a number of the solo instrumentalists,
however, became members of AGMA. At no time did the AFM
clearly relinquish its jurisdiction over the solo instrumentalists,
though there is little evidence that any strong protests were
made by the musicians union during the period when AGMA
began to organize them.

Early in August 1940, Petrillo decided to act. Since the long-
range program of the musicians union required that the union
should exercise some control over the instrumental soloists,
Petrillo ordered this group of musicians to join the AFM by
Labor Day. He warned that unless it did so, members of the
musicians union would not be permitted to play at any function
in which soloists participated. In his letter to Lawrence Tibbett,
president of AGMA, Petrillo stated that the instrumentalists
and symphony leaders must resign from AGMA and join the
AFM. He maintained that the policy of the AFM required
these individuals to join the labor union which had jurisdic-
tional rights. The musicians union formulated this position in
an attempt to prevent a gradual infringement on the area
which had been assigned to it by charter and to restrain the
excesses of AGMA. Notice of the union's position was sent to
radio networks, opera companies, symphony orchestras, and
others who might be affected.

Overnight the incident raised a national issue. The con-
testing personalities were colorful and the names of the leading
musical artists of America were involved. The nation chuckled
when Petrillo said: "Since when is there any difference between
Heifetz playing a fiddle and the fiddler in a tavern? They're
both musicians."1 Describing the action of AGMA, he said:
"They went along and took the instrumentalists. They took
the piano players and then they took orchestras. They stole my
people and I'm going to get them. They're musicians and be-
long to me." Tibbett and Petrillo discussed the matter for two
weeks and it appeared as if some progress was being made

115

towards an amicable settlement. The leader of the musicians
seemed willing to compromise.

But Lawrence Tibbett secretly was preparing a court case.
AGMA had worked diligently and laboriously in building its
membership to 1,800 persons and was not willing to relinquish
any part of it. Tibbett was no doubt aware that the proper
tribunal for adjudicating and adjusting the dispute was the
American Federation of Labor. But past experience had de-
monstrated that the more powerful labor union usually wins
its case before the councils of the AFL. His own AGMA had
absorbed a smaller AFL union through use of some highly
questionable legal technicalities on a previous occasion.2

The American Guild of Musical Artists asked the court to
restrain Petrillo and the musicians union from carrying out
their threats against the instrumentalists. Justice Ferdinand
Pecora of the New York Supreme Court granted a restraining
order, which barred Petrillo from taking any action in the
matter until a regular session of the court could hear the case.
Great astonishment was expressed by the judge that the presi-
dent of the union had the authority to impose fines on members
of the union and to suspend or change any provision of the
union constitution, at his discretion.3 These provisions were not
new, of course, for Weber had been vested with similar powers
for more than 20 years. It was not unexpected therefore that
the American Federation of Musicians turned down Pecora's
subsequent offer to mediate the dispute.

In a statement to the press Tibbett declared that the battle
between AGMA and AFM was not jurisdictional, but the be-
ginning of a fight for freedom of musical culture in America
from petty totalitarian dictators. Meanwhile, the position of
AGMA received general approval. Tibbett was unanimously
elected president of the American Federation of Radio Artists.
The Screen Actors Guild came out in support of AGMA. The
newspapers of the country generally were behind the Guild.
Pleaded Petrillo: "Everybody calls me the tsar, the chieftain
and this and that. What can I do?"4

As both sides prepared for the next step in the court test, the
musical artists laid plans to stage a mammoth fund raising con-
cert which would include performances by Jascha Heifetz,
Efrem Zimbalist, Mischa Elman, Jose Iturbi, Lily Pons, Gladys

116

Swarthout, Ezio Pinza, and Kirsten Flagstad. This concert was
never held, because many of the stars involved were uncertain
which side to support on the issue.

In the middle of November, Judge Aron Steuer of the New
York Supreme Court rendered a decision which set aside the
temporary stay of action granted previously, but at the same
time he stated that AGMA could have the issues in the case
tried in court. He declared that though members of the AFM
might be under dictatorial control and exposed to the danger
of union extortion, these facts were outside the scope of judicial
notice.5 AGMA announced its intention to appeal, and Petrillo
assured the court that the matter would be held in status quo
until the case would be reviewed by a higher court.

The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court in refusing to grant the Guild an
injunction, but went beyond that and held that since a labor
dispute was involved no cause for action could be found; and
it dismissed the case against the musicians.6 This decision was
unanimous and clear-cut. When the AFM decided that solo
instrumentalists must become members of the union by March
1941 if they desired to perform with other musicians, the rush
to enroll began. Though only a few soloists met the announced
deadline, more than a hundred of the leading instrumental
artists in the country and many symphony conductors joined
the musicians union in the next few months. Some of them had
previously been members of AGMA and some had never been
in any union before. Sergei Rachmaninoff, Fritz Kreisler, and
Josef Hofmann were given honorary memberships by the musi-
cians. They were excused from initiation fees and dues, but
agreed to conform to the laws and rules of the union. Four
instrumentalists who were not United States citizens and there-
fore not eligible to join the union, and a minor, likewise in-
eligible, were given permits by the Federation of Musicians
when they agreed to adhere to the rules of the union.

Albert Spalding, who was one of the founders of the Guild,
resigned from that body and joined the Federation. He told the
press that while the original purpose of the Guild had been to
form an organization of solo singers and instrumentalists, AGMA
had proceeded to organize chorus members, dancers, and accom-
panists, so that instrumental soloists had become only a small

117
fraction of the total membership. In addition, he said, the
soloists had been asked to employ only Guild members as
accompanists. Spalding then declared that the court rulings
were decisive and that he was joining the musicians union; his
attorneys had assured him that there was no basis for the fear
expressed by some persons that onerous terms and conditions
would be imposed by the AFM on the instrumental soloists.

Petrillo had won a resounding victory. The important solo
instrumentalists in the country were members of his union. The
Department of Justice then announced that a federal grand
jury would investigate charges that Petrillo had conspired with
radio chains and concert booking agencies to destroy AGMA.
The Department was interested in the arrangement under
which most of the concerts presented in the United States were
controlled by NBC and CBS. The networks were able to do so
through a technique by which Civic Concerts and Community
Concerts, affiliates of NBC Artists Service and Columbia Con-
certs Corporation respectively, supplied only block-booked
schedules. The investigation was to cover the practices used by
booking agencies, concert bureaus, and broadcasters in dealing
with artists in the musical fields and it was to examine the rela-
tionship between Petrillo and these organizations. The investi-
gation, however, was never made.

When the New York Court of Appeals, highest court in the
state, ruled in the summer of 1941 that the Appellate Division
had erred in dismissing the case against the AFM, AGMA al-
ready had lost the instrumentalists. The Court of Appeals held
that though it was proper to vacate the temporary court stay,
a trial should be held as to whether the musicians should be
prevented from taking over the soloists and whether they should
be required to pay damages. The court stated that the broad
doctrine had been established with regard to labor unions in
the State of New York that harm intentionally done is action-
able if not justified.7 Justifiable harm— some activity having a
reasonable connection with wages, hours, health, safety, the
right of collective bargaining, or other condition of employ-
ment—would be a lawful labor objective. No such objective was
obvious to the court in this case and therefore a trial should be
held. The decision, however, had come after the AFM had con-
solidated its hold on the solo instrumentalists, and though

118

AG MA did prepare for trial the outlook for the eventual suc-
cess of the Guild was hopeless.

During the winter of 1941 the American Federation of Musi-
cians finally moved in the direction which it had previously
rejected. It asked the American Federation of Labor to revoke
the charter of the Associated Actors and Artists of America
(Four A's) , the parent organization of AGMA, for trespassing
upon the jurisdiction of the AFM.

The AFL is vested with the power to take such action. A
union joining the labor federation receives a charter in which
its organizational jurisdiction is outlined. Exclusive rights to
organize certain kinds of workers are granted and no other labor
union in the federation may infringe on these areas. The AFL
has the authority to enforce and revoke the charter if a union
violates any of the provisions. Unfortunately the record of the
American Federation of Labor on matters jurisdictional has
been dismal. Economic power usually has been the only deter-
minant upon which it has based decisions in jurisdictional
questions and disputes. This weakness displayed by the AFL
has been the cause of much public criticism and concern and
has led to legislative intervention.

When Petrillo asked the American Federation of Labor to
investigate his charges that AGMA had transgressed jurisdiction-
ally, William Green, president of the AFL, advised him that
the unions should try to settle their differences through amicable
negotiation. The musicians union had won the struggle and
was interested in obtaining general acceptance of its new posi-
tion. The Guild desired to salvage what remained of its former
control. A settlement was reached in February 1942 after weeks
of negotiation. It provided that AGMA would recognize the
AFM's jurisdiction over concert solo instrumentalists and accom-
panists in all fields. AGMA, however, received authority to act
as the exclusive bargaining agent for all the solo instrumentalists
when they were engaged in the concert field only and it was
permitted to control the relationship between these musicians
and their managers.8 The New York Supreme Court lawsuit
which was pending was discontinued. Even as agreement was
reached, Petrillo was able to state that 99 per cent of the solo
concert instrumentalists were already members of the American
Federation of Musicians.

119

Both the AFM and the AGMA had been subjected to strong
criticism during the controversy. Petrillo, however, had borne
the brunt of the abuse. He had been threatened and reviled by
an indignant press and an aroused public. Nevertheless, as the
courts ruled in his favor and, subsequently, as a settlement was
reached with AGMA, there was a considerable tempering of the
attitude of the public and even an expression of occasional
words of approbation for Petrillo. AGMA, though subject to
much less censure, had not escaped unscathed. During the pre-
ceding years its activities, as well as those of its parent body-
Associated Actors and Artists of America, had been marked by
conflict and turmoil. The battle with the stage hands in 1939
had been one which aroused resentment and bitter enmity. These
facts were not forgotten by those persons who denounced the
actions of the Guild.

The outcome of the solo instrumentalist case strengthened
Petrillo's hand immeasurably. He was in much more strategic
position with regard to his objectives in the field of recordings,
and furthermore he could hasten the completion of his negotia-
tions with the Boston Symphony Orchestra which he had under-
taken and which was part of the larger plan.

• Unionization of the Boston Symphony Orchestra

The Boston Symphony Orchestra was founded in 1881. It
was organized by Henry Lee Higginson, whose name is often
prefixed by the title "major" because that is the rank he attained
in the army during the American Civil War. Higginson, a mem-
ber of a banking family, had considerable wealth when he
launched the orchestra. He had been a music enthusiast during
his youth and in his later years he desired to build an orchestra
which would be worthy of the highest merit. In the nearly 40
years of his association with the orchestra, he preferred to be its
sole underwriter. During that span of time he met deficits
aggregating nearly a million dollars from his personal resources.

The beginning of Higginson's long struggle with the union
came shortly before 1890 when a new conductor of the orchestra
was to arrive from Europe. The local musicians union objected
to the admission of this conductor to the United States on the
ground that his entry would violate the alien contract labor
law, but the contention was not sustained. Though this incident

120

preceded the organization of the American Federation of Musi-
cians it is illustrative of what was to follow.

By the turn of the century all of the symphony orchestras in
the United States except the one in Boston had been unionized.
Higginson hated and resisted labor unions, and in order to
stem the tide of union affiliation which he foresaw coming
towards his orchestra, he introduced a pension plan in 1903.
Nevertheless a large number of the members of the Boston
Symphony joined the union by 1904. Higginson warned the
members of the orchestra that if the union interfered in any
way with his policies, he would disband the symphony. The men
who had joined all resigned from the union.

The union, thereupon, turned its attention to the task of
eliminating a major source of the supply of musical talent for
the Boston Symphony Orchestra. This source was the foreign
musician. Though the musical critics agreed that many foreign
instrumentalists displayed a higher caliber than those residing
in the United States, the union denied this assertion. The union,
on the other hand, maintained that foreign musicians tended
to undercut American wage standards. It therefore did not per-
mit any person to become a member unless he had declared his
intention of becoming an American citizen and had obtained
his first papers. At the union's Boston convention in 1906, Presi-
dent Weber said: "It is about time to give the American boy
a chance in America."9 The union claimed that foreign musi-
cians were recruited only because the practice made it possible
to include elements of novelty in the season's preliminary press
notices; but that no improvement in the orchestra resulted from
the annual changes in personnel.

It is possible that the superior achievements of the Boston
Symphony might have been attained by depending solely upon
American musicians. But leadership among symphonies could
not be maintained if the orchestra were confined in its recruit-
ment to nonunion musicians. Except for members of the Boston
orchestra, the best musicians in the United States generally
belonged to the American Federation of Musicians. Since mem-
bers of the AFM could not be easily persuaded to join him, it
was incumbent upon Higginson to seek replacements and new
performers for his nonunion orchestra abroad. This process
effectively thwarted the union in its efforts to gain control over

121

the Boston Symphony Orchestra, even though it had a closed
shop in the other symphonies performing in the United States.

During the years preceding 1920, the Boston Symphony
reached the height of its musical eminence under the leadership
of Dr. Karl Muck. Muck had been the conductor of the Royal
Opera in Berlin for 20 years when he was given permission by
the German Emperor to go to Boston in order to lead the
orchestra in that city. He remained in Boston during the seasons
of 1906 and 1907. Muck then returned to Germany to fulfill his
contract there, but he was again attracted by the much greater
financial remuneration offered in the United States; and he
resumed his leadership of the Boston Symphony Orchestra in
1912.

Early in the first World War, Muck was criticized severely
for presenting "all German" recitals. After the United States
entered the war, it became customary for all orchestras and bands
to play the Star Spangled Banner during each program. Muck
refused to comply with the public request that the Boston Sym-
phony adopt this custom and as a result set in motion a wave of
nationwide criticism. Higginson and Muck argued that the
national anthem was not suitable for symphony presentations.
Higginson threatened to disband the orchestra rather than to
allow it to play the anthem. Muck, however, became the center
of the storm when Walter Damrosch declared that Boston's
conductor was a loyal citizen of Prussia.

The mayor of Boston, James M. Curley, ordered the license
of Symphony Hall canceled if the orchestra failed to play the
anthem at every performance. The American Federation of
Musicians congratulated the mayor on his patriotic stand. Under
the severe public criticism the orchestra abandoned its first
position and agreed to play the Star Spangled Banner, but the
action came too late to save Muck. A few persons came to his
defense, but almost everybody else resented his attitude. The
Swiss legation in this country verified the fact that Muck was a
citizen of Switzerland. But since he had been born in Bavaria,
had been associated with Germany for the greater portion of
his professional life, and was conducting an orchestra which,
because of the foreign background of its members could not be
considered American, he became a symbol of the enemy. He was
arrested as an enemy alien and jailed. When the war ended he

122

was released from internment and went back to Germany. He
refused many lucrative offers to return to this country. In 1939,
the year before his death, he was decorated by Adolph Hitler.

Although Higginson was strongly pro-Ally, he endured per-
sonal humiliation during the war because of the loyalty he
manifested to his conductor. When Muck was interned, Hig-
ginson, then 83 years of age, announced that others would have
to carry on the burden of supervising the affairs of the orchestra
and he severed his connections with the symphony.

After Muck was arrested, the managers of the symphony, in
order to appease public opinion, discharged all members of the
orchestra who were citizens of enemy countries. These men
were unable to secure new employment because they were not
members of the union. Union membership was a prerequisite
for all of the better jobs available to musicians in the country.
The National Alien Enemy Relief Committee requested the
union to admit these men to membership. Weber denied the
request because it required action that was in conflict with
the principles under which the union operated. No musician im-
ported under a contract could become a member of the union
because contract labor represented unfair competition. The
union maintained that members of the Boston orchestra had
been recruited in this unfair manner and that if they were per-
mitted to join, others would be encouraged similarly to violate
union rules. The National Alien Enemy Relief Committee ac-
cepted this explanation.

The most nearly successful attempt to organize the orchestra
prior to 1940, occurred in 1920. An attempt to unionize the group
had been made by some of the members in advance of the
opening of the 1918-1919 season. Management met this chal-
lenge by giving all the instrumentalists in the orchestra a bonus
of $250 for the season. This action ended unionization efforts.
Similar methods had been used by the orchestra to frustrate
union plans five years before.

Early in 1920, 80 members of the Boston Symphony Orchestra
requested the nine trustees to increase wages and at the same
time took steps to join the union. It was already clear that the
new management of the orchestra was also opposed to the
union. Judge Frederick P. Cabot, chairman of the board of trus-
tees, had threatened to disband the symphony if any signs of

123
unionism were manifested. When he had been told by a com-
mittee of musicians the preceding year: "We can't live any
more these days on the salary you pay us," he replied: "Well,
gentlemen, all I can say is that you had better change your
profession."10

The members of the orchestra had valid grievances. The
minimum wage paid to the members of the Boston Symphony
Orchestra was $35 a week. But in the other symphony orches-
tras, all of which were unionized, the minimum was $55. Cabot
estimated that the wage demand made by the players in 1920
would increase expenditures by $100,000 and declared that the
trustees were in no position to make this additional outlay.
Though he declared that the orchestra's wages were 30 per cent
higher than before the war, he did not mention that the cost of
living had doubled. Cabot, however, told the men that union
membership would not be an issue providing they were willing
to accept the open shop principle. Under no circumstances
would he recognize the union, since that would give it some
control over the orchestra.

It has never been established definitely whether the will of
Higginson had determined in any way the attitude that the
trustees took towards the union. Higginson had died in the
interim between his retirement and 1920. Though he had at
one time announced that his will provided $1,000,000 to perpet-
uate the symphony, he revised the instrument during the Muck
affair. Then he added several codicils. The probate of the will
showed that nothing was left to the Boston Symphony, but in
one of the supplementary documents he left his valuable
musical library and musical instruments to the orchestra con-
tingent upon the discretion of the executor who between three
and five years after the testator's death was to make or cancel
the gift, "guided by the manner in which the Symphony Or-
chestra shall have been and is being managed."11 The trustees
might have been influenced by this provision.

The management remained adamant in its refusal to deal
with the players even though 90 per cent of the orchestra, in-
cluding Frederic Fradkin the concertmaster, had joined the
AFM. Suddenly Fradkin was discharged, ostensibly for disobey-
ing the conductor. Over 30 men struck to secure his reinstate-
ment, but Fradkin succeeded in getting them to return to their

124

jobs. The trustees, however, withheld the pay of these men
pending disciplinary action. The men promptly struck again
and with the help of local musicians organized their own or-
chestra and actually presented several concerts. The Boston
police, however, prevented the strikers from picketing the Boston
Symphony Orchestra.

The revolt of the union members fizzled out. The trustees
remained firm. The press was united in opposing the strikers.
The public was apathetic regarding the entire question, just
having witnessed the abortive Boston police strike of 1919. And
the Boston Symphony left for a road tour after successfully
replacing the strikers. Former members of the orchestra were
rehired. New recruits were sought and found. Then some of the
strikers resigned from the union and rejoined the orchestra. By
the end of the summer the complement of men in the symphony
was once more complete.

The Boston Symphony was not to regain its prominence as
one of the world's leading orchestras until Serge Koussevitzky
assumed the leadership in 1924. Under the successors of Muck
—Henri Rabaud and Pierre Monteux— the orchestra had deteri-
orated. The effects of the strike had not worn off when Kous-
sevitzky took over. But Koussevitzky had ability and energy. His
reputation marked him as one of the ablest of European con-
ductors. He immediately set about reorganizing the symphony.

Older players were pensioned or released and some of the
younger ones who were hired as replacements during the strike,
but were only second-raters, were dismissed. The dismissal plan
aroused some resentment among the players and there were new
moves to affiliate with the union during 1925 and 1926. But
efforts to unionize failed because the number of men who were
sufficiently bold to show that they desired to join the union was
too few. For more than 12 years thereafter attempts to unionize
the orchestra were of negligible importance.

Europe was scoured for talent during the years succeeding
1924. The conductor felt that the best recruits were to be found
there. But as the seasons passed, Koussevitzky became one of the
more ardent exponents of American music. He also recognized
the improved quality of American musical education and dur-
ing the 1930's began engaging American-born musicians. It is
true that the American Federation of Musicians blacklisted

125

the members of the Boston Symphony and fined union members
for playing at Koussevitzky's auditions. Nevertheless, many mu-
sicians went to the yearly auditions. When the second World
War opened in 1939, the orchestra was largely American because
of the new hiring policy and because most of the foreign-born
players had been Americanized.

During the first 15 years of his connection with the orchestra,
Koussevitzky remained neutral with regard to union matters.
He was not antiunion. In 1902 he had organized the first musi-
cians union in Russia and later he belonged to a musicians
union in Paris. But he was pleased with the nonunion status of
his orchestra because it gave him freedom from union regula-
tions and restrictions. However, he succeeded in inducing the
trustees not to put into effect a salary cut during the depression
after one had already been made and generally he protected
the men from the interference of management.

Notwithstanding Koussevitzky's efforts on behalf of the mem-
bers of his orchestra, the symphony player in Boston had an
inferior economic position in comparison to other musicians
performing similar duties. The weekly stipend was smaller in
Boston and the men did not have the same regularity in hours
which other symphony players had. Union men received addi-
tional pay for extra rehearsals and much higher fees when they
made symphony recordings. Apologists for the nonunion Boston
orchestra conceded that the weekly remuneration was smaller
in Boston but claimed that the annual salary was greater
because of more regular employment. These contentions were
unwarranted for though the season of the symphony man in
Boston may have been slightly longer as a result of extensions
through "pops" and festival programs, these engagements did
not counterbalance the much greater weekly remuneration re-
ceived by the union men. However, the Boston men made no
move towards union affiliation.

Unionization of the Boston Symphony came from the outside.
The orchestra's main income was derived from performances on
the radio, for recording, and in the concert hall. Whatever
deficit remained after the funds from these sources were ex-
hausted was covered by contributions of the trustees and friends
of the symphony. Shortly before 1940 the union undertook to
make the deficit grow to a point where the financial burdens of

126

the trustees would became impossible to bear. Petrillo was suc-
cessful in carrying out this policy.

It was only two weeks after his elevation to the presidency of
the national organization, that Petrillo began an intensive
campaign to unionize the Boston Symphony Orchestra. The
orchestra was one of the more important recorders for RCA
Victor and control over the activities of the orchestra was neces-
sary in order for Petrillo to be able to halt the production of
all phonographic recordings and transcriptions. Some action had
already been taken against the Boston orchestra in 1939 by the
AFM. When the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers decided to sponsor a music festival in New York's
Carnegie Hall, the Federation opposed the inclusion of the
Boston Symphony in the recital. Fiorello H. La Guardia, mayor
of New York, decided to remove the orchestra from the program
and the New York Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra was sub-
stituted. In addition, the musicians union had prevented the
Boston Symphony from performing over the radio subsequent
to the 1938 season. The union had threatened to pull out its
own musicians from radio programs if the broadcasters permitted
the nonunion group to go on the air.

Although Petrillo was negotiating with the orchestra from
the outset, he was neither in a vacillating mood, nor was he
inclined to waver from a firm resolve to unionize the symphony.
In August 1940 he told newspaper reporters: "They're through.
We've taken them off the radio and off the records."12 All
record companies who desired to employ union musicians had
been forced to secure licenses from the AFM. When the AFM
ordered the RCA Victor company to stop recording the Boston
Symphony or else suffer the loss of its license, the company
hastened to obey. RCA Victor refused to renew its contract with
the Boston orchestra. Pressed records of the orchestra, however,
were released for many months thereafter because of the ac-
cumulated recordings cut prior to the termination of the
agreement.

The strategy and tactics of the union with respect to the
Boston Symphony may be divided into four parts. First, it
involved removing the orchestra from radio programs. Secondly,
the orchestra was prevented from making any recordings. These
objectives were accomplished with promptness and dispatch and

127

helped the union to isolate and cut off the orchestra financially.

Thirdly, Petrillo refused to grant solo instrumentalists and
conductors permission to perform with the nonunion symphony
orchestra. Violinists Efrem Zimbalist and Joseph Szigeti were re-
fused permission to play scheduled dates. These men had joined
the AFM after resigning from AGMA. Conductors Howard
Hanson, Bruno Walter, and Carlos Chavez were similarly barred
from conducting the Boston Symphony. Walter was an honorary
member of the union and Chavez, as a Mexican alien, was the
holder of a permit entitling him to lead union orchestras. The
Boston orchestra was unable to obtain artists. (At the same time
union policy barred nonunion conductors from leading union
orchestras, although upon the personal appeal of Marshall
Field 3d, president of the New York Philharmonic's board of
directors, Petrillo consented to permit Koussevitzky to conduct
a series of the New York society's concerts early in 1942.) The
link between the enrollment of solo instrumentalists in the
union and the unionization of the Boston Symphony Orchestra
thus was made evident. The unionized solo instrumentalists
and the unionized conductors could be prevented from accept-
ing guest engagements with a nonunion orchestra.

The fourth action of the union was aimed at blocking the
road tours of the orchestra. Concert halls which scheduled recit-
als by the Boston Symphony were told that they would be put
on the union blacklist. This pressure was applied when the
orchestra tried to use the municipal auditorium in Springfield,
Massachusetts, the Eastman Theater in Rochester, New York,
and Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts. Though the
union was not successful in securing the elimination of the
orchestra from all of these halls, the orchestra undoubtedly
suffered from some unfavorable publicity. The union also con-
sidered picketing Symphony Hall, home of the Boston orchestra.
Carnegie Hall in New York City was put on the local's unfair
list in June 1942 because it refused to agree to schedule only
union orchestras. Petrillo, however, removed it from the list
pending the outcome of his negotiations with the Boston Sym-
phony. These negotiations already were on their way to success-
ful termination.

Even as the union was tightening its vise-like grip on the
orchestra, conferences between the AFM and the Boston Sym-

128

phony had continued. As events unfolded, the executives of
the Boston orchestra maintained strict silence on the matter of
unionization. Only once was this rule broken. Rumors had per-
sisted that the will of Henry L. Higginson had provided re-
sources to the orchestra contingent upon its remaining free
from unionism. George Judd, manager of the orchestra, empha-
tically stated that the will did not prohibit the employment of
union musicians. In April 1942 Ernest B. Dane, president of
the board of trustees of the orchestra, died. He had been resolute
in his opposition to the union and, as the largest contributor,
had been the orchestra's most influential policy maker. His
death weakened opposition to the union. It then became pos-
sible for the parties to reach general agreement, although many
details remained to be worked out subsequently.

Koussevitzky had been trying to get the trustees to permit
unionization since 1939. He perceived the need for an unin-
terrupted flow of revenues from radio performances and record-
ings and he knew that the orchestra would suffer from its inabil-
ity to obtain guest artists and interchange conductors. But he
could not convince the trustees and he almost decided to sever
his connection with the Boston group and come to New York
as conductor of the Philharmonic. Petrillo appreciated the posi-
tion of Koussevitzky and told a reporter: "Look here, the Boston
Symphony wants the privilege of walking around the country
as a nonunion organization, whereas 95 per cent of its members
want to join. This includes Koussevitzky himself. How do I
know? He told me so personally, when I visited him at his home
in the Berkshires last summer." Petrillo added that Koussevitzky
had advised him to "go easy" with the trustees. Petrillo then
concluded: "I've been going easy for a year. But what do I get?
A letter from Ernest B. Dane that he will stand by Judd as
manager. And what did Judd write before that? He said he
could not go over the head of the trustees. All right, if a fight
is what they want, they can have it."13

In November 1942 the parties reached full agreement and a
contract was signed. The 111 members of the Boston Symphony
Orchestra, including the conductor and assistant conductors,
agreed to join the union on condition that the orchestra be
given the right to hire instrumentalists from any part of the
United States and not, as had previously been required, only

129

from within the jurisdiction of the local in which the orchestra
was located. In order to effect this basic change, the laws of the
union had to be modified. Petrillo consulted with representatives
of 15 of the largest locals in the United States; the necessary
revision of the union laws would directly affect these jurisdic-
tions. As might be expected, the changes proposed by Petrillo
were approved unanimously. Then under article I, section 1, of
the bylaws of the union, Petrillo modified the bylaws to provide
that all symphony orchestras might recruit players from any
part of the United States. A symphony instrumentalist may
now accept a symphony job in another jurisdiction without the
permission of the local in whose jurisdiction the job is located.

These changes produced pleasant relations between the or-
chestra and the union. Although the repealed provisions con-
cerning the employment of symphony players had not been
enforced strictly and many exceptions had been permitted by
the union, the trustees of the Boston orchestra felt that the mere
existence of the restriction in the union law was a threat to the
artistic integrity of the symphony. Said Serge Koussevitzky of
Petrillo: "He's a very able man in his line. For his union he did
a splendid job."14 And indeed he did. But the time element had
favored Petrillo and had played a leading role in breaking
down the resistance of the directors of the orchestra to the union.

After 61 years of opposition to unionization, the Boston
Symphony Orchestra was forced to yield. The immediate cause
of its capitulation was dire financial necessity. Though this
orchestra was one of the world's finest and had been run effi-
ciently and economically, its budget could not be balanced. In
some cities, deficits were paid from the contributions of a few
patrons of art. In Boston, Higginson had made up the difference
between the income and outlay of the orchestra, and had at the
same time dictated the policies. After his death this task was
taken up by others. When Dane died, no person or group of
persons was willing to meet the deficit from its own resources.
The income that could be derived from radio engagements, re-
cordings, and road tours became indispensable for the continued
solvency of the orchestra.

Freedom in the selection of orchestra members had become a
changed problem over the years. The first decades of the century
had been highlighted by union attempts to prevent the

130

influx of foreign musicians into this country. Orchestras and
bands, however, operated on the assumption that foreign play-
ers generally surpassed American instrumentalists. The union
took a long-range point of view and stressed the need for im-
proving the opportunities of American musicians and making
more adequate use of their talent. Laws restricting alien contract
labor were only partially successful from the union's point of
view, but immigration restrictions were somewhat more effective.
The first World War helped the union by cutting off the supply
of immigrants. In some cases the contract labor law had an indi-
rect influence on the number of foreign musicians entering the
United States. When a musician from abroad was brought to
this country in the expectation of subsequently getting a contract
from the Boston Symphony, he had to wait several months in
order to meet the requirements of the law. As a result the musi-
cian insisted that the contract which he finally signed should in-
clude special provisions and should be of long duration. This
arrangement made for more rigid conditions and reduced the
flexibility of the orchestra.

The sound musical training instituted by American high
schools, colleges, and music schools had improved the quality
of orchestra players here. The foresight and vision of Kousse-
vitzky in substituting American men for the older foreign players
in the orchestra had eliminated a major grievance of the union.
In 1918, the Boston Symphony Orchestra consisted of 100 men.
Of these, 51 were American citizens but only 17 were native
born. Twenty-two were German, eight Austrian, six Dutch,
three French, two British, two Italian, two Russian, two Belgian,
and two Bohemians. In 1940 native Americans dominated the
orchestra.

The Boston Symphony Orchestra, therefore, was more in-
clined to deal with the union. Money derived from recordings
and radio programs was essential for the continuation of opera-
tions. In order to obtain such funds the demands of the union
had to be met. But it was now possible for the orchestra to
recruit an adequate supply of excellent musicians by sifting the
United States, because American players had attained extreme
proficiency and were among the best in the world. As soon as
the union was ready to make a few concessions the basis for an
agreement was found. The long struggle ended with a complete

131

understanding when the union consented to modify its hiring
requirements. The importance of nonunion musicians in the
United States was entirely eliminated and the union's control
over professional musicians became complete.

Petrillo had accomplished his preliminary tasks. The two
weaknesses in the organization of musicians which he had found
when he became president were eliminated. The solo instru-
mentalists had been taken away from the American Guild of
Musical Artists and the Boston Symphony had been converted
into a union orchestra. His fight with the record companies
now could be undertaken.

THE RECORD BAN IN 1942 Q

OR ROOSEVELT COULDN'T END THAT ONE • °

"[The companies resorted to] bitterness, injustice, trick-
ery and reactionism which would do justice to slave-
owners [; they engaged in a} vile, indecent, malicious
and filthy campaign of libel, slander and vilification. . . .
Honesty and fairness . . . triumphed over falsity and
fraud. . . . If . . . the companies, fail to change [their
past course], the A.F.M. will not hesitate to break off
relations and leave them to die by their own nefarious
schemes."

JAMES CAESAR PETRILLO

• The Cessation of Recording

Petrillo realized that the ban on the production of recordings
which he had imposed on Chicago musicians for 18 months in
1937 and 1938 had cost the members of his local a quarter of a
million dollars in wages. Yet he was not afraid to re-engage in
battle against mechanical music. The conventions of 1941 and
1942 had authorized him to try to bring to an end the produc-
tion of musical records and transcriptions. When Petrillo had
succeeded in his preliminary maneuvers and had brought all
instrumentalists into the union, he acted with dispatch.

Late in June 1942, the recording and transcription companies
were notified that after August 1, members of the AFM would
not play or contract to make records, transcriptions, or other
types of mechanical reproduction of music. Elmer Davis, director
of the Office of War Information, requested the union to with-
draw its notices, but he was turned down; the order went into
effect as scheduled. Senator Burton K. Wheeler's offer to mediate
between the union and the companies was rejected by the union
on the grounds that it had no intention of dealing or negotiat-
ing with the companies.

Meanwhile, however, the government had intervened in the
record controversy in two ways. In August, Senator D. Worth
Clark introduced a resolution in Congress to investigate Pe-

133

trillo and the union. Preliminary hearings were held and the
resolution was approved.1 In January 1943, Petrillo and his
counsel appeared before the subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate Commerce which was inquiring into the
ban on records. After lengthy testimony Petrillo promised to
negotiate with the companies. The government also acted
through the Department of Justice. In July 1942, Attorney
General Francis Biddle authorized Thurman Arnold of the
Department of Justice to seek an injunction from the United
States District Court to prevent the union from engaging in
restraint of trade and from violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The judge, however, supported the contention of the union
that a labor dispute was involved and he therefore did not issue
any injunction. The United States Supreme Court upheld the
decision of the lower court.2 A second suit to secure an injunc-
tion was dropped by the Department of Justice in April 1943
after Tom C. Clark replaced Arnold as Assistant Attorney
General.

For six months Petrillo held firm to his resolution not to
permit his members to make musical recordings. He had told
the 1942 convention of the union that the industry would be
permitted to produce records if it gave assurances that they
would be used only in the home or that they would be used by
the armed forces; the ban would be dropped if President Roose-
velt would so request. During the first month after recording
had ceased, the manufacture of transcriptions which were to be
used only once and then destroyed had been permitted by
Petrillo. He had canceled this authorization when his lawyers
advised him that the concession might be construed as a viola-
tion of the law because it discriminated in favor of commercial
transcriptions and against library recordings and phonographic
records. The position of the union in the recording controversy
was supported by various groups and persons, mainly labor
organizations. In October 1942 the convention of the American
Federation of Labor, upon the recommendation of its executive
council, passed a resolution approving the ban on records.

The Puerto Rico Federation of Musicians announced that it
was supporting the AFM and that it too was banning the
production of musical recordings. The Puerto Rican musicians
claimed that this position was also being taken by the musicians

134

of Cuba and Argentina. The Musicians Union of Great Britain
pledged itself to aid the AFM by preventing the export of
musical records from Great Britain. The British musicians did
not resume making records for shipment to the United States
and Canada, until after the AFM had reached an agreement
with the recording companies. This was of vital importance to
Petrillo for it eliminated what might have become a means of
dissipating the effectiveness of the ban on production which
had been imposed in the United States. Members of the AFM
backed the ban and completely refrained from making record-
ings. Personnel of name bands and symphony orchestras and
solo instrumentalists who were unable to record and whose
incomes were therefore curtailed, voiced very few complaints.

External opposition to the action taken by the union was
more vociferous and bitter. The public was disquieted. A Gallup
poll at the end of the summer of 1942 showed that 73 per cent
of the people favored legal action by the government to stop
Petrillo, while only 12 per cent were opposed. The chief antag-
onism to the union and Petrillo came from the National Asso-
ciation of Broadcasters. The NAB is the trade association of the
radio industry; and although it has enrolled most of the stations
in the country among its membership, it is dominated by the
large networks. In 1943, James L. Fly, then chairman of the
Federal Communications Commission characterized the NAB
as a "stooge organization" before a Senate committee. The
Association was vociferous in denouncing, taunting, and reviling
Petrillo. Acrimonious speeches were made, disparaging pam-
phlets were issued, special bulletins were published, and car-
toons ridiculing Petrillo were reproduced. The dictatorial
implications of Petrillo's middle name— Caesar— were stressed
by the NAB; Petrillo complained that the NAB had spent a
million and a half dollars publicizing this fact. Petrillo un-
doubtedly did not know that in 1908, the American Federation
of Musicians had attacked the policies recommended by the
temporary chairman of the Republican national convention,
Julius Caesar Burroughs; the AFM emphasized that such pro-
posals might be expected from a person bearing the names
"Julius Caesar."3

The campaign waged by the NAB against the policy of the
musicians union was reinforced by the specific employers affected

135

—the recording companies and the radio broadcasters. The
recording industry consists of two parts. Some companies manu-
facture records and others manufacture electrical transcriptions.
Phonographic records are readily available to the public. About
80 per cent of the records are purchased for use in the home,
19 per cent are bought for use in juke boxes located in hotels,
restaurants, and dance halls, and one per cent is obtained by
radio stations. The bulk of the records made in the United
States are produced by six companies— Columbia Recording
Corporation (affiliated with CBS) , RCA Victor (affiliated with
NBC) , Decca Records, Capitol Records, Mercury Record Corpo-
ration, and MGM Records.

Electrical transcriptions are specially prepared 33-inch plat-
ters which, because of the materials utilized and the method of
recording, may be used only for radio broadcasts. The tran-
scription business has two distinct divisions, generally known as
library and commercial. Library transcriptions are rented by
stations for use on sustaining programs— that is, programs which
have no commercial sponsor. Like phonograph records, they
may be played many times. Commercial transcriptions record
broadcasts which are sponsored by advertisers. They are rarely
used more than once. The radio recording division of NBC
controls a very large proportion of the transcription business.
Only a handful of firms render library service, though there are
a larger number engaged in making commercial transcriptions.
The gross annual income of the transcription industry amounts
to several million dollars.

The closed shop has prevailed in the recording industry for
many years, but until 1944 no negotiations concerning working
conditions ever took place. The AFM laid down the terms, in-
cluding the amount of wages to be paid and the number of
hours to be worked, and the companies adopted them. The
original reason for licensing the recording companies in 1938
was to force them to restrict the use of records to noncommercial
purposes. The court subsequently determined that such a limi-
tation could not be enforced legally.4 Nevertheless the union
continued to issue licenses until the recording ban went into
effect.

The interests of the radio broadcasting companies have been
intertwined with those of the recording companies. Senator

136

Burton K. Wheeler had at one time been advised by Petrillo to
investigate this connection, but Wheeler had been persuaded
by the radio interests not to do so. Radio stations and networks
were strongly opposed to the record ban. Most of the newspapers
in the country supported the radio industry but this attitude at
least partially depended on the fact that many of them own or
control radio stations.

Petrillo stressed that he could not expect very much more
employment from the recording companies, and that he was
really interested in getting at the radio stations. Nearly 75 per
cent of all radio time has been devoted to music; less than half
has consisted of live music and the remainder has constituted
recorded programs. The proportions have varied among the
stations, the amount of recorded music having been much
smaller, in general, on network outlets. Though the AFM con-
ceded that at least half of the radio stations earned incomes
which were too small to enable them to hire live musicians, it
demanded that stations which could afford to do so, should
increase the number of staff musicians. The union claimed that
musicians should share in the huge profits of the radio industry.

Bargaining with radio networks has been carried on mainly
on a local basis and handled by the local unions, but the
national organization has always been ready to help the local
deal with a station that is part of a network system. The AFM
was formerly able to do this by getting the network to induce
the local station to accept the terms of the local union.

Petrillo made a good impression when he testified before a
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce
on January 12 and 13, 1943.5 He stated that the union was
willing to negotiate with the recording industry in order to
work out a just solution. At one point Senator Clark broke into
the discussion and said to Petrillo: "Would you change jobs
with one of us? Today I would," was the answer he received.6

In February 1943 the union proposed that recording compa-
nies should pay a fee for each record and transcription made
by union members. These fees would be put into a fund to be
used for the reduction of unemployment among musicians.
Both the phonographic record companies and the transcription
companies, which bargained separately with the union, turned
the proposal down. The companies refused to make payments

137

into a fund which would be used for the benefit of musicians
whom they had never employed. After several months of fruit-
less conferences, the negotiations lapsed. Some of the companies
affected appealed to the United States Conciliation Service, and
when this agency could not settle the dispute it certified the
matter to the National War Labor Board.

Many of the companies, however, were in no haste to settle the
issues. Radio stations and juke box operators had had long
notice of Petrillo's intention to ban recording, and they had
accumulated huge stocks of musical selections. The recorders
continued to release records by pressing reissues and by dipping
into the backlogs which they had built up. They also manufac-
tured records and transcriptions for the United States govern-
ment. Petrillo permitted musicians to make recordings in con-
nection with the government's war effort.

The companies continued to record vocal arrangements, but
when they attempted to use vocal backgrounds simulating music,
Petrillo felt that they were going too far. He warned the top
ranking singers against this practice. They agreed to refrain
from using such backgrounds when they were told that the
musicians union would eventually take account of all their
activities during the ban. Recordings of music with instruments
not then covered by the union rules or contracts— such as harmon-
icas, ocarinas, and one-man bands— continued to be made but
they found little popular appeal. "Bootleg" recordings carrying
names like Hal Goodman, Peter Piper, and Johnny Jones, were
made to circumvent the ban, but they were not numerous. Other
records were brought in from Mexico and Cuba.

There was another reason why the record ban applied by
Petrillo was not too burdensome on industry. The record manu-
facturers were faced by an acute shortage of raw materials.
India has been the only source of supply of shellac and little of
this substance was imported during the war. Shellac normally
constitutes 20 per cent of the matter in each disk. It is used
because it pours evenly when the record is pressed, it resists
heat when the record is played, and it keeps surface noise down.
The only satisfactory substitute for shellac is vinylite (used in
making transcriptions) but the high cost has made it uneco-
nomical to use vinylite in the production of records. Manufac-
turers, thus dependent on reprocessed and salvaged shellac,

138

found that production costs had increased and that the quality
of the records had been reduced. This situation and the impo-
sition of quotas by the government limiting the amount of
virgin shellac which the record companies could consume were
responsible for a decrease in the output of records.

As a result the recording industry had time to consider what
to do and to delay the acceptance of proposals submitted. When
the case went to the NWLB, the AFM denied that that agency
had any jurisdiction. In spite of the fact that the union had
maintained, and succeeded in winning its case before the courts
on grounds that it was involved in a labor dispute with the
recording companies, it denied to the NWLB that any labor
controversy existed. The American Federation of Musicians
therefore claimed that the NWLB had no jurisdiction. Follow-
ing a short hearing, however, the NWLB assumed jurisdiction
of the case in July 1943.

After the Board panel had begun hearings, Decca Records
capitulated to the union demands and signed an agreement in
September. Gradually all of the other record and transcription
companies accepted similar terms and they also signed contracts.
But Columbia, RCA Victor, and the NBC transcription division
refused to agree to the principle of making payments to the
union and continued the case before the panel. In March 1944,
the panel recommended to the NWLB that the men should be
ordered back to work and that no royalty plan should be ap-
proved. In June, the NWLB handed down its decision.7 The
Board decided that the musicians should return to work at
once, but overruled the panel and held that immediate nego-
tiations should be held regarding the amount of contributions
that employers should make to a welfare fund.

The union, however, rejected the Board's directive. It refused
to work for the three companies unless they accepted contracts
similar to those agreed to by the others. The companies refused
to comply with the union's demand and the NWLB turned the
case over to Fred M. Vinson, Director of Economic Stabilization.
The union argued that war agencies had no jurisdiction over
the matter because the war effort was not involved; despite the
fact that Chauncey A. Weaver, a member of the union's inter-
national executive board for many years had maintained, in
another connection, that music is a war essential.

139

Nevertheless, neither Vinson nor James F. Byrnes, Director
of War Mobilization was able to settle the case and it was
referred to President Roosevelt. On October 4, 1944, Roosevelt
sent a telegram to Petrillo asking him to comply with the
NWLB directive. Roosevelt said that he would not seize the
industry because noncompliance by the union was not unduly
impeding the war effort, but that he hoped the union would
accept the decision in the interests of orderly government.

Although Petrillo had stated publicly that he would end the
record ban if requested to do so by President Roosevelt, his
statement had been made before any of the companies had
signed agreements. Since almost all of them had come to terms
by October 1944, Petrillo turned down the request of the presi-
dent. He refused to give advantageous terms to those companies
which had not yet signed. Roosevelt announced that he would
check the law to see what he could do about Petrillo's decision.
But the president did nothing further and many people were
disappointed by his failure to act. The disappointment, in one
instance, was expressed the following year during hearings held
by a committee of the House of Representatives. Paul A. Porter,
chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, was
testifying. The dialogue was: "Mr. Brown. Do you mean to say
that even the appeal of the President did not move Mr. Petrillo
in the stand he had taken with reference to those records? Mr.
Porter. Mr. Petrillo was adamant. Mr. Brown. What was that
word? Mr. Porter. Mr. Petrillo did not budge. Mr. Brown. You
mean he just did not budge. Mr. Porter. That is right. Mr.
Brown. And there wasn't anybody who carried him out of his
office, was there? Mr. Porter. No."8

Columbia and RCA Victor were not able to procrastinate any
longer because their competitive positions were deteriorating
rapidly. The War Production Board had increased shellac
quotas substantially and the output of records had begun to
rise. Decca, some of whose album sales reached enormous pro-
portions, was recording almost all the new tunes (a few smaller
and newer companies were expanding under the unusually
auspicious conditions) . But more important in prompting the
decision of Columbia and RCA Victor was the possibility that
many of their artists would switch to Decca. The imminence of
such changes was demonstrated when Jascha Heifetz ended his

140

long exclusive connection with RCA Victor and signed a non-
exclusive agreement with Decca.

Although Columbia and RCA Victor had hesitated to concede
the principle of paying royalties to the union because it might
have led to similar demands by the union on the parent radio
networks, they were constrained to acquiesce by circumstances.
In November 1944, they agreed to terms and the bitter dispute
ended. It had lasted more than 27 months. Said Petrillo after
it was over: "[The companies resorted to] bitterness, injustice,
trickery and reactionism which would do justice to slaveowners
[; they engaged in a] vile, indecent, malicious and filthy cam-
paign of libel, slander and vilification. . . . Honesty and fairness
. . . triumphed over falsity and fraud. . . . If . . . the companies,
fail to change [their past course], the A.F.M. will not hesitate
to break off relations and leave them to die by their own
nefarious schemes." When Petrillo was asked to comment on
the companies' statement that the government was either un-
willing or unable to enforce its orders, he said: "Why should
I? I've already called them every goddamned name I could
think of."9

The contracts signed by Columbia and RCA Victor were
similar to those of the other companies except that provisions
were added that should the union call a strike against either
of them, then their artists would be free to work for any record-
ing companies not involved in the dispute. The major provi-
sions of these contracts, which eventually applied to about 600
companies, established a fund controlled by the union into
which the companies paid a specified sum of money for every
record and transcription produced with the services of musi-
cians. The fees paid for each record varied from a quarter of a
cent for 35 cent disks to five cents for two-dollar records; and
the fee was two and a half per cent of the selling price of those
records which sold for more than two dollars. No fee was paid
for commercial electrical transcriptions manufactured for a
single broadcast but library transcriptions were assessed a sum
amounting to three per cent of the gross revenues derived from
their use. The union was given access to the books of the com-
panies and the companies were required to obtain permission
from the union to record any studio broadcasts. When rebroad-
casting transcriptions, the companies agreed to pay scale wages

141

to the musicians who had made the recording. All contracts
were arranged to terminate on December 31, 1947.

These contracts represented a milestone in labor relations.
They were the first major contractual arrangements of the post-
war period under which employers paid money directly to a
labor organization and the agreements marked the beginning
of the establishment of a large number of welfare funds. Most
of the recording contracts specified that the purpose of the fund
was to foster musical culture by employing live musicians and
that no more than five per cent of the moneys collected could
be used for administration. The contracts stipulated that wage
scales could be changed only once during the period in which
the agreement applied. The union did not gain any direct
control over wired music or juke boxes (including telephone
music boxes in which patrons choose the selection through a
telephone device; and "soundies" in which the music boxes
have a picture accompaniment) .

In October 1946, the wage provisions of the contract were
re-examined and Petrillo was able to secure wage increases of
37i/2 per cent for recording services and of 50 per cent for tran-
scription work. The new base was $41.25 for three hours of
regular recording or $38.50 for two hours of recording by sym-
phony orchestras. Services of musicians for electrical transcrip-
tions were fixed at $27 for 15 minutes.

• Union Activities during the Second World War

Despite the union's ban on recordings and transcriptions, it
contributed generously and patriotically to the nation's war
effort. The government generally paid for services rendered to
it during the war, but the musicians contributed millions of
dollars worth of free music to different government agencies
and to army camps and hospitals. The union offered the services
of its members without charge to the army and navy so that the
armed forces could make records and transcriptions. Union
members even played for RCA Victor and Columbia during
the period when the recording case was before the NWLB.

The musicians union reintroduced some of the policies it had
followed during the first World War. By an order of Petrillo,
it exempted all members of the union who enlisted in the armed
forces, from the payment of dues and assessments. It required

142

bands and orchestras to play the Star Spangled Banner at the
beginning and end of each concert or musical program. It pur-
chased many thousands of dollars of United States and Canadian
war bonds. It fought to raise the rank of the army band leader
from warrant officer to commissioned status.

Late in 1942, Petrillo visited President Roosevelt at the White
House. At Roosevelt's suggestion, the AFM undertook to pre-
sent a program of free public concerts in the smaller communi-
ties of the nation. In the summer of the following year the
union completed its plans. The most important symphonic
orchestras in the country agreed to take part. Although the
AFM had admitted that recordings by symphony orchestras
did not displace live musicians and although the leading or-
chestras had requested the union to remove the ban because
much of their income had been derived from recording work,
the orchestras agreed to cooperate in the project to spread
symphonic music even though they had received no relief.
Nearly 80 concerts were played by 20 leading symphony or-
chestras. All expenses, including the payment of more than
$100,000 in wages to the members of the orchestras, were borne
by the AFM. Transportation difficulties forced the cancellation
of many scheduled concerts. The concerts met with genera]
acclaim though some opposition to them was expressed by
members of the union who believed that the money should
have been spent to help unemployed musicians rather than to
employ symphony instrumentalists— a group already receiving
high wages.

• Problems related to the Radio Industry

The union gained an impressive victory when it negotiated
the establishment of the employment fund but simultaneously
it abandoned one of its major objectives. The union had not
opposed making records for home use, but it had contended that
radio stations should not be permitted to use phonographic
records. In spite of the opinion of the panel of the National
War Labor Board that radio broadcasting had not displaced
live music, the union maintained that such was the case. It
argued that stations were making excessive use of records. The
union was pleased with the action of the Canadian government
which prohibited the use of recordings on radio stations in the

143

Dominion during evening hours; since this regulation encour-
aged the use of live talent.

The union particularly objected to the activities of certain
disk jockeys who were making large sums of money from musical
records but were not paying anything to musicians. During the
period when the record ban was in effect, the union engaged
in a brief strike at station WNEW in New York City because
Martin Block, disk jockey of the "Make Believe Ballroom"
program, played recordings of American tunes imported from
Great Britain. These records had been shipped to him by a
friend in England, though normally the British musicians union
had had to give written consent before any records could be
exported. Further controversy was averted when Block agreed
to stop using such records. WNEW had provided very little
employment for musicians, yet had been grossing over a mil-
lion dollars each year. A small station, WINX in Washington,
D. C, increased its value tenfold in four years by selling adver-
tisements on its musically recorded programs.

The radio stations were not affected by the terms of the
settlement between the union and the record companies since
the price of records did not rise. But the AFM continued trying
to get the radio stations to employ more musicians. The locals
in the union have had the major responsibility for the achieve-
ment of this task although the AFM has helped them with all
possible means. The AFM itself has been mainly concerned in
the negotiations with the four major networks. Since almost all
network programs originate in New York, Los Angeles, and
Chicago, the locals in these three cities have had the major role
in negotiating. Generally the locals have worked out wage scales
with the networks, and the AFM has been chiefly concerned
with working conditions. Since April 1946, however, all network
broadcasting contract provisions for musicians, other than for
staff orchestras and staff leaders, have had to be approved by the
AFM. Local contracts usually have run for three years, but nego-
tiations scheduled in 1947 were postponed to 1948 by extending
the contracts then in force.

Like other unions, the AFM has tried to secure guaranteed
employment for its members. The AFM, therefore, has tried to
get radio stations to use a greater number of permanent staff
musicians. Although there have been over 2,100 licenses issued

144

to standard or AM broadcasting stations by the Federal Com-
munications Commission in the United States, only 301 of them
employed musicians steadily throughout the year in 1949. One
hundred and one additional stations used musicians with some
regularity. Forty-nine others employed musicians on a single
engagement basis only. Two hundred and fifty-nine of these
stations employing musicians were affiliated with networks and
192 were independent. Steady staff employment accounted for
the jobs of 2,450 musicians who received ten and three-quarter
million dollars during the year. Single engagement broadcast-
ing for sustaining programs provided musicians with a little
over two and a quarter million dollars, distributed among
several thousand men.10 Single engagement commercial broad-
casting employment in the United States that year provided
jobs for about 3,700 men and yielded an income of over five
and a third million dollars. Since 1949, except for network staff
musicians, there has been a further decline in radio employ-
ment.

The union attempted to increase radio employment in various
ways. The technique which evoked the greatest criticism was
the requirement of standbys. Standby musicians formerly had
to be used by radio stations when programs were put on which
included amateurs, nonunion musicians, or traveling musicians
from other jurisdictions. This practice prevailed until the
passage of the Lea Act in 1946. For example, the union required
the employment of a standby band of union musicians when a
naval band broadcast at the graduation exercises of the Great
Lakes Naval Training Station in 1942. (In making a film, the
the Canadian government had to pay the AFM a standby fee
of $60 in 1946 because it used a nonunion church organist.)

For several years the union was perplexed by the problem
arising from remote control programs. Music played by name
bands at hotels, restaurants, and night clubs was piped over the
air by radio stations. Booking agents who controlled radio lines
were able to select the bands that played over the air. The union
maintained that this procedure limited competition among
orchestras and unfairly reduced the opportunities of some bands
to play on the radio. The AFM, however, was able to get the
radio stations, for a time, to pay the bands additional remunera-
tion when the music was picked up and in 1940 executed an

145

agreement with the stations by which all radio lines were
removed from the control of bookers. Radio lines have been
handled since by the stations themselves. Today, stations an-
nounce that remote control programs are broadcast through
the courtesy of James C. Petrillo and the American Federation
of Musicians. The AFM expects that such pickups will not
replace programs which would have employed live musicians.

In 1941 the union suddenly banned musicians from playing
on cooperatively sponsored programs. These network programs
are broadcast across the country, but each region has a different
sponsor. The union maintained that sponsors were not paying
for the full value of the services rendered by the musicians.
The union claimed that it was losing employment opportunities
because cooperative programs eliminated the need for local
concerns to advertise on local programs and to employ live
musicians; and that such programs arranged by a national net-
work threw many local bands out of work. Naturally, radio
stations were reluctant to pay standby fees, although the AFM
never made such requests. For a considerable period of time,
cooperatively sponsored programs were not permitted to use
musicians. Instead they substituted vocal choirs for musicians.
Some of the programs affected were the Joan Davis show, Meet
Me at Parky's, Abbott and Costello, Alexander's Mediation
Board, and Headline Edition. Information Please, which pre-
viously had had a single sponsor, became a cooperative program
in 1947. Since the show had depended partly upon the per-
formance of a pianist and was no longer able to use one, the
producer filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
He claimed that the union violated the Taft-Hartley Act by
denying musicians to Information Please and by engaging in
an illegal boycott against the program. Although the union
contract was with the networks, Petrillo, upon their advice,
removed the ban in November 1947. The immediate effect was
that several cooperative programs engaged the services of orches-
tras and individual musicians. Petrillo, however, undertook to
determine the long-run effects of his action.

The action of the union in prohibiting the networks from
broadcasting any musical programs emanating from foreign
countries other than Canada was of wider significance. This
rule had been in effect prior to the war, but it was waived by

146

the union during wartime to promote goodwill with other
nations. It was reinstituted after the war ended. The union
maintained that musical programs coming in from foreign
countries tended to reduce the employment opportunities of
American musicians. It argued that government policy prohib-
ited the importation of contract labor musicians to prevent
competition with American musicians and that the broadcasting
of foreign music was an evasion of the intent of Congress. The
AFM did not want such music to be broadcast in the United
States.

Only a few stations were affected by the ban but the protests
were numerous. The action by the union was considered a
setback to the cultural program of the United Nations. Petrillo
assured some of his critics that the ban on foreign music in no
way limited the broadcast of special religious services. Although
the Lea Act prohibited the union from continuing to impose
such restrictions, the AFM nevertheless has apparently had an
oral understanding with the networks that music originating in
foreign countries, in general, will not be rebroadcast in or
relayed to the United States.

The general prohibition against the employment of foreign
musicians in the United States was enforced rigidly. Cuban
consular officials threatened diplomatic action to break the ban.
The Mexican musicians union temporarily banned United
States musicians in retaliation. The British musicians union,
however, generally has supported Petrillo's actions. Petrillo had
also required American broadcasting companies to secure the
permission of the union before sending musical programs out-
side of the United States and Canada.

• The Recording and Transcription Fund

As union collections from the recording and transcription
companies increased criticism simultaneously began to mount.
Though the union had stated many times that the fund would
be used only to employ musicians without jobs, many persons
remained skeptical. Opposition voices became even louder
when John L. Lewis won a welfare fund for the miners in the
coal industry. Critics feared that the royalty principle would
be extended to labor contracts in general. The AFM was not
able to convince the public that the two funds were basically

147

different. The musicians maintained that the miners were pro-
ducing a commodity which was consumed after being used once
and that therefore they were not digging themselves out of
jobs. Musicians, however, were making records which could be
played over many times and thus they were helping to displace
themselves.

In February 1947, the AFM put into effect a plan for the
expenditure of the recording fund which had been worked out
at the end of 1946 by Petrillo and a committee of three local
union presidents. As was anticipated by those who were familiar
with the sincere intentions of the leaders of the union, the fund
was allocated for the employment of musicians. During the
first allocation, each local, except the three largest, was entitled
to receive $10.43 for each member in good standing. The largest
three locals were entitled to this sum for each of their first
5,000 members and to $2.00 for each additional member. Every
program planned by any local had to be approved by the
national union.

Locals employed their own members to give the free public
concerts. Though the national union attempted to regulate the
locals strictly and ordered that no part of the allocated money
could be used for administrative purposes, complaints were
expressed by many members. There were charges leveled against
some locals that favoritism helped particular musicians to
secure employment and that the unemployed were not neces-
sarily the ones hired. Many of these charges, however, were
aired by disgruntled members.

Royalties paid to the musicians union during the life of the
contract were substantial. Almost all of this money came from
the recording, not transcription, companies. The sums paid to
the union kept increasing each year because the output of new
records kept rising; because the relative sale of more expensive
records, on which the royalties were higher, rose; and because
payments were made on new pressings of recordings made in
previous years covered by the agreement.

The money in the recording and transcription fund was
collected in a period of slightly more than four years— from
the signing of the contracts in 1943 to the end of 1947— although
small sums were received later because some of the records
made under the contracts were sold subsequently. During those

148

years, the record and transcription companies contributed more
than $4,500,000 to the fund. Almost all of this money was spent
by the union in the three years between 1947 and 1950. It gave
nearly 19,000 performances at veterans hospitals, public schools,
and other institutions. The types of performances in order of
frequency included teen-age dances, entertaining units, band
concerts, orchestra concerts, regular dances, jazz concerts, parades,
and symphony concerts. More than 450,00 jobs for single en-
gagements were made available. These income and expenditure
figures are not connected with the music performance trust
fund set up by the union in 1948.

The most publicized free concert given by the AFM under
the program was the one held in Washington, D. C, on May 25,
1948. It was attended by President Harry S. Truman, many
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and
numerous other high government and labor officials. The affair
was very successful. Subsequently, Petrillo was named National
Music Chairman for the inauguration of Truman in 1948. On
January 17, 1949, Petrillo gave President Truman, who plays
the piano, a gold card making him an honorary member of the
AFM for life. At the end of the presentation, which was also
attended by William Green of the AFL, Petrillo and Green
said to Truman: "We are now your presidents, just as you are
our President."11 On June 19, 1949, a recording and transcrip-
tion concert was given at Colorado Springs, Colorado, in con-
nection with the annual conference of governors.

Union policies generally were carried out with great success
by the AFM. At the same time, a growing public interest in
musical developments brought about greater public concern
with the methods, tactics, and policies pursued by the union.
The end of the war enabled Congress to focus more attention on
the activities of this union.

HOW THE INTERLOCHEN DISPUTE Q

LED TO THE LEA ACT • ^

"This fellow {Tetrillo] has gone too far. We've got to
clip his wings. But we don't want to interfere with the
legitimate functions of a union."

CLARENCE J. BROWN

• Competition from Amateurs

If Petrillo had been content to confine his dispute with the
radio networks to matters dealing with recordings and to the
wages and hours of musicians employed by the stations, he
might have succeeded completely in his objectives. The position
taken by the musicians had substantial merit and impressed
those conversant with the recording problem that the welfare
fund was an equitable solution. The clamor of the National
Association of Broadcasters was loud, and was echoed by large
parts of the press and the public. Yet these vociferations would
have subsided in due course. Petrillo's zest for protecting and
improving the welfare of his members knew no bounds, how-
ever, and consequently he overreached himself and infuriated
many Congressmen.

Petrillo had ascribed many of the hardships of the musicians
to the radio industry and he felt that all aspects of the matter
should be considered at one time. He decided that the ban on
the production of records solved only one phase of the prob-
lem and that the competition between amateurs, especially
school orchestras, and professional musicians for radio time
must be eliminated. He probably did not realize that the
achievement of this goal could be of only slight benefit to
musicians. When amateur musicians played on the air standby
fees usually were paid to the AFM; though no fees generally
were paid when school bands were involved. Furthermore, the
number of such programs was extremely limited. Petrillo's
trait of ignoring the attitudes and opinions of the public when
undertaking an action on behalf of the musicians was not

150

sensible. In return for the little he could gain by taking school-
boys off the radio, he became deeply involved in unfavorable
publicity. Congress then passed restrictive labor legislation
aimed at the musicians union which served as the harbinger of
a more general law curtailing the power of unions.

The music of high school and college bands and orchestras
for years had been one of the cultural features presented by
radio stations. Young musicians have been encouraged and
stimulated in pursuing their musical education by appearances
on the radio. Petrillo recognized this fact and together with
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt he had sponsored a National Youth
Administration children's orchestra on the air. At the end of
1941, however, Petrillo was successful in forcing the cancellation
of a number of broadcasts. These programs were scheduled as
part of a series of presentations by the Music Educators Na-
tional Conference. School bands in Chicago, Cleveland, Wash-
ington, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and San Francisco, among other
cities, were not permitted to go on the air. And in New York
City, only the intervention of Mayor La Guardia enabled a
radio program to be scheduled at the High School of Music and
Art. These isolated restrictions, however, aroused little attention.
During the middle of 1941, a more serious controversy be-
gan. Petrillo told the National Broadcasting Company that the
summer series of concerts played by the National Music Camp
at Interlochen, Michigan must not be permitted to go on the
air. This camp had opened in 1928 as a summer music school
and had been attended every year by boys and girls selected on
a competitive basis from all over the United States. In 1930 it
began a series of radio programs over NBC which continued
through 1941. The manufacturers of Majestic Radios sponsored
the concerts in 1930 and paid for a standby orchestra of union
musicians. Each week that the program was on the air that year
an announcement had been made stating that the broadcast
was performed in cooperation with the American Federation of
Musicians. From 1931 on, the program was a sustaining feature
of the network and no standby musicians were employed.

When Petrillo made his demand of NBC in 1941, it was
explained to him that all the contractual and other arrange-
ments for the year had been completed, and that much incon-
venience would result from any changes. The union leader then

151

dropped his request on the understanding that the matter
would be reopened by the company before scheduling the camp
for the 1942 season. The company either ignored or violated
this agreement with the union and completed plans for the
1942 Interlochen series. Just before the first concert was to go
on the air in the second week in July, however, Petrillo ordered
NBC to cancel the series. In a large measure the company had
forced his hand. Petrillo had acted with moderation and though
many persons felt that the 160 boys and girls of the school
orchestra had been roughly treated, there was no other course
of action which he could take. While the objective of the union
in this case was not felicitous, the decision had not been made
in haste.

The union had a closed shop agreement with the network
which permitted only professional musicians be used on the
radio. The AFM maintained that since the number of hours of
radio broadcast time is fixed, the more hours that are allocated
to the nonprofessional musicians— amateurs and school players—
the less that remain for the professional. Petrillo pointed out
that the Interlochen camp was a commercial enterprise because
it charged the students tuition fees and that the radio concerts
were used to advertise the camp and to attract new pupils.
Actually, school instructors formed the nucleus of the broad-
casting orchestra.

Dr. Joseph E. Maddy, the chief spokesman for the school, was
the founder and president of the camp and a professor of music
at the University of Michigan. The National Music Camp had
become affiliated with the university in 1942. About 40 courses
were given in the camp by the university and nearly 200 college
students attended. Maddy claimed that the institution was not
a commercial enterprise because the tuition fee of $300 for the
eight-week period covered the cost of clothing, board, the use
of instruments, library privileges, and camp facilities. He added
that although tuition is charged by colleges and universities in
the United States, they thereby do not become commercial
enterprises. The National Music Camp had been granted tax
exemption as a nonprofit educational institution, under opin-
ions of the United States Attorney General and the Michigan
Attorney General. Furthermore, beginning in 1939, each session
of the Michigan legislature had made specific appropriations to

152

the camp and guest conductors such as Frederick Stock and
Walter Damrosch, had rendered their services without charge.

Many musicians associated with the Interlochen school had
not joined the union. Representatives of the camp maintained
that the average age of the children in the orchestra was 15
years and that they were therefore ineligible to become members
of the union. But there were undoubtedly many who met the
age requirements and who were not in the union. More than
half of the 50 instructors were members of the American Federa-
tion of Musicians, Maddy himself having been a member in
good standing ever since 1909. The camp authorities, who were
joined by other educators, stated that the action by Petrillo
discouraged the youths and hindered musical education, with-
out benefiting professional musicians. They noted that NBC
merely had substituted a studio symphony orchestra for the
Interlochen concert without hiring any additional musicians.
Maddy contended also that the refusal to allow the children to
play over the air was similar to a requirement that motorists
must join a taxi drivers union or that persons who delivered an
address over the radio must join a union.

The American Federation of Musicians did not offer to nego-
tiate or compromise on this issue. When information was re-
quested of Petrillo regarding the Interlochen situation, he said:
"Too many people are talking about it. Too many people know
more about it than we do. So we'll let them settle it."1 On other
occasions when reporters were looking for him, the union chief
was "out of town." From the union point of view, banning the
school children from the air was an ill-conceived, ill-advised,
and unfortunate step. Even assuming that some additional work
might have been gained by professional musicians, though this
result never was clearly evident, the benefit seemed scarcely
worth the risk of arousing and antagonizing the public. This
was especially true at a time when the recording ban had just
been announced.

In July 1942, immediately after Petrillo's order to NBC, the
Federal Communications Commission began an investigation of
the Interlochen situation at the instigation of Senator Arthur
H. Vandenberg of Michigan. In August, the Senate passed a
resolution, already noted in connection with the ban on record-
ings, to investigate the musicians union, which contained a

153

reference in its preamble to the matter of school orchestras. But
these probes were ineffective. Nor were the appeals made to Wil-
liam Green of the AFL and to Vice President Henry A. Wallace
to intervene of any avail. Instead, the Cincinnati Conservatory
of Music, affiliated with the University of Cincinnati and sched-
uled to begin its ninth season of concerts in October over the
Columbia Broadcasting System, was forced off the air because
the school musicians were not union members. In Rochester,
New York, the orchestra of the Eastman School of Music was
obliged to cancel its radio concerts because many of the partic-
ipants were not members of the AFM. The Juilliard School of
Music in New York was more fortunate. Its concerts were all
broadcast over station WNYC, the independent noncommercial
municipal outlet, and were not affected by the ban on school
orchestras.

The musicians union and its president were criticized by
music schools throughout the country. The press, as usual,
found many uncomplimentary things to say. It was suggested
generally that Petrillo was acting strictly within his contractual
and legal rights, but that the labor laws required modification
to prevent such display of arbitrary power. Nevertheless the
issue concerning school broadcasts quieted down and no notice
was taken of it by the press during the entire year of 1943.

The whole affair was precipitated into the open again by the
action of Petrillo himself early in 1944. While reviewing the
activities of the union to the membership, Petrillo reported
boastfully with regard to school bands and orchestras: "How-
ever, when all the shooting was over and we came to the sum-
mer of 1943, there was no Interlochen high school student
orchestra on the air. Nor was there in the year 1943 any other
school band or orchestra on the networks and there never will
be without the permission of the American Federation of Musi-
cians."2 This statement was taken by Maddy and sent to the
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, where the investi-
gation of the union had lapsed. It renewed the interest of Con-
gress in the matter and resulted in the introduction of a bill by
Vandenberg in the middle of the year which prohibited inter-
ference with the broadcasting of noncommercial cultural or
educational programs. The bill passed the Senate in December
1944 but the session of Congress ended before the House

154

of Representatives could take any action in this matter.

Vandenberg therefore reintroduced the measure immediately
upon the opening of the seventy-ninth Congress in January
1945. The Senate promptly passed the bill again. The proposals
included in the bill were quite mild and no specific punitive
provisions for violations were attached. The challenge to his
power which the Senate vote indicated and the vigorous cam-
paign waged against him by Maddy infuriated Petrillo. The
Interlochen camp therefore was put on the unfair list of the
AFM. This action made it impractical for any radio network to
carry programs from the camp, because union musicians would
then be forced to withdraw their services from the network. In
addition, it made it impossible for union members to conduct,
teach, or play at the camp.

Renewed criticism of Petrillo was expressed and even CIO
economist J. Raymond Walsh noted his strong disapproval.8
The House prepared to toughen the Senate version of the bill.
Said Clarence J. Brown, a member of the House of Representa-
tives, in speaking of Petrillo: "This fellow has gone too far.
We've got to clip his wings. But we don't want to interfere with
the legitimate functions of a union."4 The committee held
hearings over an extended period but Petrillo refused to attend.5

The Senate bill was innocuous and would have prevailed but
for the increasing attention and criticism which were being
directed at Petrillo. Petrillo, however, was under pressure to
keep a rapidly growing membership employed. His techniques
aroused public resentment. Furthermore, the country was in
the middle of a world war and the tactics used by the union
were not consistent with governmental manpower measures
intended to conserve labor. Congressional scrutiny of the activi-
ties of musicians in radio broadcasting therefore was intensified.

Petrillo's efforts to increase the employment of musicians by
radio stations may be divided into two parts— one aimed at
eliminating the work of nonmembers and the other directed at
getting more employment for union musicians. First, he desired
to remove all nonunion musicians from the air; and the con-
tracts with the networks provided that only professional musi-
cians could be used on broadcasts. Any exceptions to this rule
had to receive the approval of the union. In this way school
bands and orchestras were barred. Amateur musicians could

155

play an instrument on the radio only with the permission of the
union. Many times such permission was refused, and at other
times the program could be given only upon the payment of a
standby fee. Major Edward Bowes paid the union an average
weekly standby fee of $150. Other programs preferred not to
use amateur instrumentalists rather than to pay the standby
fees. The union however did not encourage the use of amateurs
even when fees were paid and frequently radio stations made
no requests for authorization to use amateurs since they antici-
pated union refusals.

Restrictions also were placed on the use of army bands by
the networks. Army bands came under the classification of
amateurs and in several cases the union had refused to allow
the radio station to put them on. But in 1940 the defense pro-
gram of the United States was gaining momentum and the
army deemed it essential to highlight various radio programs
with army bands. The recruiting drive that year included a
series of broadcasts depicting army life. When it appeared that
the number of requests to play army bands would increase
greatly, Petrillo in December 1940 suddenly ordered the net-
works to eliminate military bands from all programs. He ex-
plained the attitude of the union. "This is a good cause and
we're all for it, but if we allowed radio stations to put music
on the air from Army camps whenever they wanted to they
could soon dispense with our men," he said. "We are in favor
of their going on the air with programs telling about life in
the Army, but we want protection against the loss of jobs for
professional musicians. This is going to be a long-range affair.
It may last a couple of years, and the sensible thing is to talk
it over and make a deal."6 The "deal" was soon made. The
networks guaranteed the union that the use of army music
would not result in any curtailment in the employment of studio
musicians.

The union has contended for many years that when a non-
professional musician performs on the radio, the time remain-
ing for professional musicians thereby is contracted. The union
has not felt that nonmusical programs would be substituted for
the performances of the amateurs. Considering that the major
portion of radio time is devoted to music, the union argument
may be correct. But the union has failed to give enough weight

156

to two facts— first that records might be used to fill the time and
secondly that radio stations have not always used the studio
musicians for the full number of hours for which they have been
hired under terms of the radio contracts. Additional hours of
performance by studio musicians therefore would not necessarily
increase the amount of wages paid to the instrumentalists.

The second part of Petrillo's program to increase the employ-
ment opportunities of union musicians was positive. He con-
tinually exerted pressure on the radio stations to augment the
number of musicians that they were employing. This plan
abandoned the objective of the 1937 and the 1938 contracts
under which the radio stations were required to expend a
minimum sum of money for the employment of musicians. In-
stead it called for the hiring of a specific minimum number of
men under guaranteed conditions of employment.

The union assigned each radio station a quota, based on
financial status and to some extent on the previous employment
record of the station. The greatest economic pressure by the
union to achieve its goal could be exerted on affiliated network
outlets all over the country for in such cases the network gen-
erally quietly intervened; because it was anxious to see the
dispute ended. The independent stations, being less dependent
on live musicians and more on recorded music could not be
subjected by the union to the same degree of pressure.

Some network stations did not want to employ any musicians
at all. Others claimed that they did not need the number of men
which the union had asked them to take. But these objections
were unavailing. The union pointed out that affiliated stations
were able to receive from the network and present to the public
programs which included the performance of live musicians.
These stations, however, were not paying the musicians for
this music and therefore should be required to employ a speci-
fied number of staff musicians.

The first of these assigned quota cases came during the month
of Petrillo's election to the presidency, in June 1940. The union
was successful in that and in every other similar case with net-
work stations occurring in the succeeding years in which it made
serious efforts to enforce quotas. The union was able to apply
three degrees of pressure after making its demands upon the
affiliate. First, it could bar name bands from playing for the

157

network. The union was forced to prohibit the network from
piping in the name band from the hotel or club at which it was
playing in order to get at the individual station because the
chains maintained that they were under contract to provide
member stations with all programs. Though the network some-
times approved the position taken by its affiliated station, it
nevertheless encouraged the station to reach an agreement.

The union's second type of pressure was to pull out the net-
work studio musicians and thereby bring an end to all sustaining
musical programs. Even then the network generally was reluctant
to cut off its programs from an affiliated station. Though it
pointed out to the union that it could not exercise control over
the decisions of the stations in the chain, yet the union main-
tained that the recommendations of the network carried much
weight. The third and final step was to call a strike. Networks
have sought to avoid strikes because the financial losses involved
are substantial. The alternatives open to the chain when a strike
is threatened by the musicians are to grant the demands or to
suffer the losses involved in the elimination of all commercially
sponsored programs having music. Though commercial broad-
casts rarely have been cut off, in 1945 the Columbia Broadcast-
ing System had to cancel the Prudential Hour when Petrillo
barred Al Goodman and his orchestra from the program. In the
same year the National Broadcasting Company's Fitch Band-
wagon program lost the services of Artie Shaw and his band
when the union had difficulties with one of the system's outlets.
The most spectacular disagreement involved KSTP in St.
Paul, Minnesota, an affiliate of NBC. Disputes between the
union and the station in 1940 and 1942 over the number of
musicians to be employed had been settled with some difficulty.
In 1944, the union made new demands which were rejected by
the management of the station. A strike of musicians ensued at
this station in spite of the pledge which labor had given not to
strike during the war period. Mediators were unsuccessful in
bringing about any agreement. The decisions and orders of the
National War Labor Board directing the end of the strike had
no effect on the musicians union. Even the criticisms expressed
by William Green, which was an astounding display of initiative,
did not influence the AFM.7 A Minneapolis court ordered the
arrest of Petrillo, but the leader of the musicians stayed out of

158

that jurisdiction. At the end of a period of 11 months, KSTP
capitulated and signed a contract meeting the terms imposed
by the union. The union gained a number of jobs, but it also
won the bitter resentment of many members of Congress.

• The Lea Act

The House committee closely scrutinized the criticisms lev-
eled against the AFM, for union demands on the radio industry
came at a time when manpower shortages were felt acutely in
various sectors of the economy. Charges of featherbedding, of
excessive employment, and of standby requirements were
brought to the attention of the committee. Broadcasters main-
tained that the standby fee tended to prevent small radio sta-
ions from using and developing local amateur talent.

Congressman Clarence F. Lea was soon ready with proposed
legislation to curb the power and activities of Petrillo. The
proposals were much more severe than anything recommended
by the Senate. After a spirited debate in which Petrillo was
attacked for being a "Caesar" and in which House members
applauded, stamped their feet, and shouted approval, the bill
was passed overwhelmingly. A few members of Congress came
to the defense of the musicians. Representative Vito Marcan-
tonio of New York expressed fear that the measure might be
construed to outlaw strikes. Congressman Benjamin J. Rabin
of New York said: "... I do not come here to praise Caesar; on
the other hand, I do not come here to bury the hard-won rights
of labor, . . ."8 The Senate was induced to accept the House
version and President Harry S. Truman signed the measure,
known as the Lea Act or Anti-Petrillo Act, in April 1946.9

Actually the new law amended some of the provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934 which applied to radio broad-
casting. The Lea Act made it unlawful to threaten or to compel
a broadcaster to: 1. employ more persons than it needed; 2. pay
money instead of hiring more persons than it needed; 3. pay
more than once for services; 4. pay for services not performed;
5. refrain from broadcasting noncommercial educational pro-
grams; 6. refrain from broadcasting radio communications origi-
nating outside the United States. With regard to recordings,
the law prohibited: 1. payment of exactions for producing or
using recordings or transcriptions; 2. imposition of restrictions

159

on production, sales, or use of records or transcriptions; 3. pay-
ment of exactions for rebroadcast of programs. Any violations
were subject to imprisonment up to one year, or to a fine of not
more than $1,000, or to both.

The provisions with regard to recordings were inserted in the
bill to prevent several practices which appeared obnoxious to
Congress. The AFM had forced a network to cancel the rebroad-
cast to the Pacific coast, by means of transcriptions, of the Jack
Benny and Rudy Vallee programs. The union demanded that
the second show should be performed over again by the live
actors, or as an alternative that the musicians should receive
double pay. The union also had imposed restrictions on the
production of records at amateur festivals. The union royalty
fund, however, apparently was not affected by this legislation.

Bing Crosby, Bob Hope, Frank Sinatra, and other radio stars
opposed the Lea Act because of the severity of its provisions.
The American Federation of Radio Artists also seemed to be
covered by the law since they engaged in many of the proscribed
practices, and some persons believed that writers would be pre-
vented from bargaining for secondary rights to their scripts.
The main target, however, had been Petrillo. Petrillo defied the
law, declaring that it was unconstitutional.

The coverage of the law was sufficiently broad to permit
Petrillo any one of a variety of constitutional tests. The test
case was undertaken at radio station WAAF in Chicago. The
station had been employing three members of the musicians
union, when the AFM requested it to hire three more musicians.
When WAAF proclaimed that it did not need any additional
musicians, the three union members were called out on strike
by Petrillo and a picket was placed before the business premises
of the station. Petrillo told reporters gathered in his office: "I'm
ready to face the music, gentlemen." Pounding his desk, he
continued: "I demand that the Government keep hands off. It
should permit the unions and big business to handle their own
affairs. . . . We had enough governmental regulation during
the war and if anyone thinks labor is going to stand aside and
lose all the privileges it has gained during the last thirty years,
he is wrong. All labor will be cemented together as never before.
We've got to be to save our own hides."10 At one point he in-
terrupted his discourse and smiled at the reporters. "How am

160

I doin,' boys?" he asked. Later he obliged photographers by
assuming a fighting stance with his left hand thrust out.

The next week Petrillo was told that Representative George
A. Dondero of Michigan, who had sponsored the equivalent of
the Vandenberg proposal in the House, was considering the
introduction of more rigorous curbs on the musicians union.
Exploded Petrillo: "Oh, that bum! He represents about 500
people up there in Michigan. He hasn't got the mentality to
know what to do. He's a gimme-gimme politician." Then ad-
ding a point of view, he said: "Under what law can they make
us go to work? The more labor laws they pass, the more labor
trouble they're going to have."11

When the Federal Bureau of Investigation had completed
its report on Petrillo's action at station WAAF, the Department
of Justice decided to prosecute. The original prosecuting assist-
ant attorney general, J. Albert Woll, severed his connection
with the case when it was disclosed that he was the son of
Matthew Woll, one of the AFL vice presidents. During the
preliminary hearing Petrillo posted a $1,000 bond by stepping
into the district court clerk's office and peeling off ten crisp
$100 bills from a roll.

Labor rallied to the support of the musicians union and the
AFL convention in 1946 voted to fight the Lea Act. The Civil
Liberties Union, which also opposed the law, was prevented
from submitting a brief on behalf of Petrillo by United States
District Court Judge Walter J. La Buy. The government argued
that the AFM was a racketeering organization that had extorted
millions of dollars from the radio industry. It told the court
that in the months subsequent to the calling of the strike, the
work of the three musicians who had walked out was performed
by the switchboard operator and another girl in the station's
office. The attorney for the government contended that Petrillo
was attempting to coerce the employer into hiring more em-
ployees than the station required.

Judge La Buy, however, accepted the arguments of the union
and in December 1946 he held that the measure was uncon-
stitutional. The court said that the Lea Act conflicted with the
first, fifth, and thirteenth amendments to the Constitution of
the United States. The first amendment which guaranteed
freedom of speech was violated because the law prevented

161

peaceful picketing, a form of speech. The fifth amendment was
transgressed because the Act discriminated against radio broad-
casting employees and hence did not grant to all persons the
equal protection of the laws. The Act also violated the thir-
teenth amendment prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude
because it regarded as coercion the refusal of some employees to
work unless additional employees were engaged.

Under a special rule the government appealed the case di-
rectly to the United States Supreme Court. The highest tribunal
in a five to three decision overruled the district court in June
1947 and held that the law is constitutional. It said that though
the government might have to modify and clarify its complaint
against Petrillo, the statute appeared to be a valid one.

Petrillo, whose statement after his victory in the district court
was: "Thank God for the Federal Court.",12 showed his respect
for the law when immediately after the adverse verdict in the
Supreme Court he said: "This is my country and the Supreme
Court makes the final rulings on its laws. No one will ever
say that Jim Petrillo fought his country or the Supreme Court.
I thought that I had the law on my side, and I made the best
fight I knew how. The Supreme Court has spoken, and I bow
to its dictates."13 The fight on this law was by no means over,
however, because the case had been remanded to the District
Court.14 Early in 1948, Judge La Buy acquitted Petrillo. He
ruled that the government did not prove that Petrillo had
attempted to compel WAAF to hire three allegedly unneces-
sary musicians. Nor did the judge find that the broadcaster had
been coerced.15 More definite court interpretations of the Lea
Act must await new test cases.

Meanwhile the National Music Camp remained in the news.
When it reopened its doors in July 1945, Maddy, in defiance of
Petrillo, was there to conduct the orchestra. He was ordered to
appear before the international executive board to explain why
he disregarded the action of the union under which the camp
had been placed on the unfair list. After a trial in which Pe-
trillo deliberately did not participate officially, Maddy was
expelled from the union early in 1946. It is possible that this
penalty could have been invoked against him long before that
time, for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the welfare of the
union. The national officers, however, had not chosen to use his

162

statements to the press and his written reports to the public as
grounds for their action. Their case against Maddy was much
stronger because they had waited.

Even after the passage of the Lea Act no network was willing
to sponsor an Interlochen program. The camp had been broad-
casting a musical program for four hours every week over the
Michigan State College station at Lansing, Michigan, an inde-
pendent station having no link with the AFM. New Congres-
sional hearings dealing with the AFM were held in 1947 by a
subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Representative Car-
roll D. Kearns, of the Committee on Education and Labor.
Petrillo threatened to expel Kearns, a music teacher, from the
AFM when the Congressman indicated that he might partake
as guest conductor in a music festival at Interlochen.16 Kearns
had given varying statements to the press, but in the end he
stayed away from the camp.

As a result of Congressional hearings and further discussions
in the summer of 1947, the union reversed its policies in several
respects. It permitted school and military bands to make record-
ings. The records, however, could be cut only for the exclusive
use of the schools and colleges and for educational purposes. In
September 1947, the AFM signed a code of ethics with repre-
sentatives for the Music Educators National Conference and the
American Association of School Administrators regarding the areas
within which each was to operate.17 This agreement convinced
Petrillo that there would be no competition between school
bands and professional musicians for employment, so he ended
the ban on radio broadcasting by school children. After a period
of five years in which they had been barred from the networks,
schools once more were permitted to resume broadcasting. But
the National Music Camp at Interlochen, Michigan, has re-
mained on the unfair list of the American Federation of Musi-
cians. Despite the Lea Act, therefore, radio networks have
refrained from broadcasting any Interlochen concerts.

The Lea Act represented the first significant legislative curb
imposed on the activities of labor unions subsequent to the
introduction of the New Deal labor policy by the federal gov-
ernment. The enactment of legislation such as the Lea Act,
curtailing the activities and power of trade unions was inevitable,
however, given the temper of Congress in 1946. The practices

163

of featherbedding, of standbys, and of banning various groups
from radio broadcasting had irked many people who were not
fully conversant with the issues.

It should be recognized that policies similar to those adopted
by the musicians union, directed towards increased employment,
were approved and enforced by many other labor organizations.
Make-work problems are certainly more serious on the railroads
and in the building trades. But the methods used by the musi-
cians union constantly were arousing bitterness and resentment.
Attention had been centered on Petrillo and every move he
made was deemed worthy of newspaper headlines. The public
relations of the union were rather unsatisfactory. Weber had
enjoyed as much power as Petrillo and had been able to win
substantial gains for the musicians during his period of leader-
ship, yet he had kept the AFM in the background and had
avoided much of the unfavorable criticism hurled against the
union during the presidency of Petrillo. It is true that Petrillo
has gained his objectives more quickly, but only at a heavier
cost to the union.

The Interlochen dispute was an unfortunate episode; especi-
ally since it probably would have been settled satisfactorily if
Maddy had taken up the matter with Petrillo directly instead
of seeking assistance from Congress and the press. Banning
school children from taking part in musical radio programs has
not appeared to be a satisfactory technique for alleviating the
unemployment of musicians in any appreciable manner. The
number of such amateur programs has been extremely small.
But the hostile sentiments engendered by this dispute were
magnified by certain union practices which had existed for a
long time. At the culmination of public disapproval, the Lea
Act was passed.

PETRILLO STABILIZES 1A

LABOR RELATIONS •

"Now Congressmen, make a law to make us go to work,
chew on that one for a while."

JAMES CAESAR PETRILLO

• Another Record Ban

The year 1948 was one in which major decisions were made
by the American Federation of Musicians. At the beginning of
January disputes were raging with regard to the manufacture
of records, the negotiation of radio contracts, the future of fre-
quency modulation, and the performance of live music over
television. Each of these difficulties essentially was adjusted by
the end of that year. Congress had expected the Lea Act to
solve the labor problems of the broadcasters. The only signifi-
cant immediate effect, however, was that the union abandoned
its practice of collecting standby fees from the radio industry.
Over a longer period, the number of staff musicians employed
by radio stations declined substantially.

Although a possibility exists that some sections in the Lea
Act affect the establishment of a recording and transcription
fund, no test of these provisions ever has been made. When
Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley Act)1 in 1947, union welfare funds clearly became
subject to federal regulation. The law gave detailed specifi-
cations regarding the provisions necessary in an agreement
between labor and management which creates such a fund.
The purpose of the welfare fund must be set down in writ-
ing. Equal control over expenditures of the money in the
fund must be exercised by representatives of the union and of
the employers. If these representatives do not agree upon a
matter within their jurisdiction, they must select an impartial
umpire to make the final decision. The law states that the fund
may be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of the em-

165

ployees, including their families and dependents, of those em-
ployers making the contribution.

The American Federation of Musicians had stated the general
purpose for which the money in its royalty fund would be used.
Minute details, however, had not been given in the agreements.
But the recording contracts expired at the end of 1947 and any
extension would be subject to the provisions of the Taft-Hartley
law. Petrillo refused to modify the basic conditions with re-
gard to the recording fund which he had included in the record-
ing contracts of 1943. He was at first reluctant to allow the
agents of the recording companies to have any voice in deter-
mining the disposition of the money in the fund. He also felt that
the fund would lose its main value to the AFM if it could be
used only for the benefit of those musicians who made the
records. The latter objection was removed, however, by the
United States Supreme Court decision that in defining the
term "employee" technical and traditional concepts were not
the sole guides to be used, but that account could be taken of
the more relevant economic and statutory considerations.2 Al-
though all musicians thus could benefit from a welfare fund,
the Lea Act and the Taft-Hartley Act made it difficult for the
union to exercise that degree of control which it desired. (As
finally set up, the recorders agreed to pay royalties into a fund
to be used for the benefit of the public, so that the law's provi-
sions regarding the employees who might benefit from a welfare
fund apparently do not apply.)

Petrillo had warned the nation that the AFM would resist
any attempt to prevent the union from collecting royalties on
records. He had announced that if the circumstances warranted,
he would "send out a simple little letter. We'll just say, 'Gentle-
men on such and such a date, members of the American Fede-
ration of Musicians will not be permitted to perform in the
making of recordings and transcriptions.' " Petrillo continued:
"Now Congressmen, make a law to make us go to work, chew
on that one for a while."3

Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act and
Petrillo subsequently sent the letter he had promised. From the
convention of 1947, Petrillo had received the authority to order
the members of the union to cease making recordings upon the
expiration of the contract. He also was given permission either

166

to negotiate new agreements with the recording companies or
to go into the recording business in competition with them. At
the end of October 1947, however, he notified the recording
and transcription companies that contracts with them would
not be renewed. He emphasized that the union irrevocably had
committed itself to a policy of never again working for any
recording company.

Petrillo's avowal that the record ban was permanent was not
given too much weight by the industry or by the public because
he had made similar statements on the previous occasions when
he had banned recordings. It seemed clear that Petrillo was
attempting to gain a stronger bargaining position. The record
companies were not too concerned with the union's threat to
go into the business because it was apparent that such action
would violate the antitrust laws. If the union were the sole
recorder of instrumentalists, competition would be eliminated
and trade would be restrained. The union itself recognized
these implications and refrained from moving in that direction.

On January 1, 1948, the production of musical records ceased
in the United States and Canada. But the major recording
companies already had had experience with a ban and were
prepared. Since they had been given sufficient warning in ad-
vance by Petrillo, they had cut enormous stockpiles of master
records. The backlog was so great that a supply of new musical
records would, if necessary, have been available to the companies
for several years. Only the newly composed popular song hits
could not be recorded. The large recording companies had
accumulated so much material that they would have sustained
losses if an immediate lifting of the record ban had occurred.
The smaller and financially weaker record companies, however,
were not prepared for a long contest with the union.

The AFM had the support of its entire membership, of many
labor unions in the United States, and of the unions of musi-
cians of Great Britain, Mexico, Cuba, Chile, and South Africa.
Petrillo emphasized that the record ban had been reimposed
because of the technological unemployment resulting from the
use of records. He referred particularly to the greater number
of juke boxes in use, to the increase in the number of disk
jockeys, and to the growth in wired music service.

There were several reasons, however, which induced Petrillo

167

to negotiate with the record and transcription companies. First,
he had told members of Congress that he would be willing to
do so. Secondly, there was public pressure exerted to remove
the restrictions on recordings. Thirdly, the number of records
produced and sent into the United States from foreign countries
expanded throughout the period of the ban and served to weaken
the control of the AFM over the situation. Furthermore, the
production of bootleg records— in which musicians work anony-
mously or under fictitious names— increased.4 Although sta-
tions employing live musicians could not use such records, those
radio broadcasters who depended entirely on recorded music
were under no such handicap. Fourthly, there was some talk in
the industry of signing musicians to long-term recording con-
tracts so that they would not be reluctant to risk expulsion from
the union for recording. Recording companies could not expect
to secure the services of leading orchestras and name bands,
however, because violation of the ban by any musician would
result in his expulsion from the union. Expelled musicians
would be barred from playing in unionized establishments, and
it has been in those places where professional musicians normally
have earned the major source of their income. Fifthly, charges
had been filed by the transcription companies with the NLRB
against the AFM, the New York local, and the Los Angeles
local in May 1948 claiming that the union had violated the
Taft-Hartley law because the record ban had compelled the
transcription companies to cease doing business with the radio
stations. This represented, they said, a secondary boycott. Sub-
sequently, however, in December 1948, the regional director of
the NLRB in New York ruled that the record ban did not
violate the Taft-Hartley law and he refused to issue any com-
plaints in this matter.5 Sixthly, the threat of Congressional action
to break the efficacy of the ban was a distinct possibility.

In February 1948, Petrillo had eased the record ban to permit
the networks to record some of their shows when the disk was
to be used only once and then discarded. It was not until Sep-
tember that he was willing to negotiate regarding a general
solution to the problem. In December agreements were reached
with the record and transcription companies under which a
music performance trust fund was set up to provide employ-
ment for instrumental musicians, whether or not members of

168

the union, and to promote the appreciation of instrumental
music by the general public. No admission fees might be charged.
The record companies were to pay a percentage of the retail
price of each record sold, ranging from one per cent of the
price of records under a dollar to two and a half per cent of the
price of records over two dollars, into the fund. The transcrip-
tion companies were to pay three per cent of the gross revenues
derived from leasing transcriptions. When the Solicitor of
Labor of the Department of Labor and the Attorney General
of the United States found that the trustee would not be ap-
pointed by or be a representative of the AFM, they held that
the trust agreement did not violate the Taft-Hartley law. The
contracts between the union and the major companies were
signed on December 14, 1948 and recording work was resumed
immediately. The first trustee, Samuel R. Rosenbaum, was
appointed by the companies. He was favorably regarded by the
union. Successor trustees are to be selected by the Secretary of
Labor. Wage scales remained the same as under the October
1946 agreement.6

Since the agreement extends through the end of 1953, a rela-
tively long period of stability has been assured. In May 1949,
Rosenbaum outlined the procedures under which the music
performance trust fund would be administered. In general, the
trustee was satisfied with the operation of the recording and
transcription fund, and therefore modeled the new fund along
those lines. Allocations to the locals now are made twice a year.7

Radio stations and networks were vitally interested in the out-
come of the record controversy because of the financial link
between the two industries and because radio programs have
depended on the use of records for much of the music they
present. There was fear that a strike by network musicians would
materialize at the expiration of the contract in January 1948.
Networks had been set to meet a strike by preparing in advance
many transcriptions of commercial advertisements which use
music. This material would have lasted several months. The
union and the networks, however, came to a basic understand-
ing and agreed to extend the expiring agreement temporarily.
The union announced two major concessions. It would no
longer apply pressure on the networks to force affiliated stations
to hire additional musicians. The AFM, which gave no indica-

169

tion of any alternative tactics, had threatened to play only on
local programs, and thus cut off affiliated stations. The AFM
also agreed to modify its policy on frequency modulation (FM)
broadcasts.

• Developments in Frequency Modulation

FM was invented and perfected by Major Edwin H. Arm-
strong in the 1930's. It is a system of radio broadcasting which
provides the listener with high fidelity reproduction of sound
and with staticless reception. The first high-power FM station
began to operate in 1939. Since then FM stations have increased
in number very rapidly and it is possible that they may eventu-
ally replace many amplitude modulation (AM) or standard
broadcasting stations. Programs prepared for AM may be sent
over FM channels with only a slight increase in engineering
costs.

The standard broadcasters immediately recognized the po-
tential importance of FM and they secured FM outlets. Many
other persons and business organizations, however, who had no
connection with AM stations also built FM stations. The devel-
opment of the invention of frequency modulation has shown
slow progress because the public has not had the disposition to
buy receiving sets of this type. On the other hand, there have
not been many entrepreneurs willing to risk capital in order
to develop the invention during the period of its infancy. Radio
networks had the most money to spend on FM, but they did
not want to invest more than the minimum necessary to gain a
strong foothold.

The original intention of the Federal Communications Com-
mission, which regulates the radio industry, was to require sep-
arate programs to be broadcast on AM and FM. This policy
presumably was intended to give all groups interested in devel-
oping the new field an equal start. When the networks pro-
tested that the additional expense would impose a financial bur-
den that would retard the rapid development of frequency
modulation, the FCC reversed its position. It ruled that the
same program could be broadcast on both mediums simultan-
eously. As a result, by 1944, an accelerated development of FM
was forecast. Though the New York local of the AFM had pro-
tested the practice of simultaneous broadcasting over AM and

170

FM in 1942 and 1943, the networks continued to engage in it.

In September 1944, immediately after the New York City
station of NBC received a commercial license for its FM trans-
mitter, Petrillo notified the four major networks that use of
musicians on FM programs without permission from the AFM
was a violation of the radio contracts. Some correspondence
between the networks and the union was interchanged, but no
solution was reached. The networks maintained that they had
to transmit programs over FM without any additional charges
to the advertisers because simultaneous broadcasts did not in-
crease the number of people able to hear the programs. Rates
to advertisers have been based upon the potential number of
listeners and not the actual size of the audience.

The musicians union claimed that the act of duplicating
programs over AM and FM without increasing the advertising
rates put independent FM stations at a competitive disadvan-
tage. Advertisers would not be encouraged to put programs on
FM stations only, if they could have them aired over both
mediums. This advertising policy would hurt the struggling
FM outlets. The AFM, however, wanted to protect the growing
FM industry because it had envisioned much future employ-
ment for its members in it. Some of the independent FM broad-
casters also opposed the simultaneous transmission of programs.

Petrillo and the networks were unable to break the impasse,
but Petrillo had the final word. After wrangling for a year,
during which time the networks continued to send AM pro-
grams over FM outlets, Petrillo ordered that beginning on
October 29, 1945, double crews of musicians would have to be
employed on all duplicated programs. Networks were not per-
mitted to feed chain programs played by orchestras on AM
stations to FM affiliates. Moreover, this ruling was applicable to
local independent AM stations. Locals of the AFM, however,
were permitted to make separate contracts to supply the services
of musicians who were to be used for broadcasting exclusively
on independent FM stations. The networks complied with these
orders because the radio contracts were silent on the FM ques-
tion and because of the implied threat of a strike by the musi-
cians. They did not employ additional musicians but they
stopped duplicating programs with music.

The policy of the musicians union was attacked by the radio

171

industry. Public clamor also was directed against the union's
position. The Federal Communications Commission was power-
less to step into this labor dispute although the broadcasters and
the public requested it to do so several times. When Paul A.
Porter, Chairman of the FCC, addressed an interested audience,
he said jocularly: "The FCC is in favor of duplicate programs
but it appears that Petrillo has overruled the FCC." A woman
in the audience asked "where Petrillo got all his power." Porter
replied: "My dear lady that question has me puzzled. All I can
say is that he didn't get it from the FCC."8

After the networks rejected Petrillo's plan, they decided to
shut down all FM transmitters. They took advantage of the
occasion and installed different transmitting equipment. This
operation was necessary because the FCC had assigned new wave
lengths for FM. The shift could best be executed by going off
the air for several months.

Those persons who had predicted that Petrillo would quickly
modify his order were wrong. For two and a half years the
AFM did not set any wage scales for FM network broadcasts
and no musical programs were duplicated, though some inde-
pendent FM stations continued to broadcast live music. Fur-
thermore, in September 1947 the AFM prohibited FM networks
from using musicians. Pleas by both AM and FM networks to
the union to alter its policy were unavailing even after passage
of the Lea Act. At the end of January 1948, however, while
negotiations were in progress to draw up new radio contracts
with the networks, Petrillo rescinded his order affecting FM.
The duplication of programs over AM and FM was permitted;
and FM networks could employ musicians. This action, how-
ever, put stations operating on FM only at a competitive dis-
advantage in securing commercial sponsors.

The decision of the union to permit duplication of programs
without asking for additional compensation for musicians was
welcomed by the radio industry and by the public. Except for
the fact that the established standard broadcasting companies
had a tremendous advantage over other FM operators, the devel-
opment of FM could be pushed forward rapidly. Yet the AM
networks, which were in the strongest financial and technical
position to advance FM, were not especially anxious to do so
because of their tremendous investment in standard broadcast-

172

ing and because of the uncertainties regarding the future of the
radio industry brought about by the growth of television (TV) .
The expansion of frequency modulation broadcasting therefore
has been very slow.

Simultaneously with the long negotiations regarding FM, the
union was engaged in working out a policy in connection with
the other major technological invention affecting musicians.
The type of agreements subsequently reached for television were
entirely different.

• The Television Controversy

The idea of television is old, but public broadcasting service
on this medium did not begin in the United States until 1939.
Commercial programs began to be telecast in 1941. Much of the
broadcast time, however, was devoted to experimentation and to
the development of new techniques and procedures. In tele-
vision too, radio networks assumed the lead. Monetary outlays
during the developmental period were high though it was un-
certain whether the future returns would show the expenditures
to have been wisely made.

At first the AFM cooperated with the industry. During 1943,
Petrillo set the television scale for musicians at $18 an hour,
and put a lower price on rehearsals. In February 1945, however,
the international executive board prohibited musicians from
playing on any form of television program. This action imme-
diately affected two of the three major forms of video presenta-
tion—television programs are divided among studio broadcasts,
mobile unit pickups, and films. Musicians were cut off from the
first two of these types of broadcasts. The televising of motion
pictures containing music was prohibited subsequently, as al-
ready described, by contract with the film producers in 1946.
The 1945 ban was not coupled with any demand, suggestion,
or request. It applied even to those performances where the
music merely would be heard and the musician would not be
included in the field of vision. However, rumors that the object
of the ban was to help the film industry take control of tele-
vision from the radio industry were denied by spokesmen for
the film producers.

The development of TV was hampered by the action of the
musicians union, but the industry continued to grow. Aside

173

from the musicians themselves, it was mainly the public which
suffered because it was barred from enjoying many possible
types of television entertainment. Television broadcasters had
greater difficulty in meeting the minimum program time require-
ments of the FCC with suitable presentations. The attitude of
the union, however, was understandable. It was based on the
fear that the disastrous unemployment which had occurred in
the theaters after the introduction of sound films would be
repeated with the development of television. Since television
programs may be produced by filming the show first and pre-
senting it at a later time over the video channel, Petrillo feared
that eventually canned television or the kinescope would dis-
place the live musicians employed during the early stages of
development. That is, for example, a television program of a
famous name band playing musical selections would be filmed
and used over again many times subsequently. The union was
trying to prevent the creation of a television record industry
which would become as important to television as phonograph
records have been to radio. Petrillo argued that before commit-
ting the AFM to any television policy, he wanted to have a
clearer idea of the direction in which video programs were
heading. The union also desired some assurance that the ap-
proximately $23,000,000 in income which its members have
been receiving from radio would not be lost by an inaccurate
decision regarding the future of television.

The solution had to be based on the assurance to musicians
that excessive use would not be made of kinescopes. The hesi-
tancy of the AFM to commit itself had justification. A decision
on its part probably would set the pattern for the future con-
tractual relations in an industry that seemed destined to replace
radio. The musicians union, therefore, either would have to
impose an outright prohibition on canned television programs
by the broadcasters or, as an alternative, it would have to de-
mand a royalty fund into which payments would be made each
time a canned musical program was televised. The union was
not concerned particularly with live television broadcasts, since
no displacement problem was presented by them.

In March 1948, Petrillo announced that a new three-year
agreement with the radio networks had been signed. Contracts
between the New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles locals and

174

the four major networks were renewed without change in either
the wage scales or the number of staff musicians to be employed.
But the contracts were modified to permit the use of musicians
on television at wage rates that would be determined every few
months during television's developmental stage. The contracts
further were altered to permit the simultaneous use of musi-
cians on AM and FM and to allow broadcasting of cooperative
programs.

At the end of April the FM and the networks agreed to put
television pay scales into effect for a six-month period, begin-
ning on May 1. The rates set were lower than those established
for radio musicians, but depended on whether a network or
local program was involved. The agreement permitted musical
programs to be filmed for storage in network files or for a single
presentation at regular television wage scales. The agreement
subsequently was extended until April 1, 1949, at which time
a new one year contract was executed with the networks under
which the pay scales were increased. Locals retained the power
to make scales for local television broadcasts emanating from
independently owned stations.

The negotiations at the beginning of 1951 between the radio
networks and the AFM locals in New York, Los Angeles, and
Chicago over the terms of a new agreement to go into effect on
February 1, 1951 were not successful. Early in March the New
York local authorized a strike against the networks, subject to
the approval of the AFM. The Los Angeles local authorized the
AFM to take such action as it might deem necessary. Petrillo,
backed by the international executive board, decided to take
over the negotiations on March 13. He maintained that such
action was in the interest of all musicians.9 In a relatively short
time he reached an agreement on the basic conditions for a
three-year contract extending to February 1, 1954. It included
radio, television, and television film contracts.

Many of the issues between the American Federation of
Musicians and the radio broadcasting and television industries
were resolved. The main gains made by the union were a
general increase in radio wage rates of 15 per cent and an agree-
ment to set the vacation period at two weeks. The broadcasters
successfully rejected demands to reduce the amount of recorded
music they would play and to increase the number of staff musi-

175

cians. Wage rates for television programs were equalized with
those prevailing in the radio industry.

The union agreed to permit simulcasting over AM and FM,
AM and TV, FM and TV, and AM, FM, and TV. No extra
charge is made by musicians for a simulcast over AM and FM,
but if the program is played simultaneously over the radio and
over television, an additional sum, depending on whether the
program is a sustaining or a commercial broadcast, is paid to
them.

The musicians were not given any additional staff employ-
ment for television broadcasts. They will, however, receive many
single engagements on this medium. Some concessions were made
by the union in regard to kinescopes or television recording.
Such recordings may be shown only once in any city on a station
not receiving the original broadcast, but affiliated with the
network at the time the film was made. The kinescope must be
taken at the time of the regularly scheduled live broadcast and
must be shown within 60 days of production. A separate tele-
vision film agreement was negotiated with the networks under
which films could be made and shown providing the networks
would pay five per cent of the receipts derived from leasing the
films into a music performance trust fund.

Cooperative programs are paid for at the same rates as if
sponsored by a single advertiser. Participating broadcasts (one
integrated unit, but without a specific time allocation to adver-
tisers) , segmented shows (where there is a specific time alloca-
tion to sponsors) , and composite programs (a combination of
the two) may be aired only if musicians are paid at higher
wage rates. The contracts also require the networks to obtain
permission from the union before sending any musical program
abroad.

In 1951, the AFM also concluded its first major contracts with
motion picture companies for televising motion picture films.
In contracts with the Republic Pictures, a member of the Motion
Picture Producers Association, and the Monogram Company
the union agreed to permit the use of films on TV provided
that the musical score was replayed and that five per cent of
the receipts of the companies from the lease of the films would
be paid into a music performance trust fund. The preceding
year agreements had been reached with several small companies

176

for the production of TV films under similar conditions.10

The union thus has reached a stage where relatively stable
relations have been achieved with the recording, radio, and
television industries. Some major issues still remain. But it
appears that there will not be much controversy engaged in by
musicians in these industries for at least a few years.

• Congressional Investigations

The union's policies in connection with technological progress
and mechanical reproduction of music has aroused public
interest and criticism. Congressional inquiry into the objectives
and practices of the AFM was renewed in 1947, because it
appeared that neither the earlier investigations nor the Lea Act
in which they had terminated had affected or influenced Petrillo
or the union markedly. The victory of the Republican party
in the 1946 Congressional elections, gave Fred A. Hartley, Jr.
the chairmanship of the House Committee on Education and
Labor. In February 1947, just after the eightieth Congress was
organized, he introduced a resolution to give his committee the
power to subpoena witnesses and to administer oaths. The
House of Representatives agreed to this resolution.

The committee had received a number of complaints regard-
ing the practices of the musicians union. Although other organi-
zations were investigated also, Hartley was interested especially
in some of the policies and activities of the AFM. Dr. Joseph
E. Maddy had complained to the committee about the Inter-
lochen situation. Charges also had been brought to the committee
by Earl Carroll that the Los Angeles local of the union had
forced him to maintain an orchestra larger than he needed for
the operation of his theater-restaurant in that city. The com-
mittee subsequently suspected that officers and members of
local 47 in Los Angeles had been guilty of intimidating and
punishing Earl Carroll for bringing the charges. Hartley ordered
a thorough investigation of the charges. He appointed a subcom-
mittee of three members to determine whether any laws had
been violated and whether any witnesses had been coerced.
Carroll D. Kearns, of Pennsylvania, who was a member of the
musicians union, was named chairman. The subcommittee was
anxious to hear Petrillo testify and it served him with a subpoena,
though it delayed calling upon him until the United States

177

Supreme Court had ruled that the Lea Act was constitutional.
As a result, in order to be at the disposal of the subcommittee
Petrillo was forced to cancel a scheduled trip to Europe. He
had hoped to formulate a plan, in cooperation with the British
musicians, under which a world federation of musicians would
be organized. This plan now must await a more propitious
occasion.

Most of the testimony was taken in Los Angeles. Much of it
was concerned with the policies and activities of the Los
Angeles local. Petrillo, however, testified in Washington, D. C,
in July. The president of the AFM reiterated many of the argu-
ments he had previously expressed regarding the necessity of
protecting the employment opportunities of musicians. Petrillo
claimed that musicians who do not work full time in the
profession, but who desire to do so, must be considered unem-
ployed. No accurate study of the working activities and schedules
of the membership ever has been made. It was estimated in
1947, however, that about 32,400 of the 216,000 members of
the AFM earned their livelihood by working exclusively as
musicians. About twice that number gained part of their live-
lihood in other vocations. More than 86,000 musicians had
dropped their instruments because there was no work for them
or because they developed other interests.11 Throughout his
testimony, Petrillo manifested a disposition to compromise the
issues in dispute.

During one exchange with the committee, Petrillo said to
Congressman Kearns: "By the way, I understand you are a good
musician. Mr. Kearns. Thank you, Mr. Petrillo. Mr. Petrillo.
I mean that. Mr. Nixon. Do you understand he is also a good
Congressman? Mr. Petrillo. Not yet. I will tell you more about
that when we get through here."12 At another time, Petrillo
said: "While we are talking about the Government, what are
we going to do about President Truman? He plays the piano.
Mr. Kearns. I will make the suggestion that we pay him as a
stand-by. How is that?"13

Petrillo made several immediate and tangible concessions as
a result of his appearance before the Congressional subcom-
mittee. He executed a code of ethics with the American
Association of School Administrators and with the Music
Educators National Conference. This document permitted music

178

students to perform in public, broadcast, and make audition
records in furtherance of their musical education, if such activity
was of a nonprofit, noncommercial, and noncompetitive nature.
Petrillo also agreed to permit the service bands of the armed
forces to make recordings to be used strictly for educational
purposes. Furthermore, Petrillo restored the union licenses to
two bookers who had complained to the subcommittee that
their licenses had been revoked without good cause.

The subcommittee found that the Los Angeles local had
adjusted its dispute with Earl Carroll in a manner satisfactory
to all concerned. It therefore recommended that that phase of
the investigation should be closed without any further action.
The report which it submitted to Congress, however, urged the
enactment of legislation which would end the monopolistic
practices of trade unions and bar unions from licensing employ-
ers who want to do business. The subcommittee said of Petrillo
and the AFM: "The continued exercise of such tyrannical power
by any individual or group should not be countenanced nor
tolerated in a free Republic."14

The House Committee on Education and Labor began hearings
in January 1948 to consider the legislation proposed by the
subcommittee to forbid monopolistic practices of labor unions
which are injurious to the public interest. Representatives of
industry testified at length that the power of the AFM was
excessive and should be curbed. One witness became so irritated,
he said: "I have an ulcer which I would like to give to Mr.
Petrillo."15 Spokesmen for the recorders, however, declared that
they were in favor of continuing payments under a royalty plan,
but that the Labor Management Relations Act had interposed
an obstacle to the peaceful settlement of the recording contro-
versy. Petrillo also was called to the witness stand. He declared
that he was willing to negotiate all issues, except the ban on
records. He agreed, however, to Hartley's suggestion that a
secret poll of musicians should be taken to determine whether
members of the AFM really favored the ban on recordings; the
vote never was held. Petrillo repeated that he had no objections
to the manufacture of records that would be used only in the
home, if such a system could be worked out. He was opposed to
the production of that 20 per cent of the records which is used
commercially.

179

Petrillo was told by one of the members of the committee that
President Truman disagreed with him regarding the amount
of money available to the public for consumption expenditures.
"Mr. Owens. . . . And now, do you not believe the President?
Mr. Petrillo. I won't contradict the President. Mr. Owens. Well,
it is true; is it not? Mr. Petrillo. After all, he is a potential
member of the union; he is a piano player. Mr. Owens. That is
right. He was more than a piano player, Mr. Petrillo. He had
several other occupations, as well."16

Various caustic and sarcastic remarks were interjected into
the testimony. The chairman related that he had been told by
a member of the AFM: "You know, in music when we say
'fortissimo,' we speak of loud music; when we say 'pianissimo,'
we speak of soft music; and when we say 'Petrillo,' we speak of
no music."17 At one point, a discussion occurred regarding the
qualifications necessary for membership in the union. Both the
witness and the Congressman who questioned him felt that the
admission standards were too low." Mr. Hoffman. . . . the fellow
who carries a record from one room to another and puts it on
the machine— Mr. Asch. A platter turner. Mr. Hoffman. Is eligible
to become a member of the union. Mr. Asch. I am not sure.
They probably would make him a cymbal player and let him
bang the cymbals and take him in. Mr. Hoffman. . . . May a
janitor, for example, become a member of the union? . . . The
Chairman. Let us be in order."18 It is therefore a curious fact that
at the beginning of 1950 a report by a committee of the Ameri-
can Conference of Academic Deans assailed the medical profes-
sion for using "Petrillo economics" to keep down the number
of students admitted to medical schools. Petrillo denied the
implied charge, pointing out that admission to his union was
relatively easy.19

The first major result of these hearings was that Petrillo
rescinded the ban on the simulcast or duplication of AM and
FM programs. No double crew or additional pay was necessary.
This action by Petrillo already has been discussed. No legislation
was enacted by Congress as a result of these hearings and no
further investigations of the AFM have been made.

The history of Congressional investigations of the AFM has
demonstrated one salient characteristic. The union of musicians
has corrected many of the undesirable practices and eliminated

180

some of the abuses of which it has been guilty, as a result of public
hearings. Airing the problems before a legislative committee has
been effective in bringing the pressure of public opinion to beai
on the union and has served to narrow the area of many disputes.
Vengeful Congressional legislation, however, has not solved
the troublesome and vexatious problems faced by the musicians.

PETRILLO MARCHES ON —

11

TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEMS REMAIN • J"J~

"The machine of itself brings certain dangers and certain
benefits. To my mind the latter outweigh the former."

STUART CHASE

• The Stature of Petrillo

During the decade in which he has served as president of the
American Federation of Musicians, James C. Petrillo has gained
tremendous stature as a labor leader. Today, as he passes 60
years of age, he is emerging slowly as one of labor's elder states-
men. He is respected by the overwhelming majority of the
members of his union and by the employers with whom he
deals. Although, for example, there is much more amiability
between Petrillo and the film producers than between Petrillo
and the heads of the radio networks, his integrity is recognized
by all with whom he negotiates. In January 1951, Petrillo was
elected a vice president of the American Federation of Labor,
succeeding Joseph N. Weber in that position.

As Petrillo has increased his knowledge of the music industry
and as he has perfected the techniques of bargaining with
employers, he simultaneously has become milder. His position
of control in the union is so complete that he no longer has to
undertake vigorous campaigns against employers to demonstrate
his value to the organization. Employers frequently are more
willing to negotiate with Petrillo, whom they consider more
reasonable, than with local officers, whose more extensive
demands would be more costly if granted. There have already
been several minor indications that some local leaders are
anxiously waiting for the time when Petrillo will be ready to
retire. At present, though faint rumblings may be heard in a
number of locals, no member of the AFM poses a threat to
Petrillo's dominance.

It is a common practice for Petrillo to take action on certain

182

matters first and then secure the concurrence of the international
executive board. Sometimes, however, it is not practicable to
wait for approval before taking the action. During his service
as president, Petrillo has built up a good record. He was respon-
sible for the unionization of all the nonunion professional musi-
cians who had not yet joined the AFM. Several jurisdictional
disputes were brought to an amicable termination. Written
contracts were negotiated with the record companies and film
producers for the first time. The principle of a royalty payment
into a fund used for the benefit of the musicians union was
formulated first in connection with the recording and tran-
scription companies and then carried over to the film and tele-
vision industries. Favorable agreements were concluded with the
radio and television networks. The most serious setback suf-
fered by the AFM in the last 10 years was the passage of the
Lea Act, the main result of which was that the network affiliated
radio stations and the independent stations were able to reduce
or eliminate the services rendered to them by live musicians.

Weber had had a relatively favorable press. From the time
Petrillo assumed the presidency of the international union in
1940, however, the new head of the AFM served as the butt of
vitriolic attacks by the newspapers and was caricatured unfavor-
ably by the cartoonists. Since 1948, when Petrillo decided to hire
a public relations adviser and to spend many tens of thousands
of dollars in influencing public opinion, there has been an
evident change in the treatment he has received from reporters.
In most descriptions of him which now appear, he is considered
to be a human being.

There have been several matters in which Petrillo has shown
an especial interest recently. He has clearly recognized and told
the members of the union that when business conditions deterio-
rate, it is necessary for the AFM to make concessions to employers
who are hard pressed to stay in business.1 It is mainly for this
reason that the AFM has been waging a vigorous campaign
during the last few years to have the 20 per cent amusement tax
imposed on the prices charged by establishments where live
musicians are employed repealed. The union has maintained
that the decline in employment of musicians in restaurants,
night clubs, hotels, dance halls, and theaters might be arrested

183

if the tax were eliminated. The tax has encouraged some employ-
ers to substitute wired music or juke boxes for the live musicians.
The employer thus is able to derive a revenue and to eliminate
the 20 per cent tax from his establishment.

The AFM has become more concerned with political activity.
Petrillo always has supported the Democratic party, but the
position of the union now is more clearly formulated and
regularly described in the pages of the International Musician.
The attitude generally follows the one taken by Labor's League
for Political Education of the AFL, to which body the musicians
union has given considerable financial support. The American
Federation of Musicians has made significant contributions in
assisting the government to conduct the "cold" war. The AFM
sometimes has donated its services and on other occasions has
waived its rules to make music available for the Voice of
America programs and to assist the Economic Cooperation
Administration.2

• Technological Issues

The activities of the American Federation of Musicians affect
a quarter of a million members directly, but also have an impact
on the life of the nation. Leisure time and relaxation for millions
in the population are linked intimately with musical entertain-
ment. The decisions of the musicians union therefore should
be scrutinized closely by the public. Of most immediate concern
to the country has been the policy of the union in connection
with technological change. The position of the union on this
matter has been formulated slowly.

The musicians union suffered severe unemployment when
the sound films were introduced into the theaters. Since that
time the union has sought to arrest the development and utili-
zation of many mechanical devices and technological advances
in the field of music. Gradually, a distinction between the
different inventions has been made. Frequency modulation has
been recognized as a medium which will not involve any
displacement of musicians in the future. The television industry,
except for the use of kinescopes, seems to be of similar character.
The union decided therefore, though reluctantly, not to require
double crews when simultaneous broadcasts are made, although

184

musicians do receive a higher wage rate for simulcasts involving
TV. The AFM also abandoned its attempt to impose especially
onerous conditions on cooperatively sponsored programs.

The situation differs when the musician helps to produce a
commodity which may be used subsequently to eliminate his
services. The first important invention of this kind was the
phonograph record. The problem has divided itself into two
parts. First, although the musician has been paid a high wage
scale by the company when he has performed for the recording,
he has had no further claim to remuneration no matter how
much income the company has earned from the record. Secondly,
the unlimited use of records by the radio stations has reduced
the need for live talent. In the last few years the disk jockey
and the juke box have become national institutions.

The AFM seems to have solved the first aspect of the problem.
The union has not been concerned primarily with the recording
musicians because the income of this group has been high.
Instead, the union has endeavored to assist those musicians who
supposedly are unemployed because of the encroachment of
records. Although the music performance trust fund has been
adopted as the means to that end, several alternatives had been
possible.

It has been proposed that the recording companies should
lease or rent their product, in a manner similar to the tran-
scription companies, rather than sell it outright. This procedure
would have enabled the companies to maintain control over the
phonographic record and prevent its unauthorized use by radio
stations, in juke boxes, and for other public commercial services.
The use of the records in the home, of course, would not be
supervised. This plan would have made it feasible for a fee to
be paid by radio stations and juke boxes for the use of records.
Court decisions which have nullified stipulations limiting the
use of the records to the home would have become inapplicable,
because records no longer would be sold.

It also has been proposed that the copyright law should be
modified. British laws provide for the payment of a fee to musi-
cians each time their records are used. The United States copy-
right law of 1909 provides that the composer and librettist of a
musical composition should receive royalties from radio stations
playing their records and from publishers of their songs.3 Under

185

a contract with the recording company, the band leader gets a
royalty on sales. Musicians in the band, however, are guaranteed
to receive nothing beyond the union scale, though they may be
paid above the scale.

The AFM admitted that performing musicians have been
well paid. It felt therefore that the copyright income should be
utilized for the benefit of unemployed musicians. This condition
would have necessitated transferring the receipts of the copy-
right from the performer to the union or assigning the copyright
to the manufacturer under a contract that a specified proportion
of the receipts would be turned over to the union. Neither the
union nor the recording companies were enthusiastic to obtain
copyright legislation of this nature. The union would have been
burdened with tax and administrative difficulties and possibly
with the resentment of recording musicians who would receive
none of the royalties. The companies were not disposed to
accept the principle of turning over copyright moneys to be used
for the benefit of musicians whom they never had employed.
Although copyright legislation might have been able to produce
the income which the union sought, the AFM never zealously
strove to obtain such provisions.

The manufacture of transcriptions never raised serious com-
plications because the industry is small and the product is leased,
not sold, to radio stations. The union receives a percentage of
the income of the transcription companies and hence is not
concerned particularly with the number of times the transcrip-
tion is used by the lessee. It is this plan which the musicians
union has adopted in connection with the television industry.

The second aspect of the problem is a major point of conten-
tion. Over the last decade there has been a gradual decline in
the number of staff musicians employed by radio stations in the
United States. To a larger extent, the independent stations have
depended on records for the musical portion of their schedules
and the affiliated stations have supplemented programs based
on records with programs supplied by the network. It is likely
that if this trend continues the union will give more attention
to the matter. The union, however, has not been able to gain
any control over the juke box operators.

Technological displacement problems seem to be less im-
portant to the musicians union today than at any time in the

186

last 25 years. An adjustment has been made or a compromise
has been reached along many fronts. Yet as the future is envi-
saged several potential strike questions loom forth. First, a few
locals already have begun to exert pressure on the networks to
reduce the amount of time allotted to records and transcriptions.
The radio stations have resisted this demand forcefully. The
industry thus far has been free from any limitation on the use
of records and seems ready to take a strike rather than give way
on this issue.

Secondly, the growing use of the kinescope may raise a serious
issue. The kinescope, which for television corresponds to the
record in the radio industry, is a motion picture of a television
program. By building up a library of kinescopes it would be
possible for a TV station to operate a balanced schedule of
programs without employing musicians. The AFM has been
able to negotiate agreements with the TV networks that when
kinescopes are used the networks will allocate five per cent of
the income derived to a fund established for the benefit of
musicians. If the networks should decide not to renew such
contract provisions in the future it seems that a strike against
them is inevitable.

Thirdly, the union has begun to negotiate agreements along
similar lines for the use of regular motion pictures over tele-
vision. The union will try to prevent the motion picture film
industry or the television stations from presenting over video
the music of any film unless a payment is made to the music
performance trust fund. The AFM also must continue to
oppose the reuse of motion picture sound tracks in new pictures.

If the volume of unemployment among musicians becomes
high, the American Federation of Musicians may be expected
to take a stronger stand on some technological issues. Yet the
union must recognize that as long as it generally admits to
membership any person who claims to be a musician, the prob-
lem of unemployment may never be solved. Individuals are
inclined to join the union when they know that the union
provides for its unemployed. Everybody who can play an instru-
ment should not be classified as a professional musician. Persist-
ently high unemployment among musicians suggests that there
are too many of them and that some persons who consider
themselves to be professional musicians should be retrained.

187

Some musical critics have supported the contention of the
union that excessive use of mechanical devices to replace live
musicians somehow must be blocked; otherwise a reduction in
the quality of musical performance eventually would take place
because persons would have less incentive to study music. The
ultimate result of such a situation would be a blow to cultural
progress. Although this argument has some merit, the economic
system in the United States leaves such decisions in the hands
of the public. The people must choose, through their monetary
outlays, the form of music they wish to hear.

The musicians union has accepted the principle that in a
democracy labor cannot permanently stifle technological prog-
ress. The decision by the union is wise. The public, however,
must recognize that technological change must come about
through a smooth adjustment without seriously disrupting the
lives of many workers. Stuart Chase concluded a study of the
problem of technology by saying: "The machine of itself brings
certain dangers and certain benefits. To my mind the latter
outweigh the former."4 If machines are used with discretion they
serve to contribute greatly to the welfare of mankind.

NOTES

Chapter I

1. Cecil Johns, "The Stony Road to Unionism," International
Musician, July 1946, p. 17.

2. International Musician, April 1950, p. 30.

3. Oscar Ameringer, If You Don't Weaken, 1940, p. 49.

4. International Musician, May 1907, p. 1.

5. Ibid., January 1946, pp. 1, 15.

6. American Musician, May 1, 1898, p. 3.

7. The biographical facts in Weber's life as detailed by the
union on different occasions show marked variation. Even
the year of his birth cannot be decisively established. See
International Musician, July 1925, p. 2 and January 1951,
p. 7.

8. Ibid., July 1927, p. 3.

9. New York Sun, July 17, 1904, p. 7:3.

10. John R. Commons, "Types of American Labor Unions— The
Musicians of St. Louis and New York," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, May 1906, p. 419.

Chapter II

1. Christian Science Monitor, March 18, 1922, p. 14:1 and
New York Times, April 21, 1918, p. 8:3.

2. Kunze v. Weber, 197 App. Div. 319, 323, May 27, 1921
(Appellate Division, New York Supreme Court) .

3. Musical Mutual Protective Union v. Weber (New York
Supreme Court) , New York Law Journal, October 4, 1922,
p. 41:3.

4. New York Tribune, December 20, 1893, p. 7:1 and Decem-
ber 23, 1893, p. 9:1.

5. Walter Damrosch, My Musical Life, 1923, pp. 212-14.

6. Philadelphia Public Ledger, December 14, 1908.

7. International Musician, July 1927, p. 1.

8. 47 Stat. 67, March 17, 1932.

9. The ban on contract labor was ordered on August 7, 1929
in P. C. 1413 and its suspension came on April 11, 1947 in
P. C. 1329. See Statutory Orders and Regulations of Canada,
Consolidation, 1949, Volume II, pp. 2183-84.

189

10. Official Opinions of the Attorneys-General of the United
States, Volume 27, pp. 90-95.

11. 39 Stat. 166, 188-89, June 3, 1916.

12. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Amer-
ican Federation of Musicians, 1904, p. 76.

Chapter III

1. Westbrook Pegler, "Thieves with Union Cards," Collier's,
January 9, 1943, p. 30.

2. Bruce Dennis, "He Was Always Good at Arithmetic," The
Saturday Evening Post, October 12, 1940, p. 13.

3. International Musician, April 1922, p. 3.

4. Bruce Dennis, op. cit., p. 49.

5. Ibid.

6. Rizzo, Belcaster v. Petrillo, Records of Clerk, Circuit Court
of Cook County, Case B 281, 594, December 19, 1933; cited
in Twentieth Century Fund, How Collective Bargaining
Works, 1942, p. 850.

7. Robert Coughlan, "Petrillo," Life, August 3, 1942, p. 74.

8. Geoffrey Parsons, Jr. and Robert M. Yoder, "Petrillo:
Mussolini of Music," The American Mercury, November
1940, p. 285.

9. International Musician, July 1949, p. 10.

10. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Amer-
ican Federation of Musicians, 1950, pp. 95-99.

11. A description of the Chicago local may be found in Twen-
tieth Century Fund, How Collective Bargaining Works
1942, pp. 848-66, 868. This is a section in the chapter on
Chicago Service Trades, written by C. Lawrence Christenson.

12. Robert Coughlan, op. cit., p. 70.

13. New York Times, January 14, 1943, p. 9:5, 6.

14. A good description of Petrillo by an artist who painted his
portrait may be found in International Musician, December
1949, p. 27.

15. Restrictive Union Practices of the American Federation of
Musicians, Hearings before the Committee on Education
and Labor, House of Representatives, 1948 (80th Congress,
2nd Session) , p. 308.

Chapter IV

1. International Musician, July 1929, p. 1.

2. See ibid., June 1930, p. 17.

190

3. Ibid., May 1928, p. 21.

4. Ibid., November 1929, pp. 9-10.

5. New York Daily News, December 7, 1931, p. 22:3.

6. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians, 1932, p. 188.

7. New York Times, June 13, 1937, p. 1:4.

8. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians, 1951, p. 131.

9. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 194 Atl. 631,
October 8, 1937.

10. RCA Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86, CCA 2, July
25, 1940; affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court, 311 U.S. 712,
December 16, 1940.

11. International Musician, October 1927, p. 22.

12. Quoted from the Chicago Tribune in the International Musi-
cian, January 1937, p. 13.

13. International Musician, September 1916, p. 9; see also ibid.,
October 1914, p. 8.

14. Ibid., May 1938, p. 1.

Chapter V

1. Use of Mechanical Reproduction of Music, Hearings before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce,
United States Senate, 1942 (77th Congress, 2nd Session),
p. 110.

2. Restrictive Union Practices of the American Federation of
Musicians, Hearings before the Committee on Education
and Labor, House of Representatives, 1948 (80th Congress,
2nd Session), p. 371.

3. Official Journal, Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater
New York, American Federation of Musicians, July 1940,
p. 9.

4. American Federation of Musicians, Constitution, By-Laws,
and Standing Resolutions, 1947, p. 20.

5. Ibid., p. 8.

6. Figures have been obtained from various union sources. For
some of the earlier years, conflicting figures may be found.

7. Figures on employment and earnings of musicians engaged
in the motion picture industry are reported by the union.
See Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the
American Federation of Musicians, 1951, pp. 132-33, for the
statistics for 1949.

8. International Musician, June 1927, p. 1.

191

9. National Broadcasting Company, Inc., 59 NLRB 478, No-
vember 24, 1944 (certification), and 61 NLRB 161, March
31, 1945 (order to bargain).

10. National Labor Relations Board v. National Broadcasting
Co., Inc., 150 F.2d 895, 900, CCA 2, July 27, 1945.

11. International Musician, August 1948, p. 4.

12. Ibid., October 1949, p. 7.

13. New York Times, October 1, 1949, p. 2:3. See also Time, Oc-
tober 10, 1949, p. 92.

14. New York Times, October 5, 1949, p. 24:1.

15. International Musician, September 1950, p. 11.

16. Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Joseph N. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348,
357, April 24, 1941. This decision overruled the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court, 17 N.Y.S.2d 144, January
26, 1940, which in turn had overruled the decision of the
Supreme Court, 170 Misc. 272, January 24, 1939.

17. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, June 23, 1947.

18. Official Journal, Allegro, Local 802, Associated Musicians of
Greater New York, May 1948, p. 6. But see ibid., March 1952,
p. 13, regarding responsibility for unemployment compensa-
tion taxes.

19. International Musician, May 1949, p. 8.

20. Ibid., March 1935, p. 8.

21. New York Times, January 18, 1949, p. 17:5.

22. International Musician, November 1947, p. 16.

Chapter VI

1. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians, 1951, pp. 7-34.

2. Investigation of So-Called "Rackets," Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on Commerce, United States
Senate, Volume II, Part 1, 1934 (73rd Congress, 2nd Session) .

3. Official Journal, Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater
New York, American Federation of Musicians, February
1945, p. 13.

4. See New York Times, June 28, 1948, p. 15:1 and March 18,
1949, p. 33:1.

5. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 92 NLRB 1528, January 24, 1951;
reversed by Gamble Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 196 F. 2d 61, CCA 6, May 9, 1952.

6. New York World-Telegram, January 8, 1942, p. 17:1.

7. 1939 Laws of New York 2151, June 13, 1939.

8. International Musician, January 1950, p. 35.

192

9. New York Times, September 12, 1946, p. 9:5.

10. Hotel Association of St. Louis, 92 NLRB 1388, January 17,
1951.

11. The text of the decision is printed in Official Journal, Al-
legro, Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater New York,
October 1950, p. 5.

12. Ibid., May 1951, p. 28.

13. The membership figures have been taken from the records of
the international union or of the local union.

14. New York Times, December 7, 1949, p. 1:6.

15. Robert Coughlan, "Petrillo," Life, August 3, 1942, p. 76.

Chapter VII

1. New York Times, August 14, 1940, p. 21:8.

2. See AGMA, Official Organ of the American Guild of Musi-
cal Artists, Inc., July- August 1937, p. 4 and September-
October 1937, p. 4. The union involved was the Grand
Opera Artists Association of America.

3. New York Times, August 30, 1940, p. 21:8.

4. Time, September 2, 1940, p. 45.

5. AGMA v. AFM, 23 N.Y.S.2d 947, November 19, 1940.

6. AGMA v. Petrillo, 24 N.Y.S,2d 854, January 24, 1941.

7. AGMA v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, July 29, 1941.

8. International Musician, June 1942, p. 25.

9. Ibid., June 1906, p. 8.

10. New York Telegraph, April 18, 1919; see Moses Smith, Kous-
sevitzky, 1947, p. 141.

11. John T. Morse, Jr., "Henry Lee Higginson," Harvard Grad-
uates' Magazine, March 1920, p. 391.

12. New York Times, August 14, 1940, p. 21:8.

13. Boston Globe, September 23, 1941; see Moses Smith, op. cit.,
p. 318.

14. New York Times, December 15, 1942, p. 24:7.

Chapter VIII

1. Use of Mechanical Reproduction of Music, Hearings before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce,
United States Senate, 1942 (77th Congress, 2nd Session),
p. 3.

2. United States v. American Federation of Musicians, 318
U.S. 741, February 15, 1943, affirming 47 F. Supp. 304, Octo-
ber 14, 1942.

193

3. International Musician, July 1908, p. 8.

4. RCA Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, CCA 2, July
25, 1940; affirmed 311 U.S. 712, December 16, 1940.

5. These hearings were held on January 12, 13, and 14, 1943.
The record was never published.

6. New York Herald Tribune, January 14, 1943, p. 14:2.

7. Electrical Transcription Mfrs., 16 War Lab. Rep. 369, June
15, 1944; the decision of the NWLB to take jurisdiction
was made on July 20, 1943, 10 War Lab. Rep. 157.

8. Interference with Broadcasting of Noncommercial Educa-
tional Programs, Hearings before the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives,
1945 (79th Congress, 1st Session), p. 16.

9. Time, November 20, 1944, p. 21.

10. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Amer-
ican Federation of Musicians, 1951, pp. 128-29.

11. Ibid., 1949, p. 145.

Chapter IX

1. New York Times, July 21, 1942, p. 15:2.

2. International Musician, January 1944, p. 10.

3. New York Times, February 9, 1945, p. 17:6.

4. Ibid., February 24, 1945, p. 13:3.

5. Interference with Broadcasting of Noncommercial Educa-
tional Programs, Hearings before the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 1945

(79th Congress, 1st Session) .

6. New York Times, December 15, 1940, p. 1:2.

7. Ibid., April 21, 1944, p. 1:2.

8. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume
92, p. 1553.

9. 60 Stat. 89, April 16, 1946.

10. New York Times, May 29, 1946, p. 4:4.

11. Ibid., June 5, 1946, p. 14:1.

12. Ibid., December 3, 1946, p. 34:2.

13. Ibid., June 24, 1947, p. 5:6, 7.

14. The District Court handed down its decision on December
2, 1946 in United States v. Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845; the
Supreme Court ruled on June 23, 1947 in United States v.
Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1.

15. United States v. Petrillo, 75 F. Supp. 176, January 14, 1948.

16. New York Times, June 10, 1947, p. 1:6. Another version

194

of the threat, less favorable to Petrillo, is given by Welling-
ton Roe. See Juggernaut, p. 212.
17. The code is reproduced in a Congressional document. See
Restrictive Union Practices of the American Federation of
Musicians, Hearings before the Committee on Education
and Labor, House of Representatives, 1948 (80th Congress,
2nd Session) , pp. 363-65.

Chapter X

1. 61 Stat. 136, 157-58, section 302(c) (5), June 23, 1947.

2. National Labor Relations Board v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331
U.S. 398, 403, May 19, 1947.

3. New York Times, June 4, 1946, p. 18:3.

4. Ibid., July 25, 1948, II, 5:1.

5. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Amer-
ican Federation of Musicians, 1949, pp. 103-4.

6. The various contracts with the recording and transcription
companies and the legal opinions of the government officials
are included ibid., pp. 152-86.

7. International Musician, July 1949, pp. 11-12.

8. New York Times, October 25, 1945, p. 23:4.

9. International Musician, April 1951, pp. 16, 33.

10. The various contracts may be found in Official Proceedings
of the Annual Convention of the American Federation of
Musicians, 1951, pp. 94-123. See also International Musician,
July 1950, p. 7 and New York Times, June 10, 1951, II, 3:1
and June 18, 1950, II, 13:6.

11. Investigation of James C. Petrillo and the American Federa-
tion of Musicians, House of Representatives, Report No.
1162, December 15, 1947 (80th Congress, 1st Session), p. 6.

12. Investigation of James C. Petrillo, the American Federa-
tion of Musicians, et ah, Hearings before the Special Sub-
committee of the Committee on Education and Labor,
House of Representatives, 1947 (80th Congress, 1st Session) ,
p. 185.

13. Ibid., p. 260.

14. Investigation of James C. Petrillo and the American Federa-
tion of Musicians, op. cit., p. 12.

15. Restrictive Union Practices of the American Federation of
Musicians, Hearings before the Committee on Education
and Labor, House of Representatives, 1948 (80th Congress,
2nd Session), p. 114.

195

16. Ibid., p. 361.

17. Ibid., p. 216.

18. Ibid., p. 101.

19. New York Times, January 10, 1950, p. 1:6 and January 11,
1950, p. 11:1.

Chapter XI

1. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Amer-
can Federation of Musicians, 1950, p. 92.

2. International Musician, August 1950, pp. 7, 34.

3. 35 Stat. 1075-76, March 4, 1909.

4. Stuart Chase, Men and Machines, 1929, p. 335.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Sources

Business Week

International Musician

Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater New York, Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians, Official Journal, Allegro

New York Times

New York Times Index

Newsweek

Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the American
Federation of Musicians

Time

Books

Carpenter, Paul S., Music, an Art and a Business, 1950 (Chap-
ter 7-In Union There Is Petrillo, pp. 137-49)

Roe, Wellington, Juggernaut, 1948 (Chapter 16— G-Clef Caesar,
pp. 205-19)

Twentieth Century Fund, How Collective Bargaining Works,
1942 (Chapter 15— Chicago Service Trades by C. Lawrence
Christenson: section 4, The Musicians of Chicago, pp. 848-66,
868)

Government Documents

Electrical Transcription Mfrs., June 15, 1944, 16 War Lab. Rep.

369-99
Interference with Broadcasting of Noncommercial Educational

Programs, Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and

Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 79 Congress,

1 Session, February 22, 23, May 8, 10, 1945
Investigation of James C. Petrillo and the American Federation

of Musicians, House of Representatives, Report No. 1162,

80 Congress, 1 Session, December 15, 1947
Investigation of James C. Petrillo, the American Federation of

Musicians, et ah, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee

of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Repre-

197

sentatives, 80 Congress, 1 Session, June 17, 18, 19, July 7, 8,
August 4, 5, 6, 7, 1947

Investigation of So-Called "Rackets/' Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on Commerce, United States
Senate, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Volume II, Part 1, January
31, 1934

Prohibiting Certain Coercive Practices Affecting Radio Broad-
casting, House of Representatives, Report No. 1508, 79 Con-
gress, 2 Session, January 29, 1946; Part 2 (minority views) ,
February 8, 1946

Restrictive Union Practices of the American Federation of Musi-
cians, Hearings before the Committee on Education and
Labor, House of Representatives, 80 Congress, 2 Session, Jan-
uary 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 1948

Use of Mechanical Reproduction of Music, Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce,
United States Senate, 77 Congress, 2 Session, September 17,
18, 21, 1942

Magazine Articles

Beatty, Jerome, "Hard-Boiled Maestro," American Magazine,
October 1940, pp. 30-31, 130-31

Commons, John R., "Types of American Labor Unions— The
Musicians of St. Louis and New York," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, May 1906, pp. 419-42

Coughlan, Robert, "Petrillo," Life, August 3, 1942, pp. 68-70,
72, 74, 76

Countryman, Vern, "The Organized Musicians," University of
Chicago Law Review, Autumn 1948, pp. 56-85 and Winter
1949, pp. 239-297

Dennis, Bruce, "He Was Always Good at Arithmetic," The
Saturday Evening Post, October 12, 1940, pp. 12-13, 49-50,
52, 57

Lunde, Anders S., "The American Federation of Musicians and
the Recording Ban," Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1948,
pp. 45-56

Markey, Morris, "What Petrillo's Victory Means to You," Lib-
erty, May 19, 1945, pp. 24-25, 68-69

Parsons, Geoffrey, Jr. and Robert M. Yoder, "Petrillo: Musso-
lini of Music," The American Mercury, November 1940, pp.
281-87

Pegler, Westbrook, "Thieves with Union Cards," Collier's, Jan-
uary 9, 1943, pp. 21, 30

"Petrillo, James Caesar," Current Biography, 1940, pp. 650-52

INDEX

Actor, 9, 86-88
Actors Equity, 88

Admission policy, 18, 21, 99, 108, 179
Allegro, 98-99, 107-108
American Association of School Ad-
ministrators, 162, 177
American Federation of Labor, 14-
16, 19-20, 24, 32, 49, 72, 84, 86-
89, 107, 113, 115, 118, 133, 153,
160, 181
American Federation of Musicians,
19-23, 25, 45-46, 181-183;
Boston Symphony, 119-131;
consolidation, 26-41;
finances, 64-65;
formation, 16-17;
Interlochen dispute, 149-163;
locals, 94-111;

membership, 56, 64, 80, 95;
organization and administration,

75-93;
Petrillo runs for office, 48;
radio, 143-146;
record ban in 1942, 132-141, 146-

148;
record ban in 1948, 164-169;
rival unionism, 43, 113-119;
second World War, 142-143;
technology, 54-61, 66-71, 164-180,
183-187
American Federation of Radio Art-
ists, 115, 159
American Guild of Musical Artists,

84, 113-119, 131
American Guild of Variety Artists,

86-88
American Musician, 21
American Musicians Union, 43, 45
49;
Petrillo joins, 44
American Society of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers, 68, 126
Anti-Petrillo Act (see Lea Act)
Arbitration, 63
Armstrong, Edwin PL, 169
Arnold, Thurman, 133

Asch, Leonard L., 179

Associated Actors and Artists of

America, 118-119
Associated Musicians of Greater New

York, 95, 110

Bagley, Charles L., 48
Baltimore local, 13, 23
Band, 9, 21-22, 24, 27, 47, 81, 104-

105, 142, 150;
name, 27, 91, 134, 144, 167
Bartholdt, Richard, 39
Beissenherz, Henry D., 13, 17
Benny, Jack, 159
Bevin, Ernest, 98
Biddle, Francis, 133
Block, Martin, 143
Bonaparte, Charles J., 39
Bookers, 79, 81, 87, 93, 103, 117, 144,

178
Borge, Victor, 87
Boston local, 14, 23
Boston Symphony Orchestra, 34, 113,

119-131
Bowes, Edward, 155
Bremer, Alexander, 29-30
Brown, Clarence J., 139, 154
Browne, George E., 53
Burroughs, Julius C, 134
Byrnes, James F., 139

Cabot, Frederick P., 122-123
Canadian musicians, 24, 36, 40, 77-

78, 93, 142-146
Canavan, Edward M., 96
Carothers, Frank, 26
Carroll, Earl, 176, 178
Cermak, Anton J., 46, 48
Chase, Stuart, 187
Chavez, Carlos, 127
Chicago local, 13-14, 42-53, 62, 68,
73, 85, 143, 173-174;

administration, 51-52;

controversy, 22, 43;

formation of local 10, 43;

Negroes, 43

199

Chicago Musicians Club, 43
Cincinnati local, 14, 20-21
Civil Liberties Union, 160
Clark, D. Worth, 75, 132, 136
Clark, Tom C, 133
Closed shop, 25, 99, 121, 135, 151
Collective bargaining, 24;
local union, 99-105;
national union, 81-84
Colonization, 36-37
Communists, 58, 91, 97-98
Conductor, 24, 57, 93, 102, 114, 119,

128
Congress of Industrial Organizations,

49, 154
Congressional investigation, 96, 152-

154, 158, 162, 176-180
Contract labor law, 33, 35-36, 41,

119, 122, 130
Contractor, 12, 24, 102
Coolidge, Calvin, 39-40, 46
Copyright legislation, 184-185
Coughlin, Charles E., 92
Cox, James M., 67
Creatore, Giuseppe, 27, 35
Crosby, Bing, 159
Curley, James M., 121

Damrosch, Walter, 34, 121, 152
Dane, Ernest B., 128-129
Darrow, Clarence, 46
Davis, Elmer, 132
Dawes, Charles G., 46
Denver local, 20;

controversy, 22, 43
Des Moines local, 92
Detroit local, 14
Dondero, George A., 160
Dorsey, Tommy, 51

Edison, Thomas A., 54
Elman, Mischa, 115

Featherbedding (See Standby)

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 160

Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 67, 134, 139, 144, 152, 169,
171, 173

Federal Radio Commission, 67

Feinberg, William, 100

Field, Marshall, 3d, 127

Flagstad, Kirsten, 116

Fly, James L., 134

Fradkin, Frederic, 123

Frequency modulation, 164, 169-172,

174-175, 179, 183
Frullate, Marie, 52
Furtwaengler, Wilhelm, 92

Gallup poll, 134
Gompers, Samuel, 16, 39
Goodman, Al, 157

Green, William, 49, 84, 87, 118, 148,
153, 157

Hanson, Howard, 127

Harding, Warren G., 39, 67

Hartley, Fred A., Jr., 176, 178

Heifetz, Jascha, 114-115, 139

Herbert, Victor, 27

Higginson, Henry L., 119-123, 128-

129
Hitler, Adolph, 122
Hoffman, Clare E., 76, 179
Hofmann, Josef, 116
Hope, Bob, 159
Horner, Henry, 48
Hotel, 46, 71, 104, 144, 182
Howard, Willie, 49

Immigration, 32-33, 91, 130
Initiation fee, 18, 90, 109
Injunction, 16, 25, 46, 86, 104, 116,

133
Interlochen dispute, 150-163, 176
Intermezzo, 52
International Alliance of Theatrical

Stage Employees, 53, 84, 88, 119
International Musician, 78, 89-90,

183
Iturbi, Jose, 115
Iucci, Charles R., 96

Jones, Spike, 87

Judd, George, 128

Juke box, 66, 70, 104, 135, 137, 141,

166, 183-185
Jurisdictional disputes, 82-88, 113-

119, 182

Kearns, Carroll D„ 162, 176-177
Kelly, Edward J., 48
Kickback, 102-103
Knights of Labor, 14-15
Koussevitzky, Serge, 124-125, 127-130
Kreisler, Fritz, 116

200

La Buy, Walter J., 160-161

La Guardia, Fiorello H., 126, 150

Labor Management Relations Act

(see Taft-Hartley Act)
Lavelli, Tony, 87
Lea, Clarence F., 158
Lea Act, 50, 144, 146, 158-165, 176-

177, 182;
provisions, 158-159
Leaders, 13, 91, 93, 102-103, 185
League of New York Theaters, 100-

102
Lewis, John L., 49-50, 146
Lilienthal, David, 46
Living Music Day, 61
Local unions, 94-111;

finances, 89
Los Angeles local, 58, 82, 143, 167,

173-174, 176-178

Maddy, Joseph E., 151, 153-154, 161-

163, 176
Madison, James, 38
Marcantonio, Vito, 158
Mayer, William L., 48
McCann, Richard, 98
Metal Polishers Union, 84-85
Middle Ages, 9, 93
Miller, Owen, 16, 19-20, 41, 76
Milwaukee local, 14
Monroe, Vaughn, 87
Monteux, Pierre, 124
Motion Picture Internationals' Com-
mittee, 84
Motion Picture Producers Associa-
tion, 175
Motion pictures, 47-48, 54-61, 172,
181, 186;
industry, 82-84
Muck, Karl, 121-124
Music Defense League, 60
Music Educators National Confer-
ence, 150, 162, 177
Music performance trust fund, 105,

148, 167-168, 175, 184, 186
Musical Mutual Protective Union of

New York, 17, 28-32, 34
Musicians, 83, 93;
nineteenth century, 9-11;
nonprofessional, 12, 151;
professional, 10-12, 14-15, 27, 33,

71, 90, 105-106, 151-152, 186;
semiprofessional, 12;

unemployment, 47, 61-66, 88, 136,

163, 173, 177, 184-186;
unionization, 10, 12;
wages, 12, 17, 57, 81;
working conditions. 11-12, 27-28,
99
Mussolini, Benito, 46
Mutual Musical Corporation, 32
Muzak Corporation, 70-71, 104

National Association of Broadcast En-
gineers and Technicians, 85-86
National Association of Broadcasters,

134, 149
National Labor Relations Act (see

Wagner Act)
National Labor Relations Board, 85-

86, 101, 104, 145
National League of Musicians, 15-17,
23, 28, 38, 95;
formation, 14;
weaknesses, 18-19
National Music Camp (see Inter-

lochen dispute)
National Musical Association, 14
National Recovery Administration,

62-63
National War Labor Board, 137-139,

142, 157
Negroes, 43, 92-93, 107
New York local, 13-14, 17-18, 23, 62,
71, 167, 169, 173-174;
administration, 96-99;
collective bargaining, 99-105, 143;
consolidation, 94-99;
finances, 108-110;
local 802 chartered, 31;
membership, 106;
struggle with the AFM, 28-32;
unemployment, 105-108
Nixon, Richard M., 177
Nonunion musicians, 18, 23, 25, 64,
99, 107, 154, 182;
amateurs, 37, 50, 149-154, 159;
children, 37, 47, 50, 93;
foreign, 32-37, 120;
military, 37-40, 155, 162, 178
Norris-La Guardia Act, 86

Official Journal (see Allegro)
Owens, Thomas L., 179

Padway, Joseph A., 75

201

Pecora, Ferdinand, 115
Pegler, Westbrook, 42
Pershing, John J., 40
Petrillo, Caesar J., 44
Petrillo, James C, 62, 69, 85, 87, 92,
97-98, 103-104, 108;

AGMA dispute, 113-119;

Boston Symphony dispute, 126-129,
131;

Chicago local, 45-48, 50-53, 112;

dispute with John L. Lewis, 49-50;

early life, 42-45;

frequency modulation, 170-171;

Interlochen dispute, 149-163;

national politics, 48, 183:

power, 75-76, 112;

radio, 145-146;

record ban in 1942, 132-141;

recordings, 68, 112-113, 147-148,
165-167;

relation to Congress, 176-179;

second World War, 141-142;

stature, 181-183;

succeeds Weber, 73-74;

technology, 60;

television, 172-173;

vice president of AFL, 181
Petrillo, James J., 52
Petrillo, Leroy, 52
Petrillo, Lester, 52
Petrillo, Marie, 52
Philadelphia local, 13-14, 23, 34-35
Pinza, Ezio, 116
Pittsburgh local, 23
Polish-American Musicians Union, 49
Pons, Lily, 115
Porter, Paul A., 139, 171
Price list, 13, 37, 100
Prohibition era, 27, 64
Pryor, Arthur, 27
Puerto Rico local, 76

Quorum Club, 30-31

Rabaud, Henri, 124
Rabin, Benjamin J., 158
Rachmaninoff, Sergei, 116
Radio, 45-47, 55, 82, 110, 136-137, 140,
149-150, 164, 181, 185-186;

cooperative programs, 175;

employment, 154-158;

recordings, 66-70
Ream, Joseph H., 53

Records, 54-55, 66-70, 82;

ban in 1942, 132-141;

ban in 1948, 164-169
Reed, James A., 39
Relief, 62-63, 109-110
Richberg, Donald, 46
Rival unions, 18, 23, 25, 37, 43, 46,

49
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 102, 150
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 48, 62, 72,

133, 139, 142
Roosevelt, Theodore, 35, 38
Rosenbaum, Samuel R., 168
Rothafel, Samuel L., 56

St. Louis local, 12-13, 19-20, 58

Screen Actors Guild, 115

Seattle local, 20

Shaw, Artie, 87, 157

Sheridan, Philip, 38

Sinatra, Frank, 159

Social security taxes, 90-91

Sousa, John P., 27

Spalding, Albert, 116-117

Standby, 50, 102, 104, 144-145, 149-

150, 155, 158, 163-164, 177
Steuer, Aron, 116
Stock, Frederick, 152
Strike, 24, 30-31, 45-46, 49, 57, 79,
87, 92, 123-124, 157, 159-160, 168,
174, 186;

benefits, 90, 110;

records, 68;

sit-in, 66;

sympathy, 88
Studio Basic Agreement, 84
Swarthout, Gladys, H5-116
Symphony orchestra, 9, 28, 34-35, 57,

82, 114, 119-131, 134, 142
Szigeti, Joseph, 127

Taft, Robert A., 92

Taft-Hartley Act, 50, 86, 92, 101,

104, 145, 164-165, 167-168, 178
Teamsters, 84, 107-108
Technology, 41, 88, 113, 183-187;

frequency modulation, 169-172;

radio, 142-146;

records, 132-141, 164-169;

sound films, 54-61;

television, 172-176
Television, 164, 172-176, 183-186
Templeton, Alec, 51

202

Theaters, 31, 45, 47, 49-50, 53, 173,
182;

local bargaining, 100-102;

organization by musicians, 54, 56
Tibbett, Lawrence, 114-115
Transfer law, 22-23, 31, 36-37, 107
Truman, Harry S., 148, 158, 177, 179

Union Labor Life Insurance Com-
pany, 109

United Mine Workers, 49, 146-147

United Nations, 146

United States Conciliation Service,
137

Vacations, 106, 174

Vallee, Rudy, 159

Van, Gus, 87

Vandenberg, Arthur H., 152-154, 160

Vinson, Fred M., 138-139

Walsh, J. Raymond, 154
Walter, Bruno, 127
War Production Board, 139
WTeaver, Chauncey A., 138
Weber, Joseph N., 30-32, 39, 68-69,
76, 96, 112-113, 115, 120, 122,
163, 181-182;

assumption of presidency, 21-24;

criticizes Petrillo, 73, 112;

early life, 20;

health, 26, 72;

later life, 71-74;

praises Petrillo, 48;

sound films, 56-60
WTheeler, Burton K., 132, 136
Wilson, Woodrow, 39
Winkler, Joseph F., 45
Woll, J. Albert, 160
Woll, Matthew, 160
Work Projects Administration, 63, 92

Wagner Act, 85-86
Wallace, Henry A., 153

Zimbalist, Efrem, 115, 127